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ARTICLES

AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF LAWYER
REGULATION: WHO SHOULD CONTROL
LAWYER REGULATION-COURTS,
LEGISLATURES, OR THE MARKET?
Benjamin H. Barton*
The litany of the legal profession's woes is now so well-known as
to verge on the prosaic. The legal profession, while always unpopular,' has reached new lows in the public's esteem.2 Lawyers,

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. B.A. 1991,
Haverford College; J.D. 1996, University of Michigan. The author gives special thanks to
Indya Kincannon, Deborah Rhode, Theodore Schneyer, George Schatzki, Judy Cornett, Carol
Parker, Dwight Aarons, Doug Blaze, and the Honorable Diana Gribbon Motz. I would also
like to thank the participants in faculty presentations at the University of Tennessee College
of Law, the Arizona State University College of Law, the John Marshall Law School, and the
Law College at Michigan State University.
' See, e.g., JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 47 (1978) (quoting John Quincy

Adams as stating in 1787, "The mere title of lawyer is sufficient to deprive a man of public
confidence.... The popular odium which has been excited against the practitioners in this
Commonwealth prevails to so great a degree that the most innocent and irreproachable life
cannot guard a lawyer against the hatred of his fellow citizens."); Leonard E. Gross, The
Public Hates Lawyers: Why Should We Care?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1405, 1407-20 (1999)
(furnishing lengthy history of lawyer unpopularity in America); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The
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academics, and judges all complain about lawyer competency 3 and
decency,4 and lawyers themselves are increasingly unhappy with
their profession.5 The regulation of lawyerss-via barriers to entry

Good That Lawyers Do, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 7, 7-8 (2000) (providing short history of
lawyer unpopularity).
' See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public
Opinion, Jokes and PoliticalDiscourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 809 (1998) 'When, in 1991,
a national sample was asked to volunteer 'what profession or type of worker do you trust the
least,' lawyers were far and away the most frequent response. Almost as many (23%)
spontaneously volunteered lawyers as the next two categories (car salesman, 13%, politicians,
11%) combined."); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Legal Professionand the PublicImage of Lawyers,
23 J. LEGAL PROF. 51, 53 (1999) (noting negative public perception of lawyers); Public
Opinion,CIN. ENQUIRER, Nov. 21, 1999, at A2 (reporting that lawyers rank among "[t]he three
professions that have lost the most in the ratings over the last 10 years" in public opinion poll
regarding ethics and honesty in various professions).
I See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 158-68 (2000); see also Warren
E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Trainingand Certification of
Advocates Essentialto Our System of Justice?,42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 234 (1973) (stating
that "fo]ne.third to one-half of the lawyers who appear in the serious cases are not really
qualified"); Bryant G. Garth, Rethinking the Legal Profession'sApproach to Collective SelfImprovement: Competence and the ConsumerProspective, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 639,639-40 ("No
one with any practical experience would deny the superficiality and shoddiness of much legal
work, nor would anyone claim that the bar's institutions of quality control have provided
effective means of self-regulation in the past."); Edward D. Re, The Causes of Popular
DissatisfactionWith the Legal Profession,68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 85,110-13 (1994) (discussing
continuing problems with attorney competence); Deborah L. Rhode, The Rhetoric of
ProfessionalReform, 45 MD. L. REV. 274, 288-90 (1986) (discussing ongoing debate over
attorney competence); William W. Schwarzer, Dealingwith Incompetent Counsel-The Trial
Judge's Role, 93 HARV. L. REv. 633, 634 (1980) C'[S]urveys indicate that judges rate the
overall performance of around one-tenth of the lawyers appearing before them as less than
adequate and prejudicial to their client's cause."); Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., To What Extent
Can a Disciplinary Code Assure the Competence of Lawyers, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1211, 1214
(1988) (same). See generallyAMERICAN BARASSN, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE (1983) (detailing two years of findings
regarding attorney competence).
' See, e.g., PAULG. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE AS THEY Do 80-105 (1998) (noting
lack ofcommon decency among lawyers and blaming increased competition); SOLM. LINOWITZ
& MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH

CENTURY 192 (1994) (noting that many attorneys believe that "zealously representing clients
means pushing all rules of ethics and decency to the limit"); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Honor as
a Deficient Aspirationfor "theHonorableProfession": The Lawyer as Nostromo, 69 FORDHAM
L. REV. 859, 860 (2000) ('[The legal profession] (or at least many of its members) is not
honorable.").
' See, e.g., David A. Kessler, ProfessionalAsphyxiation: Why the Legal Profession is
Gaspingfor Breath, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 455, 457-77 (1997) (delineating some causes of
lawyer unhappiness); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash in the Qualityof Life in the Law:
Changes in the Economics, Diversificationand Organizationof Lawyering, 44 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 621, 623-24 (1994) (describing some of changes to legal practice and their maligning
effects upon the "quality of life and work environments of lawyers"); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics
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such as the bar exam and the character and fitness process, and via
the rules of conduct and disciplinary apparatus-is doing little to
remedy these difficulties and may exacerbate the problem.7 There
is growing scholarly accord that regulating lawyers is designed as
much, or more, to benefit lawyers than to protect the public.8 Public

in Practice,in ETHICS INPRACTICE 4-8 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000) (detailing economics of
legal practice, and its deleterious effect on lawyer happiness); Patrick J. Schlitz, On Being a
Happy, Healthy, and EthicalMember of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession,
52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 888-906 (1999) (explaining poor health and unhappiness of lawyers);
Charles Silver & Frank B. Cross, What's Not to Like About Being a Lawyer?, 109 YALE L.J.
1443, 1443-46 (2000) (reviewing ARTHUR L. L IMAN, LAWYER: A LIFE OF COUNSEL AND
CONTROVERSY (1998), and depicting and partially debunking claims of lawyer unhappiness).
' When referring to "regulation," this Article refers to the administrative rules that
govern the conduct of existing lawyers and the rules that govern entry into the practice.
These rules certainly are not the only determinants of lawyer behavior, both the common law
claims of legal malpractice and abuse of process, see generally John Leubsdorf, Legal
MalpracticeandProfessionalResponsibility, 48 RUTGERsL. REV. 101 (1995), and the informal
behavioral norms of attorneys, see generally W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the
Legal Profession: Social Norms in ProfessionalCommunities, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955 (2001),
influence and control lawyers.
' A short overview of lawyer regulation, both of entry and conduct, along with cites to
some of the various criticisms of this regulation scheme, is included as an Appendix to this
Article. See infra notes 298-308 and accompanying text. If the reader needs convincing that
lawyer regulation is more self-interested than public spirited, please refer to this Appendix,
or see generally Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic
Analysis of the Justificationsfor Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429 (2001).
' The scholarly work in this area takes many forms. Some have taken an overarching
view and argued that the system as a whole favors lawyers. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL,
AMERICAN LAWYERS 142-65 (1989) (examining critically past, present, and future of American
lawyer regulation); JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 3-129 (1976) (arguing that legal
regulation has favored social and racial elites); RHODE, supranote 3, at 143-83 (2000) (finding
lawyer self-interest in almost all aspects of attorney regulation). Some scholars have
criticized particular portions oflegal regulation as self-interested. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel,
Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3-9 (1998) (arguing that confidentiality
rules are structured primarily for benefit of lawyers); Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About
When We Talked About Ethics: A CriticalView of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 27072 (1985) (arguing that conflict of interest rules favor interests of legal profession over public
interest); Michael K. McChrystal, A Structural Analysis of the Good Moral Character
Requirement for Bar Admission, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 67, 67-100 (1984) (illustrating
applications of Bar character requirement, and finding requirement irregularly applied);
Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Characteras a Professional Credential,94 YALE L.J. 491, 507-46
(1985) (arguing that character and fitness requirement for bar admission is of little use and
aimed primarily at assisting lawyers). I have previously compared the various justifications-such as addressing market failures or protecting lawyer independence-for regulating
the legal market against the regulations themselves, and established that much of the
regulation cannot be justified and exists primarily for the benefit of lawyers. See generally
Barton, supranote 7.
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interest groups,' judges, 0 and even the ABA" have questioned the
efficacy of lawyer regulation. The proposals for reform have ranged
from the ongoing (and largely ineffective) bar association "professionalism" crusade, 2 to more thoughtful treatments of lawyers' ethical
duties and place in American society.'"

9 See, e.g., SHARON TISHER ET AL., BRINGING THE BAR TO JUSTICE 86-117 (1977)

(surveying dismal lawyer discipline rates of six bar associations); Overlawyered.com, About
This Site, at http://www.overlawyered.com/pages/aboutus.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2003)
(describing mission and activities of Overlawyered Group); HALT: An Organization of
Americans for Legal Reform, Lawyer Accountability Project, at http://www.halt.org/laphome.
php (last visited Apr. 4, 2003) (criticizing lawyer regulation and stating HALT's goal of ending
lawyer self-regulation).
"0 Consider, for example, Chief Justice Burger's well-publicized criticisms of lawyer
regulation. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism,63 FORDHAM L. REV.
949, 950 (1995) (arguing that failure to appropriately sanction professional misconduct by
lawyers has led to decline in public esteem of lawyers); George M. Gold, Burger Urges Reform
of Lawyer Discipline, BAR LEADER, May-June 1984, at 29 (same).
11 See CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, LAWYER REGULATION FOR
A NEW CENTURY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCE-

MENT 11 (1992) [hereinafter MCKAY REPORT) ("Existing regulation, while generally effective
in disciplining serious misconduct, does not adequately protect the public from lawyer
incompetence and neglect."); SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT,
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 1

(1970) [hereinafter CLARK REPORT] (describing state of lawyer discipline as "scandalous
situation").
"2 See Samuel J. Levine, Faith in Legal Professionalism: Believers and Heretics,61 MD.
L. REV. 217, 226 (2002) (outlining professionalism movement, and describing it as akin to
religious faith). See generally Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter'sCommentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259 (1995) (describing and critiquing professionalism
movement); W. Bradley Wendel, Morality, Motivation, and the ProfessionalismMovement,
52 S.C. L. REV. 557 (2001) (same).
"' Deborah Rhode's excellent and comprehensive In the Interests ofJustice, for example,
suggests both a philosophical realignment of the profession towards the ideal of justice, and
nuts-and-bolts regulatory reform. RHODE, supra note 3, at 207-13; see also MARY ANN
GLENDON, ANATION UNDER LAWYERS 280-94 (1994) (evincing confidence that legal profession
will survive its current malaise); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 375-81 (1993)
(expressing hope that profession can return to "lawyer-statesman" model); DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERSAND JUSTICE, at xxiv (1988) ("[P]rovid[ing] a eulogy" and praising"progressive public
interest lawyers."); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OFJUSTICE 195-215 (1998) (advocating
shift in lawyer roles toward justice and away from zealous advocacy). Others have more
explicitly focused on the ins and outs of lawyer regulation. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 8,at
142-65 (presenting exhaustive study of history and current nature of lawyer regulation);
Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice
System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 963-82 (2000) (theorizing on operation of market for legal
services); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A FunctionalPerspectiveon Professional
Codes, 59 TEX L. REV. 689, 689-720 (1981) (assessing American Bar Association Rules of
Professional Conduct); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV.
799, 822-47 (1992) (contrasting various institutions that enforce lawyer regulations).
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Given the existence of a regulatory problem, this Article assesses
lawyer regulation from the top down. Utilizing the tools of comparative institutional study and the economic analysis of law, this
Article compares the strengths and weaknesses of the various
institutions that could control the regulation of lawyers and tries to
locate some of the problems at their source. 4 Currently, state
supreme courts govern the regulation of lawyers in all fifty states, 5
" Given a problematic regulatory outcome, administrative law scholars suggest a close
analysis of the regulatory process to determine what changes, if any, might improve the
regulatory output. See, e.g., NICHOLASMERCURO&STEVENG.MEDEMA, ECONOMICSANDTHE
LAW 121-23 (1997) (describing comparative institutional approach to legal-economic analysis);
Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation:. Incorporatingthe Administrative Process, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1998) C"[Flocusing on the administrative process reveals that procedural
reforms of the regulatory state's decisionmaking apparatus may very well go far to answer
criticisms about the inevitability of regulatory failure."). This Article compares the various
institutions that might govern lawyer regulation, i.e., the institutions that could create the
policies governing the market and then delegate their enforcement. See infra notes 30-308
and accompanying text. The questions of rule-making covered here were explicitly eschewed
in Professor Wilkins' ground-breaking article discussing who should enforce the existing rules
governing lawyer conduct. See Wilkins, supra note 13, at 810:
[lit is necessary to assume a single set of rules that will be interpreted
and applied by all enforcement officials. Because the ABA's Model Rules
of Professional Conduct and Model Code of Professional Responsibility
continue to constitute the most influential sources of professional norms,
I assume that all enforcement officials agree that lawyers can only be
sanctioned for conduct proscribed in one of these two documents.
Id.
" See MCKAY REPORT, supra note 11, at 2 (Croday, judicial regulation of lawyers is a
principle firmly established in every state."); SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE
BAR, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 116 (1992) ('[J]udicial regulation ofall lawyers is a principle firmly
established today in every state. Today the highest courts of the several states are the
gatekeepers to the profession both as to competency and as to character and fitness.");
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 24 (1986) (stating that state supreme court
regulation "covers every aspect of the practice of law, 'starting with admission, ending with
disbarment and covering everything in between'" (quoting In re LiVolsi, 428 A.2d 1268, 1272
(N.J. 1981))); Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of ProfessionalConduct Should Govern Lawyers
in Federal Court and How Should the Rules be Created?,64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460, 462 &
n. 7 (1996) (stating that "the oversight oflawyers has been predominantly a judicial function");
Eric H. Steele & Raymond T. Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients and ProfessionalRegulation, 1976
Am.B. FOUND. RES. J. 917, 921-24 ("The regulation of the legal profession is primarily under
the control of state supreme courts."). Both state legislatures and federal regulatory agencies
are beginning to involve themselves more in lawyer regulation. For a description of the
recent uptick in state legislative activity in lawyer regulation, see infra notes 287-94 and
accompanying text. For a description of the activities of federal agencies in lawyer regulation,
see Peter C. Kostant, Sacred Cows or Cash Cows: The Abuse of Rhetoric in Justifying Some
Current Norms of TransactionalLawyering, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 49, 64 (2001) ("[The
organized bar has complained that the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Office
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but a full institutional analysis must consider the strengths and
weaknesses of several other potential institutions, including other
judicial bodies (e.g., district courts or the United States Supreme
Court), state legislatures or Congress, or deregulation (allowing the
market, with ex post tort remedies, to dictate lawyer entry and
conduct).

16

There are several reasons why this analysis is particularly
appropriate. First, given the general dissatisfaction with lawyer
regulation, it is useful to study the problem from its root causes.
Second, while challenging state supreme court control of lawyer
regulation may seem counterintuitive or even heretical today, state
supreme courts have not always controlled lawyer regulation. In
fact, during the mid-nineteenth century, state legislatures set the
general requirements for bar admission, and district courts
generally governed the administration of admissions. 7
of Thrift Supervision have sometimes gone too far in demanding candor from lawyers.");
Richard W. Painter, Game Theoretic and ContractarianParadigmsin the Uneasy Relationship Between Regulatorsand Regulatory Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 153-200 (1996)
(depicting incentives of lawyers and regulators in regulation of lawyers); Wilkins, supranote
13, at 807-08 & n.30 (delineating agency attempts to regulate lawyers).
" There has been a recent scholarly reinvigoration of institutional analysis. See
generally NEIL K KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (1994) (arguing that institutional
analysis is critical, and frequently missing, aspect of legal scholarship); Daniel H. Cole, The
Importance of Being Comparative, 33 IND. L. REV. 921 (2000) (promoting importance of
institutional analysis); Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse,
and the Microanalysisof Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996) (contending that "the
new legal process" could serve as unifying theme for fractured scholarly discourses). This
trend has its historical roots in the "legal process" movement spearheaded by Professors Hart
and Sacks. See generally HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (William

Eskridge & Philip Frickey eds., 1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The
Making of the Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031 (1994). Legal scholarship is not alone
in a renewed emphasis on institutional analysis; a "new institutionalism" has taken hold in
both political science and economics. See, e.g., WENDELL GORDON, INSTITUTIONALECONOMICS
3-33 (1980); SVETOZAR PEJOVICH, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS AND SYSTEMS 23-47
(2d ed. 1998); B. GUY PETERS, INSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE "NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM" 1-25 (1999); Kathleen Thelen & Sven Steinmo, HistoricalInstitutionalism
in ComparativePolitics,in STRUCTURING POLITICS 1-32 (Sven Steinmo et al. eds., 1992). For
a creative recent application of"the new institutionalism" by a legal scholar, see generally Ian
F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial
Discrimination,109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000) (describing how racism arises unknowingly from
series of "institutional" and cognitive sources).
'7 See JAMESWiLLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OFAMERICANLAW: THE LAWMAKERS 278-79
(1950) ("From colonial days on, statutes set down at least the general form of requirements
for admission to the bar."); Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts to Regulate
the Practiceof Law: An HistoricalAnalysis, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 525, 533 (1983) (stating that in
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From the late-nineteenth century forward, state supreme courts
began to claim an inherent judicial authority to regulate the practice
of law as an outgrowth of the constitutional separation of powers
between the legislative and judicial branches. 8 Using this inherent
judicial authority, many state supreme courts barred both district
courts and state legislatures from regulating lawyers until state
supreme courts alone governed."i The question, however, is whether
state supreme courts are the most effective body to control lawyer
regulation. The few commentators who have addressed this
question have approached it as a matter of doctrine, i.e., whether
the "inherent authority" claimed by state supreme courts is a proper
reading of state constitutional law,2" or have treated the topic
majority of states in mid-nineteenth century, courts "were content to consider individual cases
and let the legislature set general rules"); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of
"Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV.433, 465-68 (1993) (describing colonial
and postrevolutionary licensing statutes, and illustrating that in colonial era, responsibility
for regulating lawyers was largely shared by colonial courts and legislatures); Leslie C. Levin,
The Emperor's Clothesand Other Tales About the Standardsfor ImposingLawyer Discipline
Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 60 n.267 (1998) (noting historical involvement of legislatures);
Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a Historyof the Legalizationof American Legal Ethics-lIThe
Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 211 (2002) ("The prevalence of legislative
regulation oflawyers remained the accepted arrangement throughout much of the nineteenth
century.").
IS See Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Ikner, 438 S.E.2d 613, 616 (W. Va. 1993) (citing
proposition that courts have inherent authority to regulate lawyers); UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE HANDBOOK 3 (Justine Fischer & Dorothy H. Lachmann eds., 1972) (asserting that
because of separation of powers "the power to define and regulate the practice of law has been
regarded as a judicial rather than a legislative function"); Alpert, supra note 17, at 536-51
(delineating history of courts claiming inherent power to regulate lawyers); Theresa A.
Gabaldon, The Self-Regulation of CongressionalEthics: Substanceand Structure,48 ADMIN.
L. REV. 39, 46-49 (1996) (describing state supreme courts' inherent authority to regulate entry
and conduct); Bruce A. Green, Doe v. Grievance Committee: On the Interpretationof Ethical
Rules, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 485, 530-31 & nn.161-62 (1989) (noting that state supreme courts
supervise and discipline lawyers pursuant to inherent judicial authority "to admit, suspend,
and disbar attorneys who practice within the jurisdiction of the court"); Bruce A. Green, Her
Brother's Keeper: The Prosecutor'sResponsibility When Defense Counsel Has a Potential
Conflict of Interest, 16 AM. J. CRIM. L. 323, 327 & n.20 (1989) (same); Note, The Inherent
Power of the Judiciaryto Regulate the Practiceof Law--A ProposedDelineation,60 MINN. L.
REV. 783, 787-95 (1976) (describing history of how Minnesota Supreme Court came to control
lawyer regulation).
'9 See WOLFRAM, supranote 15, at 22-32; Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer
Regulation-The Role of the Inherent PowersDoctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE RocK L.J. 1, 6-16
(1989-90) (overviewing exclusiveness of court's "inherent power" to regulate lawyers).
'o Compare Alpert, supra note 17, at 553 (arguing that inherent powers doctrine is
unsupportable because "the police power gives the legislature control over the practice of
law"), with Leroy Jeffers, Government of the Legal Profession: An Inherent Judicial Power
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glancingly.21 This Article seeks to address the propriety of state
supreme court control of lawyer regulation as a question of institutional analysis.22
Third, it is unusual in institutional analysis to examine courts as
legislative rather than as adjudicative bodies. It is routine to
compare the regulatory strengths and weaknesses of courts and
legislatures. Typically, however, the choice is between a statutory
scheme passed by a legislature or a common-law scheme overseen

on a case-by-case basis by the courts.2" Here, the comparison is
between courts and legislatures as legislators (i.e., as explicit policy
and rule-making bodies), an unusual and intriguing institutional
comparison that sheds a unique light upon judicial behavior and
incentives. The actions of state supreme court justices as lawyer

regulators should be of particular interest to the many scholars
examining the incentives that govern judicial behavior.24

Approach, 9 ST. MARYsL.J. 385, 385-403 (1978) (arguing in favor of inherent authority based
upon separation of powers justification).
21 See, e.g., JETHRO K LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 222 (1978) ("Courts are not
necessarily the best agency to govern professional conduct, and legislatures ought not to be
intimidated into thinking so."); Martin Garbus & Joel Seligman, Sanctions and Disbarment:
They Sit in Judgment, in VERDICTS ON LAWYERS 47, 56-60 (Ralph Nader & Mark Green eds.,
1976) (advocating legislative creation of "an agency independent of the state and local bar
associations" to govern lawyer discipline); Schneyer, infra note 87, at 41 (postulating that
"[t]he judiciary's expertise, its interest in the integrity of the legal process, and its legitimate
need for independence from the'political' branches" make judicial control of lawyer regulation
palatable).
22 The key insight of both the "legal process" movement and the renewed emphasis on
institutional analysis is that critiques of legal structures or doctrines are incomplete without
some consideration of how the doctrine arose and whether the creation process itself is
optimal. A critical analysis of the process must do more than simply point out the
weaknesses in the law as it stands; it should suggest a process that will result in better law.'
" The most obvious example is tort law. See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 16, at 153-95
(considering relative strengths of courts, legislatures, and market as "tools for the social
control of safety"); Richard B. Stewart, Crisisin Tort Law? The InstitutionalPerspective, 54
U. CHI. L. REv. 184, 190-96 (1987) (comparing institutions that control tort law); see also Lynn
M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 514-16 (1997)
(comparing Canadian and American approaches to bankruptcy reorganizations); Timothy D.
Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-Related Injuries: Defining a
Suitable Role for the Tort System in Regulatingthe FirearmsIndustry, 65 MO. L. REv. 1, 5254 (2000) (applying institutional analysis to regulation of firearms).
24 There is a burgeoning literature that ranges from the theoretical and economic, see
generally Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of
PublicChoice Theory, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 827, 838; Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and
Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993),
to the philosophical, see generally Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the
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Part I of this Article briefly details the methodology and goals of
the institutional analysis."' Part II then analyzes the strengths and
weaknesses of the judiciary-with special attention paid to state
supreme courts-as lawyer regulators, concluding that the judiciary
has some advantages in institutional expertise, but may be both too
susceptible to lawyer lobbying and too inaccessible to the public.2"
Next, Part III covers legislatures and concludes that legislatures are
more open to the public and less likely to favor lawyers, but may be
lacking in institutional expertise.27 Then, Part IV considers
deregulation of the market and reasons that, despite its many
advantages, it would prove crippling to the operations of the
courts.' Finally, Part V concludes that, although each institution
has substantial weaknesses that likely will result in lawyer
dominance of the regulatory process, a legislative body-either
Congress or state legislatures-would be more likely to produce
public-minded regulation and limit lawyer rent-seeking."
I. INSTITUTIONALANALYSIS

This Section details the methodology for an institutional analysis
of lawyer regulation. Although the comparative study of govern-

Inglorious Determinantsof JudicialBehavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615 (2000); Lynn A. Stout,
Judges as Altruistic Heirarchs, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1605 (2002), to studies based in
cognitive psychology, see generallyANTHONY G.AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDINOTHE

LAW (2000), to empirical studies of judicial decisions, see generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK
KNIGHT, THE CHoIcES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURTAND THE ATTITUDINALMODEL (1993); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001); Hillary A. Sale, JudgingHeuristics,35 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 903 (2002). Adding the behavior of judges as lawyer regulators to this mix can help
round out a picture of judicial behavior, because judicial self-interest is easier to observe
outside of the relatively closed world of deciding cases.
0 See infra notes 30-60 and accompanying text.
2"See infra notes 61.186 and accompanying text.
'
See infra notes 187-240 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 241-72 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 273-97 and accompanying text. Rent-seeking has been defined as an
effort to obtain "economic rents" (i.e., "payments for the use of an economic asset in excess of
the market price") through "government intervention in the market." Jonathan R. Macey,
Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L.
REV. 43, 224 n.6 (1988); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFrERTHE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 70 (1990)
(defining rent-seeking "as the dissipation of wealth through efforts to redistribute resources
by way of politics, rather than the production of wealth through markets").

1176

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1167

ment and market institutions has enjoyed a renaissance, there are
still many different approaches, and economists, legal scholars, and
political scientists do not always agree on the definition of "institution." Scholars of the "new institutionalism" define institutions
broadly as "formal and informal rules that constrain individual
behavior and shape human interaction; the institutionalenvironment varies with a person's position in society."30 Under this
definition, institutions are groups of individuals joined by a
constellation of common behaviors, both conscious and unconscious,
that define and confine behavior. Institutions are an explicit
reaction to transaction costs that "provide a basis for action in a
world that would otherwise be characterized by pervasive ignorance
and uncertainty."" Law professors, by contrast, tend to define
"institution" more narrowly as either a branch of government or the
free market. 2 Although this article uses "institution" in the
'o Thrainn Eggertsson, A Note on the Economics of Institutions, in EMPIRICAL STUDIES
ININSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 6, 7 (Lee J. Alston et al. eds., 1996); see also GORDON, supranote
16, at 16 (Ain institution is a grouping of people with some common behavior patterns, its
members having an awareness of the grouping.... IT]he essence of the institution is the
commonly held behavior pattern."); Lynne G. Zucker, Organizationsas Institutions, in
RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 1, 2 (Samuel B. Bacharach ed., 1983)
(positing that institutionalization is "phenomenological process by which certain social
relationships and actions come to be taken for granted" and where institutions define "what
has meaning and what actions are possible"). There are various disagreements among
economists, sociologists, and others about the precise definition of "institutions," see Paul J.
DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, Introduction, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM INORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 1, 7-9 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991) (describing
different definitions of institution), but the basic idea remains the same.
at MALCOLM RUTHERFORD, INSTITUTIONS IN ECONOMICS: THE OLD AND THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM 81 (1994); see also James A. Acheson, Welcome to Nobel Country: A Review
ofInstitutionalEconomics, in ANTHROPOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 3,8 (James M.
Acheson ed., 1994) ("Institutions are a substitute for accurate information."). In this regard,
the "new institutionalism" in economics can be traced back to the ground-breaking work on
transaction costs by Ronald H. Coase. Coase refocused the study of economics from the
theoretical world of perfect competition to the real world study of barriers to perfect
information or free transactions (i.e., transaction costs) and how individuals overcome those
barriers. For a concise and brilliant overview of Coase's distinguished and Nobel prizewinning work, see generallyRONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKETAND THE LAW (1988).
This work led to the theories of Douglass C. North and others, further refining the study of
transaction costs and specifically focusing on the human institutions that serve as a palliative
for those costs. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 27 (1990) ("My theory of institutions is constructed from a theory
of human behavior combined with a theory of the costs of transacting.").
2 See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 16, at 153-95 (comparing courts, political process, or the
market as regulators of torts); William W. Buzbee, Sprawl's Dynamics: A Comparative
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narrower sense, it still applies the tools of the "new
institutionalism" in that issues of character and trained behaviors
are considered at least as important as institutional structures.
A further controversy in institutional analysis is the choice of the
values that underlie the analysis and the criteria for comparison. 3
Obviously, choosing goals for a comparison of lawyer regulators is
highly debatable. Economic theorists would demand an emphasis
on efficiency,34 while others would focus upon maximizing social
justice35 or democratic concerns." This Article will focus upon the
following three interrelated goals for lawyer regulation: limiting the
potential for rent-seeking, maximizing procedural efficiency, and
democratization.37 This approach has the advantage of expanding
upon the traditional economic goal of utility maximization without
altogether abandoning the helpful tools of economic analysis.
Furthermore, a focus upon democratizing regulation has important

InstitutionalAnalysis Critique,WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509, 523-35 (2000) (comparing courts,
political process, or market as regulators of urban sprawl).
" Critics of Neil Komesar's work have focused on the unstated and nonspecific goals of
the analyses in Imperfect Alternatives. See Buzbee, supra note 32, 514C'Komesar gives only
limited attention to how goal choices are made and how they fit into the process of policy
analysis."); Thomas W. Merrill, InstitutionalChoiceand PoliticalFaith,22 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
959, 988 (1997) (noting that choice of policy goals can have powerful effect on comparative
institutional analysis).
" The concept of efficiency is, as applied to institutions, elusive. Most economic
approaches emphasize choosing an institution to maximize overall societal utility. See
KOME AR, supra note 16, at 4 (rTheeconomic approach to legal analysis is cast in terms of a
single social goal-resource allocation efficiency."); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF

LAW 24-26 (6th ed. 2003) (noting that normative law and economics scholarship emphasizes
efficiency and utility maximization). Another possibility is to focus on the most "efficient"
regulatory process, setting aside questions of the ultimate goal. See Cole, supra note 16, at
930 (defining most efficient regulatory process as "mechanism that could achieve society's
goal at the lowest overall cost or highest net benefit").
See, e.g., LUBAN, supranote 13, at 237-89 (using right to legal services to demonstrate
role for justice in lawyer regulation); SIMON, supra note 13, at 26-76 (arguing against societal
right to injustice through lawyer regulation).

16 See,

e.g., PAUL D. CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY:

LAW AS A PUBLIC

PROFESSION 1-6 (1999) (arguing that legal profession is uniquely responsible for, and to,
American democracy); CASSR. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACYAND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 18

(1993) (noting America's "central constitutional goal of creating a deliberative democracy").
" For a similar view of the goal of institutional analysis, see PETERS, supra note 16, at
59 ("Institutions, in the rational choice perspective, are designed to overcome identifiable
shortcomings in the market or the political system[] a good institution is one which performs
that assigned task well and efficiently, usually while maintaining commitment to other
powerful norms such as democracy.").
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economic benefits, and may in fact limit rent-seekingss Admittedly,
goal selection is controversial (and some might argue arbitrary).
Nevertheless, this Article focuses on these three goals because they
promote both economic efficiency and public participation, and they
help identify the institution that will create policy that makes
society better off and best involves the public in governance.89 With
these goals in mind, this Article analyzes the various potential
institutions of lawyer regulation under the following two criteria,
defined below: regulatory accessibility to lobbying and institutional
expertise and capacity.40
A. PROPENSITY FOR AGENCY CAPTURE AND INTEREST GROUP THEORY

The first prong of analysis, regulatory accessibility to lobbying,
addresses both rent-seeking and democratic concerns. As interestgroup theory41 has demonstrated, representative democracy
frequently lends itself to industry rent-seeking. Interest-group
theory originated from the recognition that government regulation
and regulators frequently serve the interests of a regulated industry
ahead of the public at large, a phenomenon dubbed "agency capture."42 George Stigler and other interest-group theorists eventually

38 See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.

The above-listed goals may prove contradictory. For example, many public choice
scholars would argue that representational democracy leads inevitably to rent-seeking
through governmental regulation. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalismand Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 559-63 (2001) (describing
traditional public choice framework); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation,
2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971) ("[R]egulation is acquired by the industry and is
designed and operated primarily for its benefit."). Further, a focus upon democratization may
inevitably lessen institutional efficiency; democracy has long been recognized as a trade-off
between efficiency and public input. See Benjamin E. Hermalin, The Firmas a Noneconomy:
Some Comments on Holmstrom, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 103, 104 (1999) (noting that in heat of
battle "dictatorships are more efficient than democracies"); cf. Michael H. Shapiro, The
Technology of Perfection: PerformanceEnhancement and the Controlof Attributes, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 11, 96 (1991) (asserting that "efficiency might suggest [a] benign dictatorship").
o See infra notes 41-60 and accompanying text.
41 Known alternatively as public choice theory.
" Political scientists first noted agency capture as situations where the regulators
functioned less as "a policeman and more [as] a manager of the industry." MARVER H.
BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 87 (1955).

For other

seminal works, see ROBERT S. LORCH, DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 40-44
(1969); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF
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argued that agency capture is not an aberration but is endemic to
the actions of rational, self-interested industries, regulators, and
legislators.4" The key principle is that government regulation is a

PUBLIC AUTHORITY 68-72 (1969); JAMES S. TURNER, THE CHEMICAL FEAST 202-16 (1970).
' The foundational work in interest-group theory belopgs to George Stigler, with
amplification and follow-up by Richard Posner and Sam Peltzman. See generally MANUEL F.
COHEN & GEORGE J. STIGLER, CAN REGULATORY AGENCIES PROTECT CONSUMERS? (1971);
GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE (1975); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More
General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Theories of
EconomicRegulation,5 BELLJ. ECON. &MGMT. SC. 335(1974) [hereinafter Posner, Economic
Regulation]; Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22
(1971); Stigler, supra note 39. For a discussion of the further development of the field
through theoretical expansion and empirical research, see Robert D. Tollison, Regulationand
Interest Groups, in REGULATION: ECONOMIC THEORY AND HISTORY 59-76 (Jack High ed.,
1991). Interest-group theory has been criticized on multiple levels over the years. Some
commentators have rejected the notion that a theory of regulation should be based upon
interest groups battling for influence in the regulatory process, stating that the political
process should not be treated "as an aggregation of purely private interests, but as a
deliberative effort to promote the common good." SUNSTEIN, supra note 29, at 12; see also
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic RepublicanJustificationfor the BureaucraticState, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1 511, 1515 (1992) (arguing that administrative state provides "best hope of...
deliberative decision-making informed by the values of the entire polity"). Other commentators have taken a more sanguine approach to "agency capture," postulating that changes in
agency and legislative processes could solve whatever problems exist. See SUSAN ROSEACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA 187-93 (1992); Robert B. Reich, Public
Administrationand PublicDeliberation: An InterpretiveEssay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1637-40
(1985); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1669, 1685-86, 1805-13 (1975). Additional commentators have attacked the theory for
its predictions concerning the behavior of individual regulators and legislators. See Steven
P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporatingthe Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 42-45 (1998); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture,Public
Interest and the PublicAgenda: Toward a Synthesis, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 176-81 (1990).
Others have criticized interest-group theory for ignoring the regulatory process. See
KENNETH J. MEIER, REGULATION: POLITICS, BUREAUCRACY, AND ECONOMICS 9-36 (1985). In
addition, some commentators have challenged the empirical basis for the claims of interestgroup theorists. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 200-01 (1997); LAWRENCE S. ROTHENBERG, REGULATION,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND POLITICS 254-58 (1994); Posner, Economic Regulation, supra note 43,
at 336-37. These more "empirical" criticisms are surely valid, because public choice, like any
other overbroad theory of human and economic behavior, will suffer when placed against the
complexities of real life. Even the most ardent of public choice theorists would not argue that
every government regulation or legislative act favors the powerful few over the disenfranchised many. Nevertheless, interest-group theory remains the dominant critical model for
analyzing regulatory structures. Cf. Croley, supra, at 34-41 (discussing public choice theory
before rejecting it); Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts and Agencies, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 1027, 1065 & n. 103 (1990) (noting major literature on agency capture theory);
James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 360 (James Q.
Wilson ed., 1980) (stating that "[the virtues of the economic perspective on regulation are
clear[;]" despite appearance of factual patterns which do not fit model, "it offers an elegant
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product that can, in a sense, be purchased by industries to increase
their own wealth."' Industries pay with votes and campaign
donations.
Industries obtain favorable regulation because of the difficulties
involved in organizing large groups of voters to oppose any particular piece of harmful legislation. In general, small, concentrated
groups with a lot at stake per capita regularly triumph over diffuse,
large groups with little individual stake, even though the aggregate
cost to the large group is considerable and often greater than the
gain to the small group. Large groups fail to organize because of the
high transaction costs per individual; for any given individual in the
large group, the costs of organizing outweigh the cost of doing
nothing.45 Mancur Olson grouped these impediments under the
rubric of collective action problems.46

and parsimonious way of explaining a great deal of human behavior").
" The government is a uniquely powerful entity because it has the power to coerce
private behavior through law. The state can seize money through taxation or enforce certain
standards of industry or consumer behavior. Indeed, "[t]hese powers provide the possibilities
for the utilization of the state by an industry to increase its profitability." Stigler, supranote
39, at 4. Thus, "every industry or occupation that has enough political power" will seek to
utilize the state's power to assist its business, either through direct subsidies, price-fixing,
barriers to entry (in the legal market, consider entry requirements such as law school or the
bar exam), or through suppression of competing industries (consider laws barring the
unauthorized practice of law) and the encouragement of complementary products. Id. For
example, "[cirudely put, the butter producers wish to suppress margarine and encourage the
production of bread." Id. at 6.
', The costs of monitoring politicians and organizing voters are considerable. As Stigler
noted, a consumer's "sole defense" against interest group regulation "is to organize a political
campaign to change or eliminate [an undesirable regulatory activity]. For the individual
consumer, this is a bleak prospect. The costs--in time, effort, and money--to change
legislation are large; the reward to any one consumer joining the consumer lobby is
negligible." COHEN & STIGLER, supra note 43, at 15. By contrast, "[t]he sheltered farmers,
milk companies and laborers in the industry have much larger stakes, and they can and do
mount the legislative drives which create and dominate such legislation." Id.
' MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIc OF COLLECTIVE AcTION 43-52 (1971). See generally
RUSSELL HARDIN, CoLLEcTIVE AcTION (1982) (providing background on collective action

theory). Olson differentiated between two types of groups and predicted the likelihood that
these groups would provide a collective good. OLSON, supra at 43-52. A small group with a
collective good of considerable value to each individual member of the group would be likely
to organize and provide the collective good. Id. at 43-52. By contrast, a relatively large group,
with a collective good of relatively small value to each individual, would probably not provide
the collective good, despite the fact that provision of the good would make the group better
off as a whole. Id. Ironically, some have used the reliance of interest group theorists upon
the logic of collective action as a linchpin of criticism because the theory has trouble
accounting for public voting:
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Nevertheless, no industry, no matter how powerful, can run
roughshod over consumers and rival industries through regulation
because purchasing favorable regulation involves costs, and
although the public opposition to such regulation will be weak, it is
not nonexistent. As the cost to the public of the regulation rises, the
incentives for large group organization increase.47 As a result, there
is a process of equilibrium, in which the industry "purchases" as
much helpful regulation as it can afford, given the costs of providing
votes and donations, up to the resistance point of the opposing group
(either consumers or another industry)." Thus, interest group
theory predicts that the parties eventually will reach a point of
equilibrium.49

Given the number of voters, the chance that an individual vote will
change the outcome is virtually nil. Since voting is costly in terms of time
and inconvenience, no economically rational person would vote.... Yet,
millions of people do in fact vote. A theory that cannot even account for
people going to the polls, let alone explain how they vote once they get
there, can hardly claim to provide a complete theory of politics.
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRiCKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 24-25 (1991). But see
Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Understanding(and Misunderstanding)Public Choice:
A Response to Farberand Frickey, 66 TEX. L. REV. 993, 993 (1988) (refuting this argument
and others). For the individual costs of monitoring politicians, consider a representative
Boondocks cartoon. Huey regales Caesar with a lesson in civics, and pledges to more closely
monitor the actions ofpoliticians. When Caesar answers, "Wow, so who is our Representative
Huey?" Huey answers, "Who Knows. Some chump." Aaron McGruder, The Boondocks,
KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENT., Apr. 1, 2002, at B8.
4? As any industry pushes for more and more profitable regulation, it risks taking so
much that it galvanizes the public to organize and retaliate against the offending politicians.
For example, if the dairy industry successfully lobbied to raise milk price supports to twenty
dollars a gallon, there would be palpable consequences for the legislature in the next election.
Consider, furthermore, the moderating role, however limited, of judicial oversight on the
regulatory and lawmaking process. Cf. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify
More Intrusive JudicialReview?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 33 (1991) (describing current standards
of judicial review of agency actions and statutes, and discussing whether interest group
theory justifies "more intrusive judicial review").
" STIGLER, supra note 43, at 138-39; see also Wilson, supra note 43, at 360-61 (stating
that neither industries nor consumers get everything they want, instead they are both
"optimally disgruntled"); Mr. PC Goes to Washington,THE ECONOMIST, June 1, 2002, at 59-60
("Arguably, [high-tech lobbying] could be called business as usual in Washington: industries
defend their competing interests and, more often than not, end in stalemate."); cf. Joseph P.
Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Captureand Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM..
ECON. R. 279, 285-87 (1984) (describing multiple influences upon regulation of coal stripmining).
19 BRUCE M. OWEN & RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME: STRATEGIC USE OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 14-15 (1978); William F. Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison,
Interest Groups and the Courts, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 953, 954 (1998) ("Politicians broker
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For purposes of institutional analysis, the key insight is not that

regulation will tend to favor the regulated over the public, because
that is axiomatic. The critical point is that the choice of a governing
institution can affect the equilibrium. If one chooses an institution
that the public can influence more easily and cheaply, the equilibrium shifts in favor of the public. Likewise, as the industry costs of
purchasing regulation rise, more public-minded legislation should
result. 5°
Therefore, an institutional analysis of lawyer regulation focuses
on the following two sides of the accessibility question: the accessibility of regulators to lawyers (lawyer accessibility), and the
accessibility of regulators to the public at large (public
accessibility).5 1 As public accessibility waxes and lawyer accessibil-

ity wanes, the interest-group equilibrium shifts, and regulatory
outcomes become more public-minded. In other words, rent-seeking
is lessened and democratization is increased.5 2
B. INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND CHARACTER

Consideration of the relative capacities and areas of expertise of

the various institutions is the next step.

Institutional capacity

encompasses how the institution makes policy (i.e., the nuts and

these transfers, pairing suppliers with demanders to establish political market equilibrium.').
'oThis proposition is the basic argument presented by supporters of campaign finance
reform. See, e.g., Steve Padilla, Campaign 2000: A HistoricalPerspectivein Politics,Money
Talks--and Keeps Talking, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2000, at A3 (describing history of special
interest control over politics and campaign finance reforms); Editorial, Voters Must Pressure
for Campaign Finance Reform Despite Reforms, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 3, 1997, at A22 (arguing
for campaign finance reform). Dissenters note that money will simply migrate to other votebuying fora--such as industry lobbying groups-resulting in little net change.
"' Focusing on accessibility and performing an institutional analysis places this Article
within the more optimistic public choice camp. Cf. Saul Levmore, From Cynicism to Positive
Theory in Public Choice, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 375 (2002) (expressing optimistic, rather
than cynical, view of public choice theory); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice
Casefor the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 106-28 (2000) (applying optimistic version
of public choice theory to administrative state). Less optimistic scholars likely would conclude
that bar association access to any and all decisionmakers is so overwhelming that every
institution will produce regulations disproportionately favoring lawyers.
" See Robert H. Bates, Social Dilemmas andRationalIndividuals:An Essay on the New
Institutionalism, in ANTHROPOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 43, 60-61 (James M.
Acheson ed., 1994) (submitting that selecting institution "depend[s] upon costs of transacting").
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bolts of its decisionmaking process) and how it responds to changed
circumstances. 53 In particular, an institution's proclivity for
delegation and oversight is critical because many of the institutions
that could govern lawyer regulation would have to delegate some or
most of the day-to-day regulation to a separate body."' In any
delegation, there is a danger of slack between the desires of the
delegator and the incentives of the delegatee,55 and much of interestgroup theory focuses on the tendency in any delegation of regulatory
agencies to serve their own ends ahead of the goals of the legislature.' Since many bureaucrats are rational and self-interested,
5 Part of the goal of institutional analysis is to find a regulating institution that will
provide the maximum benefits at the least cost. Rubin, supra note 16, at 1431-32; see also
Erich Schweighofer, New Developments in the Law of the European Union: Harmonization
and the AustrianExperience, 24 IN'LJ. LEGAL INFo. 5, 10 (1996) (commenting on importance
of selecting institutions for "efficient decision-shaping and decision-making process"). Note,
however, that many critics of governmental or regulatory action consider government gridlock
to be a blessing in disguise, i.e., the less the government does, the better society runs as a
whole. See, e.g., John C. Reitz, PoliticalEconomy as a Major ArchitecturalPrincipleof Public
Law, 75 TUL. L. REv. 1121, 1144-45 (2001) (positing that "gridlock government" is "acceptable
to citizens of a political economy that does not favor extensive government action"); Edwin
A. Roberts, Jr., The Lash of UnanticipatedEventualities,TAMPATRIB., Mar. 4,2001, at Al ("I
often think the greatest blessing democracy can provide is legislative gridlock. Doing nothing
is not always the worst choice on the shelf."). These theorists would, therefore, choose the
Least efficient governmental actor.
See Croley, supra note 43, at 23:
Because legislators themselves cannot build highways, inspect food and
drugs, protect the environment, ensure the safety of nuclear plants or the
airlines, or allocate the airwaves--though they can and do pass general
statutes governing all of these areas--legislators delegate regulatory
authority to administrators, that is, to administrative agencies.

Id.
'
Interest-group theorists and political scientists have generated an extensive literature
on this delegation/slack problem, using an analysis that treats legislators and bureaucracies
as principals and agents. For a thorough review of this literature, see Kathleen Bawn,
PoliticalControl Versus Expertise: CongressionalChoices About Administrative Procedures,
89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62, 63-67 (1995); David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Administrative
Procedures,Informationand Agency Discretion,38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 697, 703 (1994); Matthew
McCubbins et al., AdministrativeProceduresas Instruments of PoliticalControl,3 J.L. ECON.
& ORO. 243, 253-64 (1987); David B. Spence, AdministrativeLaw and Agency Policy-Making:
Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407, 411-46 (1997).
1 See, e.g., DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 250-57 (1989) (detailing other works
on budget-maximizing bureaucracy theory); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 120-23 (1971) (theorizing that rational, self-interested
bureaucrat will shirk his duties while padding his budget); cf. Saul Levmore, Irreversibility
and the Law: The Size of Firms and Other Organizations, 18 J. CORP. L. 333, 336-39 (1993)
(describing incentives of managers to expand organizational size). See generallyTHE BUDGET
MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISALS AND EVIDENCE (Andr6 Blais & St6phanie Dion eds.,
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they naturally seek to make their jobs easier and increase their
influence.5 7 They accomplish these goals by catering to the entities
they most frequently encounter and the parties who care about the
regulation, such as the regulated industries. Thus, interest group

theory predicts that agency capture occurs on two levels; regulated
industries first influence the legislature through votes and donations, and then they gain further advantages by lobbying the agency
to which the legislature delegates its authority." In order to deter
further policymaking drifting towards rent-seeking, this Article
utilizes institutional analysis to determine which institution will
most closely monitor its delegations."
Another consideration is institutional expertise. The more
familiar policymakers are with the regulated industry, the less time
they spend investigating and fact-finding, thus increasing efficiency.
Furthermore, agency capture is particularly prevalent when
policymakers are ignorant, because they tend to rely upon interested
parties-typically the regulated industry-to educate them about
the issues.'
1991) (providing essays building on Niskanen's theories).
" See Nancy J. Knauer, How Charitable OrganizationsInfluence Federal Tax Policy:
"Rent-Seeking"Charitiesor Virtuous Politicians?,1996 WIS. L. REV. 971, 1064 & nn.489-90;
Spence, supra note 55, at 413.
u Some refer to this phenomenon as the "iron triangle" of interest group theory, in which
interest groups, legislators, and agencies form the three sides of the triangle, and the public
is left out. See, e.g., Edward J. Janger, The FDIC's FraudulentConveyance Power Under the
Crime Control Act of 1990: Bank Insolvency Law and the Politics of the Iron Triangle, 28
CONN. L. REV. 67,67-70 (1995); Michael Lyons, CongressionalSelf-Interest,BureaucraticSelf.
Interest, and U.S. EnvironmentalPolicy Implementation, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,786, 10,786
(2000); Harold A. McDougall, Lawyering and the PublicInterest in the 1990s, 60 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1, 8 (1991); Steven A. Ramirez, DepoliticizingFinancialRegulation, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 503, 503-04 & nn.4-5 (2000).
" Although many public choice theorists agree that closer monitoring will result in less
agency capture, not all do. See Spence & Cross, supra note 51, at 99.100 ('While subsequent
public choice analyses of agencies were more optimistic about the possibility of good
government, that optimism hinged not on a more charitable view of agency decisionmaking,
but rather on the contention that politicians could effectively control the exercise of agency
discretion."). An alternative possibility is that increased oversight will result in increased
agency capture. Cf. Steven P. Croley, PublicInterestedRegulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7,
8-14 (2000) (claiming that although "[a]t times, regulatory institutions instead appear to
advance broad, diffuse interests, even at the expense of more powerful, concentrated
interests," Congress has multiple tools to rein in public-minded agencies). Nevertheless,
given that most agencies will prove self-interested, it is much more likely that increased
oversight will lessen, not increase, agency capture.
6 See JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE TYRANNY OF THE EXPERTS 17-21 (1970) (providing
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II. THE JUDICIARY

This Part assesses various judicial options for the control of
lawyer regulation. Because state supreme courts have the final
word in lawyer regulation in virtually every state, Section II.A
begins the institutional analysis with these courts." ' Next, Sections
II.B and I1.C consider other possibilities, as follows: the United
States Supreme Court could control a federalized system of lawyer
regulation,62 or, at the opposite extreme, district courts (federal or
state) could control a decentralized and local system of regulation.6"
These institutions are not considered in the same detail as state
supreme courts because, as judge-driven institutions, they have
more similarities to state supreme courts than differences.
Nevertheless, an institutional analysis that considered only state
supreme courts, or treated all of these institutions under the
moniker "the judiciary," would be misleading and incomplete.
A. STATE SUPREME COURTS

Although there are great variations among the state supreme
courts in state constitutional structure and the number of justices,
there are many commonalities. First, all state supreme court
justices are lawyers." Second, in contrast to federal judges, most
supreme court justices face some kind of election to gain or keep

example of cosmetologists pushing through state cosmetology licensing requirements);
BENJAMIN SHIMBERG ET AL., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 14 (1973) (detailing how legislatures
rely on industry experts when passing occupational licensing statutes).
61 See aupra notes 64-163 and accompanying text.
62 See supra notes 164-76 and accompanying text.
6 See supra notes 177-86 and accompanying text.
" See Henry R. Glick & Craig F. Emmert, Characteristicsof State Supreme Court

Justices, in AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS 315, 317 (Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat eds., 2d
ed. 1989) (displaying chart showing that in 1980 all state supreme court justices had

graduated from law school and practiced law); see also 33 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, THE
BOOKOFTHE STATES 135-36 (2000) [hereinafter BOOKOF STATES] (listing state requirements

for supreme court justices). Although New Hampshire and Massachusetts do not require
their justices to be lawyers, all of the current justices are lawyers. Id. at 135; Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Justices, at http://www.state.ma.us/courts/courtsandjudges/
courts/supremejudicialcourttjustices.html (last updated May 14, 2002); New Hampshire
Supreme Court, Meet the Supreme Court Justices,at http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme/
justices.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2003).
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their jobs,65 and only the justices in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island are appointed for life and face no retention
decision. 6 Thus, state supreme courts typically are much less
independent from voter sentiment than federal courts.
1. Propensity for Agency Capture. At first blush, one would
assume that state supreme courts would have the substantial
advantage of independence from lobbying. America's traditional
paradigm of judicial integrity naturally includes the assumption
that judges and courts are independent from public or private
pressure or lobbying."

The following nine states have partisan elections for state supreme court justices:
Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas,
and West Virginia. BOOK OF STATES, supra note 64, at 137-39. In addition, the following
thirteen states have nonpartisan elections for their justices: Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. The following fifteen states appoint judges via a "merit"
plan, followed by a nonpartisan retention election: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah, and Wyoming. Id. Although these three types of elections are different procedurally,
for purposes of institutional analysis they may be treated similarly. The key point is that
most justices face a retention election, and the public has an opportunity to vote them in or
out of their position. Cf. THEODORE J. BOUTROUS ET AL., STATE JUDICIARIES AND IMPARTIALITY: JUDGING THE JUDGES 10 (1996) ("Only twelve states completely exempt judges from any
form of election."); Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the
Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 726 n. 114 (1995) ("[in practical terms these different
[elective] systems operate in much the same way."). For a description of the operation of
judicial merit selection plans, see ALLAN ASHMAN & JAMES J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL
MERIT SELECTION: THE NOMINATING PROCESS 12-69 (1974); Jona Goldschmidt, Merit
Selection: Current Status, Procedures,and Issues, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 19-24 (1994). For
overviews of selection in general, see generally LARRY BERKSON ET AL., JUDICIAL SELECTION
IN THE UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS (1980); MARVIN COMISKY & PHILIP C.
PATTERSON, THEJUDICIARY-SELECTION, COMPENSATION, ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE (1987); SARI
S. EscoviTz, JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE (1975). For an excellent history of the
selection of American judges, see generally Glenn R. Winters, Selection of Judges-An
HistoricalIntroduction, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1081 (1966).
"
BOOK OF STATES, supra note 64, at 131-32, 137-39. Ten other states have terms of
office for their justices, with retention decisions by the legislature, a judicial review council,
or the governor: Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, New York, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia. Id. at 131-32, 137-39.
' See, e.g., Charles D. Cole, JudicialIndependence in the United States FederalCourts,
13 J. LEGAL PROF. 183, 187 (1988) (arguing that judicial independence is critical to
governments that protect basic human rights); Scott H. Rice, Judicial Independence and
Accountability Symposium, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 311, 312 (1999) (introducing series of articles
regarding balance between "judicial independence and accountability"); Penny J. White, It's
a Wonderful Life, or Is It? America Without JudicialIndependence, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 7
(1996) (arguing that judicial independence has been critical to development of United States).
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In fact, even typically skeptical public choice scholars have
preferred judicial decisionmakers--or at least the federal judiciary-to legislative decisionmakers, because theoretically the
judiciary is less likely to be swayed or lobbied by interest groups.68
Most theorists have attributed this favoritism to the structure and
independence of the courts.6 s One of the great concerns of interest
group theory is legislative openness to interest group lobbying
(through votes, campaign contributions, or simply information), and
courts are thought to be largely insulated from lobbying.70 In fact,

68See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 34, at 569 C'[Jludge-made rules tend to be efficiencypromoting while those made by legislatures tend to be efficiency-reducing."); Frank B. Cross,
The Judiciaryand Public Choice, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 355, 358-60 & nn.15-17 (1999) (listing
legal scholars favoring increased judicial review of legislative acts); Elhauge, supra note 47,
at 44-48 (cataloging prominent legal scholars who have favored increased judicial review of
legislative acts in response to public choice theory); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting
Public-RegardingLegislation Through StatutoryInterpretation:An Interest GroupModel, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 223, 250-56 (1986) (stating preference for judiciary and "traditional method
of statutory interpretation" because courts that give "a statute its public rather than private
meaning ... may reach a result that serves the public interest, but fails to honor the terms
of the original [rent-seeking] deal between the legislature and the interest group"); Thomas
W. Merrill &Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardizationin the Law of Property: The Numerus
Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 60 (1991) (noting that courts have been favored by
academics because "legislatures were regarded as being dominated by interest groups with
narrow distributional objectives, whereas common-law courts were regarded as being immune
from this type of distortion"); Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the RegulatoryState,
103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 478-79 (1989) (praising judicial oversight of agency decisions and cases
where courts "appear to have reacted to the possibility that collective action problems will
undermine regulatory programs"); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance:
Implicationsof Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation,74 VA. L. REV. 275, 278-79,
323-37 (1988) (suggesting that courts consider size and power of interest groups benefited and
burdened by statute, and if appropriate, construe statute narrowly). See generally RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)
(drawing in part on public choice ideas to support wide-ranging judicial activism under the
Takings Clause); Jerry L. Mashaw, ConstitutionalDeregulation: Notes Toward a Public,
PublicLaw, 54 TUL. L. REV. 849 (1980) (using interest group analysis to justify more intrusive
judicial review of legislation for rationality).
6 See, e.g., POSNER, supranote 34, at 569-70 (commenting that court "procedures," such
as standing, and court characteristics, like fixed judicial compensation and conflict of interest
rules, tend to produce more efficient legal rules); Cross, supra note 68, at 357-58 (explaining
that "judges do seem to be less susceptible than legislators and bureaucrats to collective
interests seeking rents at the expense of the general welfare" because of judicial independence); Michel Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy, Judicial Authority and the Rule of Law:
Reflections on ConstitutionalInterpretationand the Separationof Power, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
137, 150 (1993) (observing that advantages of adversarial system make courts proper forum
for constitutional interpretation).
70 POSNER, supra note 34, at 569-70; see also Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and
Incentives of Retrospective Decision-Making,75 B.U. L. REV. 941, 969 (1995):

1188

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1167

given the structure and nature of state supreme courts and their
busy caseloads, it is difficult to imagine how traditional, legislativestyle lobbying could occur.
Nevertheless, although there may be excellent reasons to favor
courts as adjudicators, when regulating lawyers state supreme
courts act as legislators,1 they are not as independent or free from
self-interest in that role.7 2
a. Accessibility to Lawyers. The first step of the interest group
equilibrium is to assess the institution's openness to lobbying by the
regulated industry, in this case, lawyers. There are a number of
reasons to believe that, although state supreme courts are not open
to lobbying in the traditional sense, they are uniquely vulnerable to
lobbying by lawyers."
A further significant feature is the insulation of judges against many
forms of iqfluence that might derogate from their willingness to fulfill
these expectations: their terms of office are long (for American federal
judges, a life sentence); pay is free from control for individual judges and
generally set in a very public manner for a large class (for American
federal judges, pay cannot be reduced); and direct attempts to secure
special treatment through threat or bribe are criminal offenses. Even
judges who must stand for election are insulated in various ways from the
sort of direct influence common to the legislative arena.
Id.

7 None of the hallmarks of adjudication are present in state supreme courts' regulation
of lawyers, e.g., there is no case or controversy, presumably any interested party has
standing, and the court is free to adopt any rule, regardless of breadth or precedent. In fact,
in ruling upon the Wisconsin Supreme Court's order to create a unified bar, the United States
Supreme Court held that the act was legislative-not judicial-in character. Lathrop v.
Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 824-25 (1961). For a discussion of the differences between
"adjudicating" and "legislating," see infra note 215 and accompanying text.
2 Some scholars have postulated that when judges are acting outside of their role as
adjudicators, their actions are more easily analyzed through a typical economic analysis of
costs and benefits. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST 15-39 (1995)
(presenting example of federal courts as lobbyists for court reforms); Richard A. Epstein, The
Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitation of Public Choice Theory, 1990 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 827,841-44 (using clerkship selection process as prime example ofjudges' behavior being
analyzed under cost-benefit analysis); Jonathan R. Macey, JudicialPreferences,PublicChoice,
and the Rules of Procedure,23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 630-31 (1994) (utilizing example of judges
drafting rules of civil procedure).
78 For stylistic purposes, this Article frequently refers to lobbying by 'lawyers" or
"lawyers' shared interests," which glosses over disputes among lawyers, and a great diversity
in lawyer interests. Further, "lawyers" as a group rarely, if ever, lobby courts or legislatures,
but bar associations and groups of lawyers (like the American Trial Lawyers Association) do.
Nevertheless, when using the term "lawyers," this Article refers to the majority (and usually
the great majority) of lawyers, as represented by the lobbying and activities of bar
associations.
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Justices and lawyers have multiple shared interests on regula-

tory issues. Most importantly, both lawyers and justices have
powerful reasons to favor inflated entry standards to the profession.
Raising entry barriers has been the sine qua non of the formation of
modern bar associations and lawyer lobbying.74 Lawyers, of course,
have an excellent reason to favor higher entry standards, namely
that such standards decrease the supply of legal services and raise
the price for those services.75 Moreover, the higher prices are a
windfall for the current members of the profession lobbying for more
difficult standards; they enjoy the higher prices without having to
meet the new, higher standards.76 This explains why every
complaint about current practitioners is solved by a burden upon

"' From its inception, the American Bar Association (ABA) pilloried what it considered
to be the undesirable element in the bar and focused upon tightening bar entry. See, e.g., 1
A.B.A. REP. 212 (1878) (proposing tightening of bar admissions standards because low
admissions standards had contributed to "extraordinary numbers" of "ignorant" and
"unprincipled" lawyers); 29 A.B.A. REP. 601-02 (1906) (proposing standards of ethical conduct
to battle new breed of lawyers who "believe themselves immune, the good or bad esteem of
their co-laborers is nothing to them provided their itching fingers are not thereby stayed in
their eager quest for lucre"); AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 5
(2001) 'Concern for improving the competence of those entering the profession was a major
reason for creating the American Bar Association in 1878.... The Association remains
vitally and actively interested in improving the legal profession through legal education.");
EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND ITS WORK 72-75
(1953) (discerning that legal education and admission to the bar "received more attention"
from ABA during its early years "than any other" issue). The ABA was not alone in its desire
for greater barriers to entry; state and local bar associations formed around the same goal.
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 562-63 (1973) (noting that Iowa
and Chicago bar associations were formed to eliminate lawyers guilty of "shystering and
unprofessional conduct"); GLENN R. WINTERS, BAR ASSOCIATION ORGANIZATION AND
ACTIVITIES 1 (1954) (providing example that one goal of bar associations was "to elevate
standards of integrity, education and public service among the members of the legal
profession"); W. Hamilton Bryson & E. Lee Shepard, The Virginia Bar, 1870-1900, in THE
NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS INPOST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 171 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984)
(discussing qualifications for Virginia bar); Marvelle C. Webber, Origin and Uses of Bar
Associations, 7 A.B.A. J. 297, 298 (1921) (discussing organization of New York bar as
prototype to combat "notorious influence[s to the ... bench and bar").
7" See Barton, supra note 7, at 441-43 (providing full description of entry barrier supply
and demand effect, and general unavailability of substitute goods).
70 Generally, current practitioners are "grandfathered" into the new, more
stringent
entry regulations. Simon Rottenberg, Introduction,in OCCUPATIONALLICENSURE 1,5 (Simon
Rottenberg ed., 1980); see also Barton, supra note 7, at 443-44. The bar exam has continued
to become more difficult, and recently, passage rates have declined substantially. See
Deborah J. Merritt et al., Raising the Bar: A Social Science Critiqueof Recent Increases to
PassingScores on the Bar Exam, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 929, 929 (2001) ("[TChe percentage of test
takers passing the bar has dropped sharply since 1994.").
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Consider the growing utilization of the

Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam (MPRE) as a response
to claims of unethical lawyering,7 8 or the original bar associations'
drive to establish the bar examination and extensive legal education
as a response to perceived lawyer incompetence. 9 While rising
entry standards have multiple benefits to lawyers, there is little
evidence that the benefit to consumers is equivalent to the higher
cost of services.8 °

"' One notable exception is mandatory continuing legal education (CLE). Scholars argue
that CLE classes do little or nothing to guarantee competence and are designed to be the least
intrusive possible response to public concerns over lawyer competence. See, e.g., Barton,
supra note 7, at 449. The addition of Rule 11 to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also
added a new, substantive burden on practicing lawyers.
78 Forty-seven states now require students to pass the MPRE. See SECTION OF LEGAL
EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BARASS'N, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION
REQUIREMENTS 21 (2000) [hereinafter BAR REQUIREMENTS]. Obviously, forcing new lawyers
to take the MPRE will do nothing to protect the public or judges against lawyers who are
currently unethical, which is presumably the problem. The MPRE may result in future
lawyers being ethical, although given the hypertechnical, multiple choice nature of the exam,
that is questionable. Cf. AM. BAR ASS'N, COMPENDIUM OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
RULES AND STANDARDS 517-22 (1999) (reprinting ten sample MPRE questions and their
answers). But the MPRE will not affect current practitioners, except insofar as it makes it
more difficult to become a lawyer, therefore making the profession more lucrative for existing
lawyers.
"' If the worry concerned currently incompetent practitioners, raising entry barriers for
future lawyers would do little to assist with the immediate problem. A current example of
this phenomenon is the many states (presently twenty-six and rising) that are beginning to
adopt the 'Multistate Performance Test," that requires applicants to display more practical
lawyering skills like brief or memo writing. See BAR REQUIREMENTS, supra note 78, at 21;
National Conference of Bar Examiners, Multistate Performance Test, at http://www.ncbex.
org/tests/mpt/mptxt.htm#contents (last visited Apr. 7, 2003). The test was adopted as a
reaction to perceived lawyer incompetence, another burden on applicants in response to the
failures of current practitioners.
' The costs to consumers are substantial, and the benefits are negligible. In order to
measure the efficacy of a licensing scheme, it is helpful to consider the minimum requirements under the system, because all that a licensing scheme can guarantee is that a licensed
practitioner has met the minimum barriers. What legal skills can we guarantee to a
consumer on the day that a newly minted lawyer passes the bar? Can the lawyer definitely
draft a complaint and pursue a lawsuit through the courts, draft a will, complete a real estate
closing, or file a copyright infringement or antitrust claim? Bar passage and law school
guarantees none of these skills, and therefore the protection offered to the public is minimal,
while the expense is considerable. See Barton, supra note 7, at 445-48 (discussing limited
efficacy of bar exam and legal education requirements); Daniel R. Hansen, Note, Do We Need
the BarExamination?A CriticalEvaluationof the Justificationsfor the Bar Examinationand
ProposedAlternatives, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1191, 1204-28 (1995) (finding bar exam not
necessary to ensure competent attorneys).
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Nevertheless, since state supreme courts have controlled, lawyer

regulation entry barriers have evolved from virtual nonexistence 81
to the complex system of today.8" Some of this growth is surely due

to the power of bar association lobbying, but the susceptibility of the
justices to their lobbying is worth considering. Part of the answer
is that justices, like lawyers, have a great incentive to favor more
difficult entry standards. Lawyers do so to increase their wages;
judges do so to ease their jobs. Many of the studies of judicial
preferences have noted that, although judges cannot be paid more
regardless of how they decide cases, judges strongly value leisure
(i.e., a reduction or streamlining in their caseload or their administrative responsibilities)." In the American court system, judges rely
heavily on lawyers to process and prosecute the cases on their

dockets, in that lawyers are in charge of filing suits, discovery,
researching and presenting the law in arguments and briefs, and

assembling cases before the courts.84 As such, the quality of the
SI See FRIEDMAN, supra note 74, at 564-66 (stating that during mid-nineteenth century
"[flew states controlled admission to the bar through a single agency or court.... Even in
these jurisdictions the control was often slight, and the standards of admission vacuous.");
KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW INAMERICAN HISToRY 212 (1989) ("Beginning in
the 1830s, local authorities lost control over the certification of lawyers to state government
and . . . it was not until the post-Civil War era that professionalization of law practice
surged."); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION INAMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO
THE 1980S, at 7-8 (1983) (noting that during mid-nineteenth century"outward manifestations
of professionalism appeared to collapse" and there were few entry requirements).
I Bar entry is centrally controlled in every United States jurisdiction by sizeable
bureaucracies. See National Conference of Bar Examiners, Bar Admissions Offices, at http://
www.ncbex.org/offices.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2003) (listing bureaucracy contacts in each
state); American Bar Association, Directory of State Bar Admissions Offices, at http://www.
abanet.org/legaled/baradmissions/barcont.html (lastvisited Apr. 7, 2003) (providing directory
of state offices).
See Mark A. Cohen, The Motives of Judges: Empirical Evidence from Antitrust
Sentencing, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 13, 24-26 (1992) (suggesting penalty for going to trial
is function of increasing judge's workload); Christopher R. Drahozal, JudicialIncentives and
theAppeals Process, 51 SMUL. REV. 469,475-76 (1998) (C[One would expect judges to decide
at least some cases so as to protect or increase their leisure time."); Jonathan R. Macey,
Judicial Preferences,Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure,23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 631
(1994) (stating thatj udges "further their own self-interest by pursuing nonmonetary interests
such as increasing leisure (reduction in workload)"); Posner, supra note 24, at 20-21 (listing
examples of "leisure-seeking ... judicial behavior"); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the
Influences on the JudicialMind. An Empirical Study of JudicialReasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1377, 1483-85 (1998) ("[The judges' workload, measured in terms of size and proportion
of criminal docket, indeed influences judicial behavior.").
" Even a cursory review of the federal rules of civil and criminal procedure establishes
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lawyering is critical to a judge; the better the lawyers, the easier the
job. 5 Thus, justices had a powerful incentive to support and
mandate the continual tightening of entry standards throughout the
twentieth century.
Further evidence of this trend is the language of the state
supreme court decisions claiming the regulatory authority that
allowed entry barriers to rise. In claiming their control over entry
and conduct regulation, courts frequently noted that lawyers, as
"officers" of the court, were critically "necessary to the proper
performance of the courts.... In ordering the unification of the bar,87
that lawyers (or in some cases pro se litigants) are primarily responsible for almost all of the
legal and factual research, as well as the procedural aspects of every case on a judge's docket.
8' Compare, for example, judicial frustration with prose litigation to the judicial pleasure
of a well-litigated case. Cf. Margaret F. Brown, Domestic Violence Advocates' Exposure to
Liabilityfor Engagingin the UnauthorizedPracticeof Law, 34 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 279,
286 & n.54 (2001) (stating that "[elvidence suggests that 'many judges find it frustrating to
deal with pro se litigants' "); Charles E. Ramos & Alvin K. Hellerstein, A View from the
Judiciary,5 FoRDHAMJ. CORP. &FIN. L. 129, 139 (2000) (offering "an unpaid advertisemen"
for commercial courts division in Manhattan based upon "well litigated" cases and "wonderful
attorneys"); Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1806 & n.119
(2001) ("Some courts are openly hostile to unrepresented parties, whom they view as tying
up the system or attempting to gain tactical advantages.").
"6 In re Bailey, 248 P. 29, 30 (Ariz. 1926) ("IThere is no more important duty, nor one
whose performance is more necessary to the proper performance of the courts, than to see
that their officers are of proper mental ability and moral character."); see also In re Sparks,
101 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Ky. 1936) ("The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its
officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is
inherent in this court as a court-appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration
ofjustice."); Exparte Steckler, 154 So. 41, 45 (La. 1934) (holding that state supreme court has
ultimate authority over bar admission because "[a] proper administration of justice depends
as largely upon the conscience, competence and conduct of the members of the bar, as upon
the work of the men on the bench"); Ayres v. Hadaway, 6 N.W.2d 905, 908 (Mich. 1942)
(quoting In re Disbarment Proceedings of William L. Newby, 107 N.W. 850, 852 (Neb. 1906)):
Attorneys practicing in the district courts of this state are officers of the
courts in which they practice. Their position is an honorable one; they are
the trusted advisers of the court. There can be no doubt that the court
has ample power to protect itself against dishonorable and corrupt
practitioners.
Id. Courts also frequently complained of legislative efforts to "destroy the courts" by
admitting "persons without legal learning, and wanting in the proper conception of the ethics
of the profession." Alpert, supra note 17, at 539-40 (quoting In re Thatcher, 22 Ohio Dec. 116
(Lucas County Common Pleas Ct. 1912)).
87 The bar is unified (i.e., integrated) in thirty-six states and the District of Columbia.
Terry Radtke, The Last Stage in Reprofessionalizingthe Bar: The Wisconsin BarIntegration
Movement, 1934-1956, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 1001, 1001 (1998). In a state within a unified bar,
a lawyer must be a member of the state bar association in order to practice law in that state.
DAYTON McKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR 21-23 (1963); Bradley A. Smith, The Limits of
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state supreme courts regularly noted their interest in the quality of
the lawyers appearing before them." This rationale even stretched
to mandatory fee schedules, the most blatantly anticompetitive of
bar association activities.8"

Compulsory Professionalism: How the Unified Bar Harms the Legal Profession, 22 FIA ST.
U. L. REV. 35, 36 (1994). For an overview of the unified bar, see generally GLENN R. WINTERS,
THE UNIFIED BAR INTHE UNITED STATES (1973); Theodore J. Schneyer, The Incoherenceof the
Unified Bar Concept: Generalizingfrom the Wisconsin Case, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1 &
n. 1(1983). Bar unification is the crown jewel of lawyer self-regulation. See Susan A. Martyn,
Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEO. L.J. 705, 707 (1981)
("Thus, unlike other professionals, who are supervised by state regulatory agencies, lawyers
remain a virtually self-regulated profession."); Nancy J. Moore, The Usefulness of Ethical
Codes, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 7, 14-16 (opining that legal profession has reached unique
heights of self.regulation); Schneyer, supra, at 37 ("Self-regulatory institutions have a firmer
hold in law than in most occupations."). In more than half of the states, state supreme courts
have delegated much, if not all, of their regulatory authority to unified state bars. Wolfram,
supra note 17, at 37 ("Courts have shown little inclination to resist strongly and widely held
[bar association] views.") This delegation clearly offers lawyers unparalleled advantages
under interest group theory.
See, e.g., In re Mont. Bar Ass'n, 368 P.2d 158, 162 (Mont. 1962) (integrating Montana
Bar by court order because "(tihere is need for improvement in our court, the district and
justice courts, and in the Bar of which we are members"); In re Integration of Neb. State Bar
Ass'n, 275 N.W. 265, 267-68 (Neb. 1937) (approving integration because "the court has an
immediate interest in the character of the bar, for the court's own sake").
D Consider the following from the Wisconsin Supreme Court:
The State Bar recently adopted a recommended minimum fee schedule
covering legal services. The present economic plight of the lawyers in this
country is one which has disturbed the bench and the bar. Able young
men who Qtherwise might be attracted to entering the legal profession are
being discouraged not to because of this. Lawyers already in the
profession because of insufficient incomes are caused to forsake the
practice of law for more financially attractive fields of endeavor.
According to statistics gathered by the Economics of Law Practice
Committee of the American Bar Association during the period of 1929 to
1951 the net income of lawyers increased but 58 per cent, while for the
same period that of dentists rose 83 per cent and that of physicians 157
per cent. During the same period the net income of employees of all
industry increased 131 per cent. During 1954 the net income before taxes
of one-third of all practicing lawyers of the nation was less than $5,485.
The quality of legal service which will be rendered to the public is likely
to suffer if young men of ability are dissuaded from entering the profession because of the difficulty of securing an adequate financial reward to
enable them to properly support themselves and their families. A
minimum fee schedule which realistically recommends charges for legal
services that are in keeping with the increased cost of living that has
taken place since World War II, should have a tendency toward remedying
this condition.
Lathrop v. Donohue, 102 N.W.2d 404, 413-14 (Wis. 1960).

1194

GEORGIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 37:1167

The judicial sympathy and empathy for bar association lobbying
also can be seen in the battle between the "upper" bar (white
middle-class males) and the "lower," entrepreneurial bar (immigrants and minorities that had to struggle for business). 90 At the
turn of the nineteenth century, American Bar Association membership was almost exclusively from the "best" of the bar.9" In each of
the efforts to tighten bar admission, or punish unethical attorneys,
there was an implied (and sometimes blatant) effort to bar immigrants, Jews, and blacks from joining the profession.9 2 Bar associations and judges railed against shysters and "ambulance chasers" as
lawyer discipline was formalized and entry standards were tightened, a clear signal of the upper bar's disdain for the entrepreneurial bar. 93 Complaints against the entrepreneurial bar had a
' From an interest-group perspective, the history of the growth in lawyer regulation is
interesting precisely because the regulated industry (i.e., lawyers) rarely has spoken with a
unified voice. More typically there are internecine squabbles among different layers of the
bar. For example, the New York bar voted against unification because of disputes between
the urban New York City bar association and the rural lawyers upstate. JEROLD S.
AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 121-23 (1976); see also William A. Glaser, The Organizationof
the IntegratedBar (1960), reprinted in VERN COUNTRYMAN & TED FINMAN, THE LAWYER IN
MODERN SOCIETY 348, 350 (1966) ("The urban-rural balance of power is often a principal issue
when integration is being planned.").
" The ABA was founded in 1878 by "seventy-five gentlemen from twenty-one
jurisdictions, out of approximately 60,000 lawyers then practicing in the United States."
ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FORTHE PUBLIC PROFESSION OFTHE LAw 208 (1921); see also John
A. Matzko, "The Best Men of the Bar" The Foundingof the American BarAssociation,in THE
NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 75-90 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed.,
1984) (providing overarching history of founders and founding of ABA). In general, the
members of the other new bar associations also were drawn by invitation from the "elite" of
practice. See FRIEDMAN, supranote 74, at 563; ROSCOE POUND, THE AWYER FROM ANTIQUITY
TO MODERN TIMES 255-70 (1953).
' Jerold S. Auerbach's seminal work, Unequal Justice,contains innumerable examples
of prominent bar members and professors seeking to "purify" the legal profession by raising
entry barriers. See AUERBACH, supra note 8,at 102-29. For example, Pennsylvania devised
a system in which every applicant to the bar needed the support of three current members
of the bar, a system that effectively barred African-American applicants from bar membership
from 1933-43 and strongly discouraged Jews from applying. Id. at 125-28; see also Alpert,
supra note 17, at 537-38 (describing late nineteenth century Illinois Supreme Court case
rejecting statute granting graduates of Illinois law schools automatic bar admission because
schools were "diploma mills" and students were frequently immigrants).
"' Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals decried an
"unscrupulous minority" of the bar for "[a]mbulance chasing" among other "evil practices,"
and held that the court had authority to investigate and punish "professional misconduct" by
an "act of its own motion." Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 488-89 (N.Y. 1928). These actions
were taken in response to complaints from bar associations, which Cardozo termed "the
organs of [the profession's] common will." Id. at 488.
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particular resonance with state supreme court justices, who
naturally considered themselves part of the "finest men" of the
profession.9 4 As a result, throughout this period, state supreme
courts proved an invaluable asset to bar associations. Entry into the
profession tightened markedly,9 5 and acting upon their own motion
in response to bar requests, supreme courts investigated the
unauthorized practice of law,96 instituted new entry standards,9 7 and
even made some bar associations mandatory.9"
Judges also have a substantial interest in maximizing their own
"prestige," which generally means standing among other lawyers.9 9

' Consider the irony of Judge Cardozo, himself Jewish, railing upon an "unscrupulous
minority" of lawyers. See Karlin, 162 N.E. at 488; see also Rodney L. Mott et al., Judicial
Personnel, in JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 195, 205 (Glendon

Schubert ed., 1964) (reporting that from 1900 to 1929 more than 70% of state supreme court
justices received "the highest Martindale rating for legal ability"). Moreover, even if state
supreme court justices actually were not originally from the "upper crust' of society, their
appointment to the bench, and the regular lobbying of the bar associations, certainly placed
them there. Cf. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the JudicialMind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 81116 (2001) (noting that judges, like most people, suffer from "egocentric bias" when analyzing
their own abilities and presumably social standing); Posner, supra note 24, at 17 ("Another
source of judicial utility must e mentioned at this juncture. It is the deference that judges
receive from lawyers and from the public generally.").
9 From 1880 to 1940, all of the following current barriers to entry were established or
strengthened: central boards of bar examiners, see REED, supranote 91, at 103; the national
conference of bar examiners, see SUNDERLAND, supra note 74, at 58; character and fitness
examinations, see Rhode, supra note 8, at 496-500; written bar exams, see Elizabeth
Chambliss, ProfessionalResponsibility: Lawyers,A Case Study, 69 FORDHAML. REV. 817,833
(2000); and increased prohibition of the unauthorized practice of law, see HURST, supra note
17, at 320-21.
" See Henry M. Dowling, The InherentPower of the Judiciary,21 A.B.A. J. 635, 636-37
(1935) (listing cases, and stating that courts had independently defined "practice of law" and
had independently pursued unauthorized legal practitioners).
7 See ABEL, supra note 8, at 47 ("The history of legal education in the first half of the
twentieth century, therefore, is largely a story of the struggle by the ABA to persuade state
licensing authorities (supreme courts or integrated bar associations) to adopt its entry
standards."); STEVENS, supra note 81, at 94 C'After 1878 the ABA added its voice. Slowly,

boards of examiners, normally controlled by local bar associations, replaced the supreme
courts as the examining authorities.").
" See MCKEAN, supranote 87, at 49 (listing various courts that formed unified bars by
court order alone).
" See Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms andIncentives of RetrospectiveDecision-Making,
75 B.U.L. REV. 941, 971-73 (1995) (asserting that judges "who conform to the model ofjudicial
decision-making" curry favor from lawyers and other judges); Drahozal, supranote 83, at 475
(commenting that judges seek to "gain respect within the legal community"); Joseph D.
Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 784-85 (2000) (noting Supreme Court Justices' interest in reputation);
Thomas W. Merrill, InstitutionalChoice and PoliticalFaith,22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 959,974
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This effect, or simple empathy for fellow lawyers, may make justices
an easy target for lawyer lobbying.' 00
The recent literature of the "new institutionalism" sheds further
light upon state supreme courts' natural affinity with the interests
and concerns of lawyers. 01 State supreme court justices, as a
defined group and "institution," respond to the world, and particularly to policy decisions, as lawyers. °2 Legal thought itself is a
powerful and constraining institution.0 5 As evidence of the "institution" of legal thinking, consider its great resistance to change." In

this regard, the phrase that most frequently describes the gist of
American law school, teaching students to "think like a lawyer,"
takes on a particularly institutional flair.' 5 Justices have had the

(1997) (contemplating judges' "institutional motivation" and assuming that judges "seek to
maximize some extrinsic good, such as their prestige"); Schauer, supra note 24, at 627-31
(outlining "the effect of reputation" upon judges).
o0 Cf. Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposalsfor Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295,1343 (1978) (pointing out that judicial reticence
to sanction discovery abuses is likely result of "judges' understanding [as] former lawyers").
Further, despite seeing a great deal of shoddy lawyering, judges rarely make complaints to
disciplinary authorities. See STANDING COMM. ON PROIL DISCIPLINE, AM. BAR ASS'N, THE
JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO LAWYER MISCONDUCT, at iii (1984) (citing research showing that
"judges represent a minority of the complaintants even against easily detected serious
misconduct directly affecting the administration of justice").
'o See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
o2 See Wolfram, supra note 17, at 211 ("[]nboth England and America, there has never
been any significant difference between judges and lawyers in their background, training,
mutual set of expectations about the nature of the work that each would perform, professional
ambitions, or professional culture.").
"o Cf. Lynn M. Lopucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers'Heads,
90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1498, 1501.02 (1996) ("Law is practiced mostly in communities. Those
communities forge shared mental models of the law and process cases principally in accord
with them.").
"o'Much of the research in the "new institutionalism" has focused upon institutional
resistance to change. See Lynne G. Zucker, The Role of Institutionalizationin Cultural
Persistence,in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM INORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 30, at
83. Law and legal reasoning have proven resistant to change. See NORMAN F. CANTOR,
IMAGINING THE LAW 373 (1997) ('A London barrister of 1500 would need only a few months
of remedial education to step into an American courtroom today."); Steven D. Smith, Believing
Like a Lawyer, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1042, 1042-43 (1999) (quoting Norman Cantor as saying that
"lawyers and judges today talk and argue and justify in pretty much the same curious way
that they have used for generations").
10 See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supranote 24, at 3 ("Mhe ways of lawyers and judges and
students of the law are specialized ways, often so ostentatious in their specialization as to
suggest the esoteric flimflam of a jealous guild."); Stephen Shapiro, The Judiciary in the
United States: A Search for Fairness,Independence, and Competence, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 667, 685 (2001):

2003]

LAWYER REGULATION

1197

transformative experiences of law school and practice, and therefore
view the world in a very specific way.1" 6 Further, state supreme
court justices are likely to be individuals who particularly thrived
under the written and unwritten rules of the legal world. State
supreme courts thus approach their work with a prescribed set of
heuristics, behaviors, and notions about the world. These cognitive
institutions are precisely why these individuals have succeeded as
lawyers and why they are valued as judges. Nevertheless, these
same factors lead justices to uniquely empathize with and under-

Most judges are chosen from the ranks of practicing attorneys. Although
a few may have harbored long-held dreams of becoming judges, at the
time that they attended law school almost all of them intended to become
lawyers, rather than judges. It is often said that American law schools
teach students to "think like a lawyer."
Id. Many have noted the great difference between the lawyer's thought process and that of
a lay person. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 14
(1996) (commenting that "to nonlawyers or to people from other cultures" lawyer's thinking
is "weird or exotic"); Alexander Scherr, Lawyers and Decisions: A Model of Practical
Judgment, 47 VILL. L. REV. 161, 164-278 (2002) (outlining model for unique decisionmaking
process of lawyers).
1o6See ROBERTA- CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS INAMERICA 259-63 (2d ed.
1992) (depicting "the judicial socialization process"); Paul J. Dimaggio & Walter W. Powell,
The Iron Cage Revisited InstitutionalIsomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM INORGANIZATIONALANALYSIS, supranote 30, at
63, 71 ("Wndividuals in an organizational field undergo anticipatory socialization to common
expectations about their personal behavior, appropriate style of dress, organizational
vocabularies, and standard methods of speaking, joking, or addressing others."). Many have
noted that law schools provide a particularly jarring and shaping form of education (and
therefore institutionbuilding). See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Legal Educationas Trainingfor
Hierarchy, in DAVID KAIRYS, THE POLITICS OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 40-61 (1982)
(describing process of legal education); Rachel F. Moran, Diversityand Its Discontents: The
End of Affirmative Action at Boalt Hall, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2241, 2331-32 (2000) (noticing that
some find law school "intellectually stunting"); James Ogloffet al.,
More Than "Learningto
Think Like a Lawyer" The EmpiricalResearch on Legal Education, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV.
73, 110-11 (2000) (denoting powerful effects of law school education). Others have noted the
continuing effect that law school has upon judges and justices. See, e.g., Julius Getman, Of
LaborLaw and Birdsong,30 CONN. L. REV. 1345, 1349 (1998) (depicting "the transformative
experiences of law school, judicial clerking, and high level legal practice" upon judges);
Charles E. Rice, The Role of Legal Education in Judicial Reform, in A BLUEPRINT FOR
JUDICIALREFORM 273,273 (1981) (noting that law schools contribute tojudicial interpretation
of law). Similarly, practicing law greatly affects judicial thinking. Cf. PHILIP ELLIOTT, THE
SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS 94-115 (1972) (covering powerful psychological and
sociological effects of"professionalization"); Marc Galanter, Mega-Law andMega-Lawyering
in the Contemporary United States, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS 152, 171-73
(Robert Dingwall & Philip Lewis eds., 1983) (describing sociological effects of mega-law firms
on practice of law, and on "upper crust" of bar).
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stand the interests and views of lawyers.1 1 7
Aside from the more esoteric and academic reasons for justices to
favor lawyers' interests, there are a number of more crass reasons.
First, most justices are members of bar associations.0 Since 1910,
the American Bar Association (ABA) has recognized the importance
of recruiting the judiciary and made a concentrated effort to sign up
judges, boasting that as of 1915, eighty-five percent of the federal
judiciary and fifty-six percent of state judges were members. 0 9
Second, bar associations lobby tirelessly on behalf of judges. The
ABA lobbies for higher salaries,11 0 better benefits,11 and improved
public opinion of the judiciary."'
Third, the coarsest possible reason, justices frequently rely upon
lawyers and bar associations to obtain and keep their jobs. For
example, lawyers provide most of the elected judiciary's campaign

"o Consider also Lawrence Baum's discussion of fundamental attribution error, "Some
psychologists have argued that the situations in which individuals act have a more critical
impact on behavior, and intrinsic traits of individuals less, than most people realize. Indeed,
the tendency to give undue weight to intrinsic traits has been labeled the 'fundamental
attribution error.' " LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 33-34 (1997)
(citations omitted). Baum concludes that the nature of a judge's practice and training has a
significant effect on the judge's goals and thought processes. Id. Professor William Bishop
has noted that this consonance of interest has affected the very structure of administrative
law. See William Bishop, A Theory of Administrative Law, 19 J. LEG. STUD. 489, 493-94
(1990) (claiming that because "judges tend to see the public interest through the eyes of the
men and women they once were," they have created"a 'lawyer's paradise' within administrative law").
10 In the thirty-six states with a unified bar, all justices are licensed attorneys, and ipso
facto are members of the state bar association. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, STATE COURT
SYSTEMS 6-7 (1978). Twenty-seven states explicitly require their justices to be members of
the state bar. Id.
'09 40 A.B.A. REP. 30 (1915). The ABA specifically founded a "Judicial Section" designed
to allow judges to meet and confer on "the duties and responsibilities of the judiciary." 38
A.B.A. REP. 152-53 (1913).
"1oIn 1912, the ABA formed a committee to increase judicial salaries, 37 A.B.A. REP. 36-37
(1912), which later succeeded in lobbying the United States Congress for higher salaries. The
committee also gathered and disseminated the salaries of state judges, to induce raises in the
low-salary states. 56 A.B.A. REP. 58-59 (1931).
,. See generally NATL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, A SURVEY OF STATE JUDICIAL FRINGE
BENEFITS (2d ed. 1996) (lobbying for increased benefits for state courts).
112 See generally LAWYERS CONFERENCE, JUDICIAL ADMIN. DIV., AM. BAR ASS'N, UNJUST
CRITICISM OF JUDGES (1986) (presenting report from ABA's subcommittee on unjust criticism
of bench). The ABA also worked with judges to draft the ABA Judicial Code. See LISA L.
MILFORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OFTHE ABAJUDICIAL CODE 3-8 (1992) (describing ABA's central
role in code's development).
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donations. "3 In elective states, including merit selection states with
retention elections, bar associations frequently endorse judicial
115
candidates" 4 and conduct and publish "bar polls" on the judges.
Many justices were selected for their positions through "merit plans"
that place substantial selection authority in state and local bar

"' See Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Tex. App. 1983) ("It is not surprising that
attorneys are the principal source of contributions in a judicial election."); David Barnhizer,
"On the Make"' CampaignFundingand the Corruptingof the American Judiciary,50 CATH.
U. L. REV. 361, 393 (2001) (delineating judiciary's reliance upon lawyer campaign contributions and its deleterious effects); William C. Cleveland, Money and JudicialElections,68 DEF.
COUNS. J. 393, 393 (2001) ("A California commission interviewed dozens ofjudges, campaign
consultants and academic experts in reaching its findings that controversial races create
pressure to raise money, that candidates are forced to solicit campaign contributions from
lawyers and litigants, and that candidates are often left in debt after the expense of
elections."); Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges'CampaignFinancing:Are State Judges'Robes
the Emperor's Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 93-94 (1985) (stating that
bulk of elected judges' campaign donations come from lawyers); Stuart Banner, Note,
DisqualifyingElected Judges from CasesInvolving CampaignContributors,40 STAN. L. REV.
449,458 (1988) ("[Iot surprisingly, much of the financing for judicial campaigns comes from
lawyers."); MarkA. Grannis, Note, Safe Guardingthe Litigant'sConstitutionalRight to aFair
and Impartial Forum: A Due Process Approach to Improprieties Arising from Judicial
Campaign Contributions from Lawyers, 86 MICH. L. REv. 382, 416 (1987) (discussing
advantages and disadvantages of lawyer contributions); Bradley A. Siciliano, Note, Attorney
Contributionsin JudicialCampaigns: Creatingthe Appearanceof Impropriety,20 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 217, 221-23 (1991) (presenting argument for attorney contributions). Studies have
suggested that the donations may be influential. See Robert R. Kuehn, Denying Access to
Legal Representation: The Attack on the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, 4 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL'Y 33, 137-38 (2000) ("Similar polls in other states found that voters, by large margins,
believed that judicial decisions are influenced by campaign contributions and that attorneys
and judges agreed that campaign donations influence judicial decisions."). As a review of the
above literature demonstrates, many have worried that elected judges might favor a lawyer
campaign contributor in a particular case. None have noted the systematic difficulty of
having justices regulate the same lawyers on which the justices rely for campaign donations.
"' See Henry T. Reath, Judicial Evaluation-The Counterpart to Merit Selection, 60
A.B.A. J. 1246 (1974) (noting that bar associations frequently are involved in process of
judicial evaluations); Schotland, supra note 113, at 121-32 (describing effect of bar
endorsements); Feature, HBA Lawyers Look Back, HOUS. LAW., Sept./Oct. 1995, at 46
("Aspiring to elect judges on merit, we urged the newspapers in their editorial endorsements
to pay heed to the Bar's preferences because lawyers, better than anyone else, were able to
evaluate the candidates with an eye toward ability and professionalism.").
1'5 See PHILIP L. DuBois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH 67-69 (1980) (reporting on use of bar
polls "for public consumption" or "official endorsement"); JAMES H. GUTERMAN & ERROL E.
MEIDINGER, IN THE OPINION OF THE BAR: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF BAR POLLING PRACTICES 1951 (1977) (evaluating and surveying national bar polling practices); DOROTHY L. MADDI,
JUDICIALPERFORMANCE POLLS 3-4 (1977) (reporting that bar polls are conducted to influence
both public and judges themselves); John M. Roll, Merit Selection: The Arizona Experience,
22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 837, 878 (1990) (describing process and uses of bar polling, and effect of bar
polls upon merit retention elections).
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associations."' Any state judges who hope to join the federal
judiciary rely on the ABA for a favorable rating."'
Lastly, even though justices are not open to lobbying in the
traditional sense (i.e., paid lobbyists or nonprofit organizations
entreating them on a particular issue), they are very open to
informal lawyer lobbying at bar association meetings, conferences
in chambers, by their clerks, or simply in social gatherings with
their current and former colleagues, partners, or associates.
Lawyers and bar associations have a high level of access to, and
influence over, justices. As an institutional matter, the interests,
social status, and even thought processes of the judiciary and
lawyers substantially dovetail.
b. Accessibility to the Public. While state supreme courts are
particularly susceptible to lawyer and bar association lobbying, they
are particularly inaccessible to lobbying from the public. As a

-

See CHARLES R. ASHMAN, THE FINEST JUDGES MONEY CAN BUY 242 (1973) (alleging

that under merit selection "all that has happened is that the politics of the governor and the
bar association have replaced the politics of the county party chairman and the electorate");
STUART S. NAGEL, COMPARING ELECTED AND APPOINTED JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 30 (American

Political Series No. 04-001, Randall B. Ripley ed., 1973) (discussing bar association
preferences in merit selection and nominating systems); RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDOL G.
DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR, JUDICIAL SELECTION UNDER THE
MISSOURI NONPARTISAN COURT PLAN 87, 170 (1969) (stating that selection process is
personalized and involves intense campaigns, and discussing role that appellate clientele play
in judicial selection process); Kelley Armitage, Denial Ain't Just a River in Egypt: A
Thorough Review of Judicial Elections, Merit Selection and the Role of State Judges in
Society, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 625, 656 (2002) ("History has shown that trial lawyers and their
acolytes have controlled merit selection committees."); Henry R. Glick, The Promiseand the
Performanceof the MissouriPlan: JudicialSelection in the Fifty States, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV.
509, 521 (1978) (stating that commissions are loaded with partisan gubernatorial appointees
and generally are not bipartisan); Goldschmidt, supra note 65, at 21-22 (observing that
"attorney members of nominating commissions are either appointed by the governor, or
elected or appointed by the state or local bars," and listing states in corresponding footnotes);
Laurance M. Hyde, The MissouriNon-PartisanCourt Plan,in SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL
SELECTION AND TENURE 47 (Glenn R. Winters ed., 1967) (stating that lawyers on Missouri
plan judicial selection committees "are elected by the bar").
" See generally Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,
The Role of the American Bar Association in the JudicialSelection Process, 101st Cong.
(1989); JOEL B. GROSSMAN, LAWYERS AND JUDGES: THE ABA AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
SELECTION (1965). Not surprisingly, scholars have noted that ambition plays a part in the
judicial utility function. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 83, at 16-17 (discussing prospect of
appointment to higher bench as potential constraint on judges); Schauer, supra note 24, at
631-33 (discussing occupational ambition); Sisk et al., supra note 83, at 1487-93 (discussing
promotion as potential factor).
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logistical matter, courts are not set up to be lobbied."' The public
cannot stop by a justice's chambers to complain about lawyer
regulation, nor are justices provided staff to respond to constituent
complaints or lobbying. In fact, courts are organized precisely to
minimize the effect of public opinion and lobbying upon judges.
Moreover, courts have a "new institutional" aversion to lobbying.
Recurrent calls for judicial independence' have a powerful effect
on how justices view their institutional roles and jobs. 20 For the
great bulk of a state supreme court justice's work, immunity from
public opinion and lobbying is laudable. When courts regulate
lawyers, however;, this immunity becomes problematic.
Even if state supreme courts were more open to lobbying, there
is the substantial difficulty of public ignorance about state supreme
courts and lawyer regulation. Transaction costs and the expense of
public education on issues contribute substantially to the power of
interest groups in the political system. 2 ' Thus, the deeper the
ignorance about the nature and role of the government body
involved, the steeper the cost of organizing the public at large.
Studies have shown that the public is unlikely to know who their
state supreme court justices are.122 Judicial elections tend to be "low
118 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183 (1983) (remarking that courts "are not
subject to lobbying, judges do not entertain visitors in their chambers for the purpose of
urging that cases be resolved one way or another, and they do not and should not respond to
parades, picketing or pressure groups"); Harold J. Krent, Should Bouie Be Buoyed?: Judicial
Retroactive Lawmakingandthe Ex PostFacto Clause,3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 35,89-93
(1997) (arguing that judges, and particularly federal judges, are immune from political
pressures); William F. Shughart & Robert D. Tollison, Interest Groupsand the Courts,6 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 953, 958-59 (1998) ('No other institution of democratic government is
supposedly more insulated from the political process than the judiciary.").
.. See White, supra note 67, at 1-15 (arguing that judicial independence is critical
element of American democracy); James W. Dolan, Underminingthe Court System, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 26, 2001, at A19 (noting that legislative oversight of court administration
undermines judicial independence); Editorial, Keep Politics Out of Justice, S. FLA. SUNSENTINEL, Nov. 4,2001, at F4 ("Judicial independence is the cornerstone of our democracy.").
"o The first canon of judicial ethics commands that "[a] judge shall uphold the integrity
and independence of the judiciary." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2000).
"
',

See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
See Deborah R. Hensler, Do We Need an Empirical Research Agenda on Judicial

Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 707, 721 (1999):

A 1995 survey of North Carolina citizens found that about 60% of
respondents did not know that their state supreme court and intermediate
appellate court justices were elected. A 1997 survey of New Mexico
residents found that 96% of respondents could not name any state
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salience," meaning that voters do not "have much interest in, or
information about, the candidates for judicial office,"' 123 and voter
turnout in judicial elections is low. 124 Voter apathy is partially a

result of the behavior of the candidates-the judicial canons of
ethics and professional norms discourage any campaign promise
beyond "the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the
office"' 2 -and partially because voters26have little incentive to learn
about any specific judicial candidate.1
supreme court or intermediate appellate court justice, and that two-thirds
could not name any of their local district court judges.
Id.
'
Philip L. DuBois, Voting Cues in NonpartisanTrial Court Elections: A Multivariate
Assessment, 18 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 395, 397 (1984); see also Richard L. Hasen, "High Court
Wrongly Elected" A Public Choice Model of Judging and Its Implications for the Voting
Rights Act, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1305, 1315-18 (1997) (noting that judicial elections are low
salience); Marie Hojnacki & Lawrence Baum, Choosing Judicial Candidates: How Voters
Explain Their Decisions,75 JUDICATURE 300,300-01 (1992) (citing voters' reliance upon their
reaction to candidate's name in voting for state supreme court race); Allen T. Kots, The
Selection of Judges and the Short Ballot, in SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND
TENURE 108, 108-09; Bridget E. Montgomery & Christopher C. Conner, PartisanElections:
The Albatross of Pennsylvania'sAppellate Judiciary,98 DICK. L. REV. 1, 20-22 (1993) (alleging
voter apathy in judicial races); Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Judges and Jurors: Their Functions,
Qualifications and Selection, 36 B.U. L. REV. 1, 43-44, 44 n.63 (1956) (pointing out voter
ignorance in judicial elections); Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There
One -Best"Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 26 (1995) (depicting widespread voter apathy
in judicial elections, particularly in nonpartisan races); Glenn R. Winters & Bob Allard, Two
Dozen MisperceptionsAbout JudicialSelection and Tenure, in JUDICIAL SELECTION 130, 132
(1993) (finding that few voters know for which judges they are voting). Contra Croley, supra
note 65, at 734 (arguing that some judicial races are evincing higher salience).
1' See Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 992
(2001) ('A relatively small percentage of the electorate votes in judicial elections. In
Wisconsin, ordinarily less than 25% of the electorate participate in judicial elections, and
Wisconsin is a state with one of the highest presidential election turnouts in the country.");
David W. Case, In Search of an Independent Judiciary: Alternatives to JudicialElections in
Mississippi, 13 MISS. C. L.REV. 1, 11, 21 (1992) (reporting low voter turnout in both
Mississippi's partisan and nonpartisan judicial elections); Jay A. Daugherty, Edge of
Extinction or a Survivor in ChangingSocio-Legal Environment?, 62 Mo. L. REV. 315, 322-23
(1997) C'[Jludicial retention elections attract the smallest voter turnout of all types of
elections.").
'25
MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (1990); DUBOIS, supra note 115,
at 65-66; see also Jack Ladinsky &Allan Silver, PopularDemocracy and JudicialIndependence: Electorateand Elite Reactions to Two Wisconsin Supreme Court Elections, 1967 WIS.
L. REV. 128, 153-54 C'Professional norms and codes inhibit or prevent utterly the substantive
discussion of judicial decisions or legal philosophies."). The Court's holding in Republican
Party v. White, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 2542 (2002), that the Minnesota version of this judicial canon
violated the First Amendment, however, may result in more openness in judicial elections.
" See Croley, supra note 65, at 731-32 (concluding that voters have "little incentive" to
learn about judicial candidates because "the likelihood that a given judicial candidate would
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Moreover, voters do not know that justices regulate the legal
profession.127 The programs that evaluate judicial performance
(presumably for the benefit of the voters) wholly ignore the judicial
role in lawyer regulation.128 Thus, even in the occasional high
salience judicial election, lawyer regulation is not an issue. 29 In
general, most people tend to think that bar associations run lawyer
discipline, and they do not connect whatever issues they have with
lawyers or lawyer regulation to state supreme court justices. 13
The first barriers to public input on lawyer regulation are thus
logistical and structural in that the public does not know who their
state justices are, or that they control lawyer regulation. Ironically,
even if those barriers could be overcome, it would still prove difficult
to vote out an offending justice over lawyer regulation, because the
few informed voters in judicial elections vote on the justice's abilities
as a judge, not as a lawyer regulator." 1 Since judging is the great

render a decision affecting any given voter is small").
1" See Steele, supranote 15, at 962-63 (stating that 35 out of 45 disgruntled former clients
interviewed "did not know of the existence of the disciplinary agency; 4 others knew of it but
could not describe its function"); see also Ann Davis, Bar Readmissions Cloaked in Secrecy,
NAtL L.J., Aug. 12, 1996, at Al C[R]eadmissions [to the bar] can be as covert as midnight
town meetings to lay people."); HALT: An Organization of Americans for Legal Reform,
Lawyer Accountability Project, at http://www.halt.org/laphome.php (last visited Apr. 8,2003)
(describing "invisibility" of lawyer regulators, "secrecy" of disciplinary processes, and lack of
public participation in process).
12
See ARIz. COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE
(2000) (evaluating Arizona judges up for retention election while never mentioning attorney
regulation); SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, AM. BAR ASS'N,
GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 9-30 (1985) (describing
evaluation of judges and ignoring lawyer regulation); NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE TRIAL
JUDGES, AM. BAR ASS'N, JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION HANDBOOK 1-7 (1996)

(overviewing judicial evaluation programs with no mention of attorney regulation).
' See, e.g., Myron Bright, Judicial Independence, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 611, 614 (1998)
(discussing several examples of dismissals or rejections of state judges with no mention of
lawyer regulation); Traciel V. Reid, The Politicizationof Retention Elections: Lessons from
the Defeat of Justices Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68, 69-77 (1999) (describing two
highly charged retention elections with no mention of lawyer regulation); Frances Kahn
Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardianof JudicialIndependence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 625,
627.28, 648-51 (1999) (detailing several campaigns against state supreme court justices with
no mention of lawyer regulation).
13
In many cases, of course, they are right. In multiple states, the supreme court has
delegated all or most of the regulation of lawyers to bar associations. See infra note 150 and
accompanying text. Consider also the lingo of the profession. A licensed practitioner is called
"a member of the bar." The licensing exam is called "the bar examination."
'a'See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
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bulk of any justice's job, this voting strategy makes perfect sense.
This lack of accountability makes the problems associated with
interest-group theory particularly acute because the only real public
check on the power of interest groups is the power to vote an
offending legislator out of office, and the dual role of justices as
judges and regulators makes it unlikely that a motivated voter
would vote to oust a justice over lawyer regulation.12
2. Institutional Capacity and Character. State supreme courts
have some advantages (e.g., expertise) and some disadvantages (e.g.,
inexperience as delegators) as regulators of lawyers.
a. Institutional Characteristics. Courts are not natural
legislators. It cuts against the grain of their institutional mission
and self-image. Courts consider themselves, first and foremost,

'" See Charles W. Wolfram, Barriersto Effective PublicParticipationin Regulation of the
Legal Profession, 62 MINN. L. REV. 619, 641-46 (1978) (describing strategies for public
participation in regulation oflegal profession). A short description of the steps a citizen would
need to take to alter lawyer regulation also helps elucidate the multiple hurdles involved in
any lobbying effort. Consider, for example, the necessary steps for a group of law school
students lobbying the supreme court to reinstate the diploma privilege (a diploma privilege
automatically admits graduates of certain in-state schools to that state's bar). See W. Ray
Williams, Hand-up or Handout? The Americans with DisabilitiesAct and "Unreasonable
Accommodation" of Learning Disabled Bar Applicants: Toward a New Paradigm, 34
CREIGHTON L. REV. 611, 621 n.28 (2001) ("Some states (Montana, South Dakota, West
Virginia and Wisconsin) grant graduates of selected schools a diploma privilege and they are
admitted to practice in those states without taking a bar examination."). First, the group
would have to appeal to the state bar association. The bar association is unlikely to support
any measures that raise the number of lawyers in practice because of the possible
disadvantageous changes to competition and pricing. In fact, bar associations have
historically fought tooth and nail against the diploma privilege. See ABEL, supra note 8,at
62-68, 263-64. The group could take its complaint to the state supreme court, although it is
difficult to imagine how the group would gain access. As noted above, state supreme courts
are purposefully designed to avoid the possibility of lobbying by disgruntled citizens. Even
if the students could attract the supreme court's attention, the odds of the supreme court
bucking the bar association are slim. In fact, state supreme courts have been willing partners
in eliminating diploma privileges all over the country. See id. If the state supreme court did
not overrule the bar association's decision, it would be extremely difficult for the group to
punish the supreme court justices. If appointed, their removal would require impeachment
proceedings, a nearly impossible task. If elected, the group would have to organize an
opposition campaign. The campaign likely would flounder because it would require
substantial voter education about the role of state supreme courts, plus education on the
multiple costs associated with entry barriers versus the benefits. Even if the group educated
voters, it still would be difficult to get them to vote on the basis of lawyer regulation, because
educated voters presumably vote for justices on the basis of their abilities as judges, not as
regulators.
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interpreters of the law, not policymakers.133 Nearly every supreme
court shrinks-at least in judicial opinions-from the bugaboo of
"judicial legislating."134 It is difficult for justices to alter their
mindset of being simple adjudicators narrowly deciding disputes.
Furthermore, whatever policies or interpretations courts do produce
tend to occur piecemeal, in small incremental steps, and are
constrained by stare decisis and past precedent.13 Judges thus are
unaccustomed to crafting broad new programs or approaching
societal problems from a policymaking perspective.
Membership on supreme courts also turns over much more slowly
than other government bodies, allowing great institutional consis-

l,3 See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE 2 (1998) (finding that, although judges clearly do make policy, they typically
are almost embarrassed about it and "insist that they simply do not engage in policy
making").
"' See, e.g., Four County (NW) Reg'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist. Bd. v. Sunray Servs., Inc.,
971 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Ark. 1998) ("[J]udicial review of legislative action is not undertaken de
novo by a trial court because that would be judicial legislating."); State v. Iowa Dist. Court,
620 N.W.2d 271, 275 (Iowa 2000) (applying plain language rule because "[tio adopt another
interpretation of this language would be nothing short ofjudicial legislating"); Rose v. Council
for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989) ('[W]e do not engage in judicial legislating.
We do not make policy. We do not substitute our judgement for that of the General
Assembly."); Lanier v. State, 635 So. 2d 813, 819 (Miss. 1994) (refusing to "engage in judicial
legislating in order to circumvent the statutory scheme"); Jewish Home & Infirmary, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 640 N.E.2d 125, 130 (N.Y. 1994) (eschewing invitation to "the forbidden realm of
judicial legislating"); Peterson v. Holm, 607 N.W.2d 8, 13 (S.D. 2000) (rejecting minority view
on statute of limitations, because to hold otherwise "would be an end-run around the statute
by judicial legislating"); Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834, 836-37 (Wyo. 1991)
(avoiding opportunity to "engage in comprehensive judicial legislating").
13 Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 29, at 35-61 (1996) (describing judiciary's propensity for
"incompletely theorized agreements," or incremental steps); Colin S. Diver, Policymaking
Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 396.401 (1981) (comparing
legislative policymaking ('comprehensive rationality") with judicial policymaking
("incrementaism")); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,92 HARV. L. REV.
353, 394-409 (1978) (arguing that judges have great difficulties implementing large-scale
social programs); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent,66 N.C. L. REv. 367, 383-93 (1988)
(offering alternative rationale for role of precedent that permits competing societal influences
to be reconciled with stare decisis). For a psychologist's take on the essentially conservative
nature of the judiciary, see Craig Haney, Psychology and Legal Change: On the Limits of a
Factual Jurisprudence, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 147, 159-60 (1980) (presenting "political
disjunction theory" that judges are predominantly politically conservative, and that legal
system based on stare decisis and precedent is also essentially conservative). Seegenerally
EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
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tency.136 Courts are, therefore, a uniquely conservative (in the
nonpolitical sense) institution.'3 7 Although this institutional
conservatism has numerous advantages
for a judicial body, it
8
hampers adaptability in policymaking.1
Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that judges will make
particularly good legislators. State supreme court justices are
selected or elected because of their abilities as judges, not as
attorney regulators. There is nothing in the selection process for
judges that suggests they will be natural administrators of lawyer
139
regulation.
The institutional difficulties are compounded by the need of a
busy, relatively small body to delegate at least day-to-day regulatory
authority. Given these institutional constraints, the question is not
whether state supreme courts will have to delegate, it is the nature
of the delegation. State supreme courts are extremely busy, and
much has been made about the "caseload crisis" in the federall40 and
state courts,' including state appellate courts. 42 State supreme
is See G. ALAN TARR& MARYPORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATEAND NATION 23839 (1988) (arguing that state supreme courts "can develop consistent institutional identities
more readily than other governmental bodies can").
" See Mitu Gulati &C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS.
157, 171 (1998) (remarking that federal appellate judges are "a group characterized by its
inherent institutional conservatism"). Consider also Adrian Vermeule's excellent discussion
of the power of habit over judicial thinking. See Adrian Vermeule, The JudicialPower in the
State (andFederal)Courts, 2000 SuP. CT. REV. 357, 391 ("Judges, like other people, become
habituated to and invested in the tasks, activities, and procedures they customarily and
repetitively perform.").
'" Naturally, critics of government regulation might see this as a singular advantage of
the courts, i.e., the less the government does, the better.
" Query, however, whether any of our democratic institutions are designed to select
especially competent elected or appointed government officials.
o See, e.g., RICHARDA. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISISAND REFORM 59-93 (1985);

Martin J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a StructuralOverhaul of the FederalCourts,
1996 WISC. L. REV. 11, 25-26 (discussing federal caseload crisis); Edith H. Jones, Back to the
Future for Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal Justice by Recovering Limited
Jurisdiction,73 TEX. L. REV. 1485, 1487-91 (1995) (same).
"' See, e.g., Jon R. Muth, The Answer to "Why?", 74 MICH. B.J. 120, 122 (1995) (describing

"exceptional growth" and "crisis" in Michigan's state courts); POSNER, supranote 140, at 86-87
(citing substantial rise in court filings in state trial courts); John B. Oakley, The Future
Relationshipof California'sState and Federal Courts: An Essay on JurisdictionalReform,
the Transformation of Property,and the New Age of Information, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2233,
2234-38 (1993) (detailing California's state and federal court caseload crisis).
142

See, e.g., APPELLATE JUDGES CONFERENCE, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE DELAY

REDUCTION 11 (1988) (elucidating upon state appellate court caseload crisis); John J.Watkins,
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courts are relatively small and cannot grow because of logistical and
constitutional concerns."' Given that judges are faced with a
scarcity of resources and a desire for a modicum of leisure,144
something has to give. Justices are naturally reluctant to forgo
their responsibilities as judges, so the abdication of their regulatory
responsibilities is a convenient solution.
This is especially true because state supreme courts approach the
task of regulating lawyers with little joy or alacrity.14 5 Few, if any,
state supreme court justices pursued their position in order to
regulate attorneys. In practice, state supreme courts tend to treat
lawyer regulation the way that district courts treat discovery
disputes, as a less palatable aspect of the job. 1"
Therefore, we would expect supreme courts to delegate as much
of their authority over lawyer regulation as they can, to preserve
leisure and to maximize the time and energy they have to spend on
their primary job, deciding cases. The degree of delegation depends
upon the consequences of overdelegation. " " In this circumstance,
the public at large, hampered by collective action problems and the
structure of the courts, has limited opportunities to punish justices
for overdelegation. Lawyers, however, are well-organized and care
greatly about the justices' policies and their delegation of authority.
Thus, we would expect state supreme courts to delegate as much
authority as they can without upsetting lawyers.

Division of Labor Between Arkansas'sAppellate Courts, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCKL.J. 177, 177
(1995) (describing "crisis in volume" afflicting Arkansas's state appellate courts).
143 See DAVID B. ROTHMAN ET AL., STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 1993, at 18-19 (1993)
(listing numbers of justices on each state supreme court, varying from five to nine); POSNER,
supra note 140, at 14 (explaining logistical barriers to expanding size of supreme courts).
1" See supra notes 64-109 and accompanying text.
14
See WOLFRAM, supra note 15, at 37 ("The relationship between the unified bar and the
court that has often created it is sometimes that of unruly offspring and compliant parent.").
'4 Cf. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 100, at ii (describing judges' general lack of knowledge
about disciplinary system and concluding that "[t]he judiciary must become more informed
about lawyer discipline"); CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, A NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON
LAWYER CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONALISM 7-16 (1999) (summarizing steps that are necessary
for state supreme courts to improve lawyer professionalism); MCKAY REPORT, supranote 11,
at 7 (stating that survey of state high court justices "showed that while they considered
discipline important, most were not aware of the many problems we have discovered").
"4See Croley, supranote 14, at 22-25 (outlining process of delegation, resulting problems
with shirking and slacking, and responses of monitoring and punishment).
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In practice, of course, this has been exactly the outcome. State
supreme courts have satisfied their own and lawyers' interests by
delegating virtually all of their regulatory authority under the
vaunted system of "lawyer self-regulation." 18 This delegation kills
two birds with one stone, because state supreme courts maximize
delegation and please the only players who care, lawyers. Lawyers
maximize their control (or capture, to use a more loaded term) over
the regulation of their profession.14 s The more of the regulation that
lawyers control, the more likely it becomes that the regulation will
serve lawyers' interests.
The ultimate example of this phenomenon is the unified bar.
State supreme courts literally delegate almost all of their regulatory
authority back to lawyers. 5 ' A more prevalent example is state
supreme court reliance on the ABA to draft the rules that govern
lawyer behavior."'
A comparison between two different areas of lawyer regulation--one that lawyers care about, and one that they do
not-demonstrates this process in practice. First, consider entry
barriers. From the late nineteenth century, bar associations have
lobbied relentlessly for higher entry barriers. These efforts have
proven enormously successful, and entry is now guarded by welloiled machines and multiple, growing requirements.'52
Second, compare attorney discipline procedures. For obvious
reasons, regulation of attorney discipline is a low priority for bar
associations. " The ABA itself, among others, has determined that
'" For a description of lawyer self-regulation, see Barton, supra note 7, at 434-44, 463-64
(comparing possible justifications for entry restrictions in legal market to current regulation,
and comparing potential justification for regulation of attorney conduct to current state
attorney regulations); L. Ray Patterson, The Function of a Code of Legal Ethics,35 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 695, 695 (1981) ("The purpose of a code of legal ethics is to implement the legal
profession's prerogative of self-regulation.").
"' Recall that agency capture occurs precisely because the regulated industry (in this case
lawyers) are the primary and repeat players before the agency.
150 MCKAY REPORT, supra note 11, at 23. Following complaints about the egregious state
of disciplinary enforcement, justices in some states have recently stripped their unified bars
offull regulatory authority, generally by removing responsibility for disciplinary enforcement.
See id. at 23-31 (advocating removing disciplinary functions from unified bars).
151 See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
'" Again, once a lawyer is licensed she loses much of her incentive to police the profession
itself, and public calls for legal reform are by and large shunted onto entrants to the
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attorney discipline is, and always has been, a neglected area."'
Attorney discipline is underfunded.' 55 There are backlogs for
investigations."
In most states, the process is secret. 5 7 Up to
ninety percent of the complaints are summarily dismissed, partially
because many complaints are over fee disputes which generally are
not covered by the rules.'" The comparison shows how the regulatory preferences of lawyers are well-reflected in the actual pro59
cesses. 1
profession, increasing the costs of joining the profession and raising the price for legal
services.
154See CLARK REPORT, supranote 11, at 1 (describing attorney discipline as "a scandalous
situation that requires the immediate attention of the profession. With few exceptions, the
prevailing attitude of lawyers toward disciplinary enforcement ranges from apathy to outright
hostility. Disciplinary action is practically nonexistent in many jurisdictions."); MCKAY
REPORT, supra note 11, at xiii-xx (noting positive changes since Clark Report, but listing
additional necessary steps for improvement); RHODE, supra note 3, at 158 (quoting ABA
research finding that public thinks attorney discipline is "[t]oo slow, too secret, too soft and
too self-regulated").
"5 See MCKAY REPORT, supra note 11, at xviii (detecting that "funding and staffing [of
disciplinary committees] have not kept pace with the growth of the profession," and that
'some agencies are so underfunded and understaffed that they offer little protection against
unethical lawyers"); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction. The Meaningof "Counsel"in the Sixth
Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 485 (1993) (noting that "many disciplinary offices are
under-funded"); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L.
REv. 1051, 1121 (1996) ("Disciplinary boards are notoriously underfunded and [are] unable
or reluctant to mount the effort needed to do battle with wealthy class action lawyers and
powerful members of the defense bar.").
" See Lisa J. Frisella et al., State Bar of California,17 CAL. REG. L. REP. 203, 205 (2000)
("In his initial February 1999 report, Justice Lui reported that the Bar's discipline system
faces an unprecedented backlog of over 7,000 open complaints and reports against attorneys
from consumers and courts."); Mark E. Hopkins, Open Attorney Discipline: New Jersey
Supreme Court'sDecision to Make Attorney DisciplinaryProceduresPublic-What it Means
to Attorneys and to the Public,27RuTGERs L.J. 757, 769 (1996) (noting backlog of New Jersey
disciplinary cases in 1980s).
"' See Sandra L. DeGraw & Bruce W. Burton, Lawyer Discipline and "Disclosure
Advertising" Towardsa New Ethos, 72 N.C. L. REV. 351, 357-59 (1994) (delineating "tradition
of invisibility" for lawyer disciplinary procedures); Paula A. Monopoli, Legal Ethics and
PracticalPolitics: Musings on the Public Perceptionof Lawyer Discipline, 10 GEO. J. LEG.
ETHICS 423, 424-25 (1997) ("Historically, lawyer discipline has been conducted behind closed
doors."); John P. Sahl, The Public Hazardof Lawyer Self-Regulation: Learningfrom Ohio's
Struggle to Reform its DisciplinarySystem, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 65, 108 (1999) ("Ohio's
disciplinary process for attorneys and judges is cloaked in secrecy.").
158See JEROMEE. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS, ASURVEYOFTHE NEWYORK CITY BAR 150-64
(1966); MCKAY REPORT, supra note 11, at xv, 11; Rhode, supra note 8, at 93 & nn.385-86;
RHODE, supra note 3, at 160; F. Raymond Marks, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is
it Self-Regulation?, 2 ILL. L.F. 193, 214.19 (1974); Steele & Nimmer, supra note 15, at 980.
169Note, however, that substantial progress has been made on lawyer discipline, see
MCKAY REPORT, supra note 11, at 89-129 (listing areas of progress since 1970 Clark Report),
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b. Institutional Expertise. State supreme courts have
expertise in the area of legal regulation. First, the regulation of
lawyers is at least partially motivated by a desire to meet the needs
of the courts, and supreme courts are in an excellent position to
Second, all of the justices are former
determine those needs."
lawyers, so they have a good understanding of the legal market, and
presumably the effects their regulation will have on the market.161
As such, state supreme courts have a comparative advantage in
expertise, and theoretically state supreme courts should be less
reliant upon the outside expertise of lawyers (the regulated
industry), and therefore more resistant to agency capture.
Nevertheless, this advantage is certainly tempered by the fact
that courts rarely use this expertise. They generally delegate
almost all of their authority back to bar associations or regulatory
agencies. 2 Moreover, most justices have experienced the legal field
as lawyers, not as clients or litigants. Their expertise may favor the
regulated because the justices are more familiar with the lawyer's
perspective than with the perspectives of other players in the

system. 163

a sign that justices and lawyers have not been wholly immune to public criticism.
"e For a discussion of how lawyer regulation can be justified as a response to the needs
of the courts, see Barton, supra note 7, at 450-52. The vast majority of lawyers will never
appear before a state supreme court, however, so justices still need to poll trial judges,
because they have the most day-to-day contact with lawyers. Nevertheless, justices seem to
be in a better position than members of other institutions to gather and interpret the
concerns of courts.
"" Most justices come to the bench from a litigation background. Their knowledge of the
practices of other areas of specialty, such as tax or transactional law, might be limited. The
regulation of lawyers (from law school requirements to the Rules of Professional Conduct) has
been criticized as overly focused on litigation concerns. See, e.g., Daniel B. Bogart, The Right
Way to Teach TransactionalLawyers: Commercial Leasing and the Forgotten"DirtLawyer",
62 U. PITT. L. REv. 335, 335 & n.1 (2000) ("For some years, law professors who hark from
careers making deals rather than trying cases have complained that law schools do not train
students for transactional practice."); Nancy B. Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need
for a Uniform Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 45, 49 (1998)
("Bankruptcy needs its own ethics code."); Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of
Professional Conduct for the Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149, 149 (1993)
(asserting that additional ethical codes are necessary for nonlitigators).
'
See infra notes 303-06 and accompanying text.
See Macey, supra note 72, at 631 (postulating that judges' "investment in the legal
'
system is likely to align their preferences with the preferences (and interests) of the legal
community as a whole"). The "expertise" argument itself is colored by lawyerly efforts at
"mystification," the conscious and unconscious clouding of professional norms to make the
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B. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

As dissatisfaction with the current state of regulation has grown,
there have been increasing calls for a federalized system of lawyer
regulation."6 4 These calls generally have assumed that Congress
would lead the way,' 5 presumably because of logistical and
constitutional concerns. Of any federal body, Congress seems to be
the only body capable of seizing control from the states.' 6 While the
Supreme Court theoretically has an "inherent authority" similar to
that of state supreme courts,'"" the Court has been much more
reticent to flex its regulatory muscles.' This is partially because
of a greater sense of deference to Congress on these issues6 9 and

entire system appear unintelligible to outsiders. See Wolfram, supra note 132, at 625-30
(describing process and effects of mystification).
'" See generally Stephen B. Burbank, State Ethical Codes and Federal Practice:
EmergingConflicts andSuggestions for Reform, 19 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 969 (1992) (suggesting
that "it is time to think seriously of a national bar, governed by uniform federal norms of
professional conduct in all practice contexts"); Amy R. Mashburn, A Clockwork Orange
Approach to Legal Ethics: A Conflicts Perspective on the Regulation of Lawyers by Federal
Courts, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 473 (1995) (delineating patchwork approaches of federal
courts to conduct regulation); Carol A. Needham, Splitting BarAdmission into Federaland
State Components: NationalAdmission for Advice on FederalLaw, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 453
(1997) (advocating for national admission for advice on federal law); Fred C. Zacharias,
FederalizingLegal Ethics, 73 TEx. L. REV. 335, 335 (1994) (considering advantages and limits
of adopting uniform federal code whose enforcement would largely be left to states). But see
generally H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Federalismand Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal
Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 73 (1997) (arguing against federalizing lawyer regulation).
'6 See, e.g., Needham, supranote 164, at 503 ('If Congress so desired, it could set criteria
for bar admission."). Zacharias, supra note 164, at 376-77 (assessing competence of Congress
to develop uniform code of legal ethics).
" Presumably such a move would rely upon Congress's powers under the Commerce
Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Whether federal regulation of lawyers would prove
constitutional, however, is an open question. See Moulton, supra note 164, at 117-23
(assessing whether nationalizing lawyer ethics would be constitutional under current
precedent or appropriate in light of federalism values).
" See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) C''Certain implied powers
must necessarily result'" to the federal courts" 'from the nature of their institution,' powers
'which cannot be dispensed with... because they are necessary to the exercise of all others."'
(quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 21, 23 (1812))).
'6
Furthermore, even a robust vision of the Supreme Court's inherent authority to
regulate lawyers would likely only apply to the federal courts, and not to appearances in state
court, or to lawyering outside court.
"6 Consider, for example, the Court's relative deference to Congress on rules of procedure.
Rather than seizing the ultimate authority as part of its inherent judicial power, the Court
has allowed Congress the final say on rules of evidence and procedure. See Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) ('Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify
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partially because the Court is unceasingly leery of creating new
administrative responsibilities and increasing its overall

workload. 170
In fact, the biggest impediment to the Court's serving as a
regulator of lawyers is logistical. The Court likely would prove
unwilling or unable to find the time necessary to regulate lawyers
without fully delegating all responsibility. The Court has been
extremely parsimonious with its institutional capacities and likely
could not or would not take on a major new responsibility. The
Court has, for example, fastidiously ignored the regulation of
lawyers in federal courts, leaving it up to district and appellate
courts to forge their own approaches."1 Similarly, the Court has
delegated many of its other regulatory authorities, such as the
drafting of the federal rules of procedure and evidence.' 7 2 The
Court's avoidance of these issues establishes a legitimate concern
that the Court would similarly shirk any additional regulatory
duties.
Regardless of the logistics, there are many similarities and a few
differences between the Court and state supreme courts as potential
attorney regulators. In terms of accessibility to lawyers and the
public, the Court likely would be less accessible. The Court has long

or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by
the Constitution."). Compare the Supreme Court's deference on these issues to the more
bellicose stands of some state supreme courts. See Carl Baar, JudicialActivism in State
Supreme Courts: The Inherent-PowersDoctrine,in STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS
IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 129, 129-41 (Mary C. Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982):
In inherent-powers cases, state trial courts have for many years been
willing to challenge executive and legislative authorities, issue mandatory
writs to elected and appointed officials, and even hold those officials in
contempt. Numerous state supreme courts have approved the inherentpowers doctrine and applied it against administrative and legislative
officials.
Id.
'o See generally David M. O'Brien, The Rehnquist Court's ShrinkingPlenary Docket, 81
JUDICATURE 58 (1997) (addressing how Supreme Court has reduced its caseload through
fewer grants of certiorari).
171 See Mashburn, supra note 164, at 473-74 (noting Court's lack of regulation and district
courts' varying approaches to lawyer regulation).
,72 For a summary of the oversight process for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see
Catherine T. Struve, The Paradoxof Delegation: Interpretingthe Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1103-41 (2002). For the Rules of Evidence, see 1 STEPHEN
A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 6-7 (7th ed. 1998).
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been heralded as the most independent in the land, because of its
tenure, constitutional position, and prestige. 7 This would have the
salutary effect of lessening the access of lawyers in the regulatory
process, but also would further alienate the public from any
meaningful involvement.' 74 Furthermore, although the physical
access of lawyers would be greatly limited, all of the psychological
and institutional concerns would remain, and perhaps be exacerbated.'
The capacity and character issues are also similar, although the
Court likely would make even greater efforts than state supreme
courts to delegate their authority. This is partially because the
Court is extremely busy and has structural limitations on its
capacity7 6 and partially because regulating lawyers in all fifty
states would prove much more difficult and time consuming than
regulating within a single state. The Court also would have less
expertise than state supreme courts because it is farther removed
from the day-to-day existence of district courts or the practices of all
but the most elite lawyers.
C. DISTRICT COURTS
a

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, legislatures and
district courts were at least as involved in lawyer regulation as state
supreme courts.'77 For example, many state district courts were the
primary agents for bar admission. 7 ' There were few formal
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing role of life tenure
in guaranteeing judicial independence in Federal Courts); Steven B. Burbank, The
Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 318-26 (1999) (describing
history and architecture of judicial independence in United States); Eric Talley, Precedential
Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87, 128-29 (1999) (noting factors leading to
independence of Supreme Court).
174 This includes, of course, the loss of even the nominal opportunity to
vote out an
offending justice. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (granting federal judges life tenure).
15
Because one of the psychological biases ofjudges (and all people) is egocentrism, judges
overestimate their own abilities, and their own fairness. See Guthrie et al., supra note 24,
at 813-16 (discussing egocentric biases among judges). Justices can be assumed to suffer from
this bias, and this would further limit the accessibility of the public.
17 See POSNER, supra note 140, at 14 (explaining logistical barriers to expanding size of
Supreme Court).
'" See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
178 See POUND, supra note 91, at 144-47 (listing three different forms of admission, as
'73
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standards, and district courts typically performed an oral bar
examination of a new applicant. 179 Furthermore, there was little
regulation of lawyer conduct,'O and district courts supplied what
little regulation existed.'' In this historical model for district court
follows: each individual court controlled admission to that court (Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Maryland), any district court could admit lawyer to practice
in any court in state (Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Delaware); and centralized admission
(New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, Virginia, and North Carolina)); see also 2 ANTONHERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 241-43 (1965)
(describing lawyer regulation system in Connecticut).
'9 See RANDALL COLLINS, THE CREDENTIAL SOCIETY 149 (1979) (noting that nineteenth
century bar examinations were typically "oral and administered in a very casual fashion");
REED, supra note 91, at 87-90,98-101 (describing early practices of oral bar examinations and
beginning of uniformity within states); STEVENS, supra note 81, at 25 (explaining that
nineteenth century bar examination was "oral and normally casual"); Robert M. Jarvis, An
Anecdotal Historyof the Bar Exam, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 359, 394-95 (1996) (commenting
that bar exam was originally oral examination given before judge of court in which one sought
to be admitted to practice). Consider, for example, this description of Abraham Lincoln's
examination of a potential attorney in Illinois as Lincoln lounged in a tub:
He asked me in a desultory way the definition of a contract, and two or
three fundamental questions, all of which I answered readily, and I
thought, correctly. Beyond these meager inquiries... he asked nothing
more. .. . The whole proceeding was so unusual and queer, if not
grotesque, that I was at a loss to determine whether I was really being
examined at all.
Beverly Moran, The Wisconsin Diploma Privilege: Try It, You'll Like It, 2000 WIS. L. REV.
645, 646.
'so See HALL, supra note 81, at 212 (stating that early nineteenth century lawyer
regulation was based upon "local control and built on a restrictive system of personal alliances
including marriage, paternal occupations, and extended apprenticeship"); HURST, supranote
17, at 286 (arguing that "there was little formal discipline" during mid-nineteenth century);
Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standardsand Rules: A New Way of Understanding
the Differences in Perceptionof Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and Foreign Lawyers, 32
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1117, 1134 (1999) ('Prior to the 1870s and the institutionalization of
the legal profession, no formal mechanisms for discipline appear to have existed. To the
extent discipline was imposed at all, it took place locally and informally."); Bruce Frohnen,
The Bases of ProfessionalResponsibility: Pluralism and Community in Early America, 63
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 931, 932 (1995) (describing how attorney behavior was "taught in
associations dedicated to passing on standards of acceptable professional conduct," not
through official regulation).
...Despite the general lack of formal controls, lawyer behavior was controlled by common
law torts and criminal sanctions. Each court retained the common law "summary jurisdiction" over the lawyers who practiced before it, and could disbar or sanction an errant
attorney. See Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 270-74 (1882) (upholding trial judge's authority
to disbar attorney who had incited lynching); Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer
DisciplinaryProcedures in the United States, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 912-17 (1994)
(describing early nineteenth century lawyer discipline administered by judges); Charles W.
Wolfram, Towards a History of the Legalization of American Legal Ethics I-Origins,8 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 469, 473-79 (2001) (describing early American disbarment
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regulation of lawyers, state legislatures established general rules for
admission, and district courts handled the rest, including an ad hoc
common-law style of conduct regulation.18 2 This Section, however,
considers district courts as the primary regulator of lawyers.
There are substantial logistical obstacles to placing district courts
(state or federal, or a combination of the two) fully in charge of

lawyer regulation. District courts could follow the loose, commonlaw regulatory approach of nineteenth century America, but this

would prove a disaster for modern America's broad and complicated
legal market. Colonial judges could admit and sanction individual
lawyers on an ad hoc basis because there were few lawyers and even
fewer courts to consider. Imagine, by contrast, if every judge in
America admitted lawyers separately and under his or her own set
of eligibility criteria. Lawyers in large metropolitan areas likely
would spend all of their time getting admitted. 8 ' In short, having
each district court individually enforce its own set of entry or

conduct standards would create a patchwork of regulation that
would cripple the legal market.'

An alternative would require district courts to act as legislative
bodies and attempt to create uniform policies. Given the current
workload of federal and district courts,

85

this would either prove

procedures).
182 See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text. Note that this structure more closely
resembles the typical legislation/delegation paradigm. The legislature set the broad policies,
and the district courts, acting in this regard almost as agencies, enforced the specifics.
' Or consider a system where admission to any state or federal court meant admission
to all courts. The variation in skills and training required by each court would make such a
system untenable and likely tantamount to deregulation.
"' Although district courts could not realistically regulate entry, consider whether a
common-law approach to conduct regulation might prove realistic and possibly even more
effective than the current rule-based program. See Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues:
Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?,69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 945-46 (1996)
(advocating replacement of Model Rules and Code with common-law system of lawyer
regulation). The difficulty is again the logistics. Because of the expense and hassle of
litigation, aggrieved clients will sue lawyers only for conduct egregious enough to create a
substantial recovery. Presumably all or most of these viable claims are already brought as
malpractice actions, meaning that a common-law approach would overlook the behavior
currently controlled by conduct regulation. Of course, given the lax state of enforcement, it
might be a small loss. See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
8 See POSNER, supranote 140, at 86-87 (discussing rising state district court caseloads);
Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy"ofthe Federal Courts:
A Causation-BasedApproach to the Search for AppropriateRemedies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871,
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logistically impossible or require a massive delegation of authority.
Aside from the logistical challenges, district courts suffer from
many of the same weaknesses as state supreme courts. Public
accessibility would be severely limited. Although any individual
judge is likely more accessible than an individual justice, trying to
lobby numerous district judges would be nearly impossible. Lawyer
accessibility also would be hampered by the volume and disparate
locations of the judges, but more accessability may be given to local
and county bar associations that generally have closer relationships
with local district courts. 186 Expertise would be improved, because
district courts would be well aware of their own needs as lawyers,
but the time pressures district courts face suggest that delegation
would likely become even more prevalent.
III. LEGISLATIVE CONTROL
Until the late nineteenth century, state legislatures, and not
state supreme courts, generally controlled lawyer regulation.18 7 The
turn of the century brought the advent of the inherent powers
doctrine and the rise of state supreme court control."' This Section
analyzes the various strengths and weaknesses of legislatures as
policymakers for lawyer regulation. For simplicity's sake, we again

877 (1983) (noting significant increases of both civil and criminal filings in federal district

courts); Wolf Heydebrand & Carroll Seron, The Rising Demand for Court Services: A
StructuralExplanationof the Caseloadof United States District Courts, 11 JUST. SYS.J. 303,
313-20 (1986) (same).

'" This closer relationship may explain why judges initiate so few complaints of lawyer
misconduct, despite being in an excellent position to witness such misconduct. See Wilkins,
supra note 13, at 822-23 (noting that vast majority of disciplinary complaints are filed by
clients rather than lawyers or judges); see also Leslie W. Abramson, The Judge's EthicalDuty
to Report Misconduct by OtherJudges and Lawyers and Its Effect on JudicialIndependence,
25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 751, 753-55 (1997) (describing judicial disincentives to reporting lawyer
misconduct).
See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
See generally Dowling, supra note 96; Leon Green, The Courts'PowerOver Admission
and Disbarment,4 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1925); Lris Shanfeld, The Scope of JudicialIndependence
of the Legislature in Matters of Procedureand Control of the Bar, 19 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 163
(1934).
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begin our analysis in Section III.A with state legislative control.'8 9
Section III.B then addresses federal congressional control. 19
A. STATE LEGISLATURES

Although there are variations in the structure, size, and constitutional powers of the various state legislatures, there are many
commonalities. 9 ' First, although some legislators are lawyers, a
law degree is not required, and the numbers of lawyer-legislators
has been declining recently.'92 Second, all state legislators are
elected.'9 3 Consequently, all state legislators face the pressures
involved in getting elected and staying in office.
1. Propensity for Agency Capture. Just as courts are seen as
relatively immune to agency capture, legislatures are the poster
children for interest-group theory. Under the purest form of
interest-group theory, legislatures are filled with rational, selfserving legislators who repeatedly cater to concentrated interests
that can deliver votes or campaign contributions at the expense of
the public at large."' Nonetheless, institutional analysis is all
about comparative advantages and disadvantages, 9 5 so it is
19 See infra notes 191-229 and accompanying text.

"9 See infra notes 230-40 and accompanying text.

191 See generally LYNN HELLEBUST, STATE LEGISLATIVE SOURCEBOOK 2001 (2001); NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INSIDETHE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (7th ed. 1997); NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, LEGISLATIVE STAFF SERVICES PROFILES OF THE 50
STATES AND TERRITORIES (1999); STATE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION CHARTS (Keon S. Chi et

al. eds., 1995).
19
1

See infra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
See WILDER CRANE, JR. & MEREDITH W. WATTS, JR., STATE LEGISLATIVE SYSTEMS 34-37

(1968) (discussing election systems in all fifty states); WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL,
THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS AND THE STATES 57-107 (7th ed. 1989)
(discussing election processes for state and federal legislatures).
' See Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the Road to Incoherence: Congress, Economics, and
Taxes, 49 UCLA L. REV. 685, 715 & n.134 (2002) (applying public choice theory to tax
preferences). See generally ROBERT E. MCCORMICK & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS,
LEGISLATION, AND THE ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GROUP THEORY OF

GOVERNMENT 7-12 (1981) (providing overview of interest group theory and legislatures);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implicationsof Public Choice Theory for
Statutory Interpretation,74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988) (same); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice
and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988) (same). Note, however, that many interest group
theorists have a more nuanced view of the operation of representational government. See
supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text.
19 See KOMESAR, supra note 16, at 14-50, 50:

1218

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1167

essential to consider state legislative openness to both sides of the
interest group equilibrium-the regulated industry and the public
at large.
a. Accessibility to Lawyers. State legislatures are certainly
ready, willing, and able to enjoy the fruits of lawyer lobbying, and
therefore capture is a significant possibility. The success of trial
lawyers in blocking "tort reform" in various states is a prime
example of the current power of the trial lawyers' lobby.lN Furthermore, while state supreme courts ordered bar unification in many
states, lawyers successfully lobbied state legislatures for unification
in other states.' 97
The success of lawyers before legislatures is a natural consequence of their organizational advantages. The question is whether
lawyers would have the same special advantages before legislatures
'
that they have before state supreme courts. 98
There are some

No economist [or legal theorist] can study any social choice except in
terms of its alternatives. Economic analysts of law are studying institu.
tional choices, usually the choice between the market and the courts.
They cannot simply rely on single institutional notions, like market
failure. Here the need to consider and compare institutional alternatives
is primary, not secondary, to competent economic analysis.
Id.; William W. Buzbee, Sprawl's Dynamics: A ComparativeInstitutionalAnalysis Critique,
35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509, 512-13 (2000) ('An inordinate focus on a single institution and
the concomitant failure to analyze ways various institutional options are likely to suffer
failures is the chief analytical error identified by Komesar and his fellow scholars of
comparative institutional analysis."); Daniel H. Cole, The Importanceof Being Comparative,
33 IND. L. REV. 921, 928-36 (2000) (describing "the importance of comparative legal analysis
and comparative institutional analysis") (emphasis omitted). As Ronald Coase aptly notes,
"[a]ll solutions have costs," and it is the comparison of these transaction costs that should
drive policy choices. COASE, supranote 31, at 118.
'" See, e.g., John Caher, Lobbyists Collideat State Capitolon Tort Reform, N.Y. L.J., Apr.
23, 2002, at 1:
New York trial lawyers and their legislative foes-primarily doctors and
businesses--are battling this week at the capitol, with advocates on both
sides of the so-called "tort-reform" debate unleashing their lobbyists in a
major late-session push. The result, insiders suggest, is likely to be nil as
two or more powerful and influential forces cancel each other out and
perpetuate the status quo.
Id.; Lynne W. Jeter, ForBiz, At Least Session Over, MISS. B.J., Apr. 22, 2002, at 1 ('Barred
by trial lawyers in key leadership positions in the executive and legislative branches, even
the weakest tort reform legislation died before the second deadline.").
' See McKEAN, supra note 87, at 49 (listing unification method in various states).
' The term "special advantages" refers to advantages beyond the financial and
organizational advantages that come with being a professional group with many shared
economic interests, e.g., the many institutional similarities between lawyers and the
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structural and institutional reasons to believe that they would not.
First, although legislatures are open to lawyer lobbying, they have
no particular reason to favor lawyers over other groups. Legislatures do not share the judicial institutional interest in strong entry
regulations, because legislatures are not dependent upon lawyers to
process their work.19 9 Legislators often rely on lawyers to draft
statutes or act as staff members, but lawyers are not central to the
legislative process to the extent that they are to the judicial
process. 2°°
Furthermore, elected state supreme court justices rely on lawyers
for the bulk of their campaign contributions,201 and bar associations
or groups of lawyers regularly are involved in assessing the faculties
and performance ofjudges. °2 Legislators would be more than happy
to accept lawyer donations, but they are open to lobbying and
contributions from all comers and have no natural reason to expect
or rely particularly on the bar for political support.
In comparison to the all-lawyer state supreme courts, approximately fifteen percent of state legislators are lawyers." 3 Interestingly, this number is shrinking, from twenty-two percent in 1976 to
fifteen percent in 1995.204 Accordingly, a much smaller number of

judiciary. For a full discussion of these special advantages, see supra notes 67-117 and
accompanying text.
"z Remember that justices have a powerful incentive to raise entry standards. As entry
barriers rise and the profession on average is populated by higher qualified members, the
work ofjudges in researching the law and processing and deciding cases becomes easier. See
supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
' This is especially true for state legislatures where staff members (legal or otherwise)
are few and at a premium. See ERIC M. USLANER & RONALD E. WEBER, PATTERNS OF
DECISION-MAKING INSTATE LEGISLATURES 24,24 (1977) (comparing state legislative staff with
congressional staff and concluding that "individual office space and staff [is] more the
exception than the rule" in state legislatures). State legislative staffs have grown recently,
but still lag behind congressional resources. See EUGENE W. HICKOK, JR., THE REFORM OF
STATE LEGISLATURES AND THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF REPRESENTATION 51-53 (1992)
(describing increases in state legislative staff and office space since 1960s).
20 See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
" See Penny J. White, Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by Use of
JudicialPerformance Evaluations,29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1064-65 (2002) (describing
use (and abuse) of bar polls in judicial elections).
NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LEGISLATORS' OCCUPATIONS 11
(1996) [hereinafter LEGISLATORS' OCCUPATIONS].
2 See id. Lawyers were 20%-30% of state legislators for most or all of the twentieth
century. A 1949 study showed that 22% of state legislators were lawyers. See Duane
Lockard, The State Legislator, in STATE LEGISLATURES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 98, 106
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legislators than judges will be members of the state bar association.
Fewer legislators will have the institutional mindset of lawyers, i.e.,
the heuristics and world view that law school and years of practice
create. Quite simply, lawyers have fewer naturally sympathetic
ears in state legislatures.
Lastly, lawyers are not particularly popular among the public or
most legislatures. Law reviews, bar publications, and newspapers
are filled with anecdotal and statistical evidence displaying the
public's low esteem for the legal profession," 5 and politicians have
responded to those sentiments. 0 6 Insofar as legislators are
(Alexander Heard ed., 1966) ("The 1949 occupational distribution of all state legislators...
showed that 22 per cent were lawyers, 23 per cent were engaged in business, and 4 per cent
were physicians and teachers."). A 1979 study showed 20%. See WILLIAM J.KEEFE &MORRIS
S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 117 (7th ed. 1989) (indicating that 20% of all
state legislators were lawyers in 1979). In 1954, it was "a fair estimate that the legal
profession has provided about one-fourth of the total number of state legislators since 1900."
ALBERT P. BLAuSTrIN & CHARLES 0. PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 97, 97 (1954); see also
George C. Brown, Lawyers as Legislators,74 WIS. LAW., Sept. 2001, at 3 ([S]ince the 1950s,
the number of attorneys serving in the state Legislature has dropped by more than 50
percent."). Part of the recent decrease in lawyer-legislators may be a reaction to anti-lawyer
sentiment among voters, while part of the decrease may be the rise of full-time legislators.
From 1976 to 1995, full-time legislator has grown from 2.7% to 14%. LEGISLATORS'
OCCUPATIONS, supra note 203, at 11. A 1997-98 survey of nonincumbent state legislator
candidates supports the hypothesis that fewer lawyers are running for the state legislature.
Only ten percent of the nonincumbent candidates surveyed listed their occupations as
"attorney." See GARY F. MONTCRIEF ET AL., WHO RUNS FOR THE LEGISLATURE? 34 (2001)
(listing top occupations as "business employee: 16%," "retired: 15.4%," "business owner:
13.7%," and "attorney: 10.4%"). Moreover, the lawyers who go on to become politicians are
less likely to be "lawyers' lawyers" in the way that judges are. Judges, especially those chosen
or evaluated under a merit system, are presumably selected from among the lawyers who
have flourished under the current system. There is no similar selection process for the
lawyers who go on to become politicians. The lawyers who run for office would likely be
successful (read wealthy), however, because of the substantial financial commitment it takes
to run for office. See MONCRIEF ETAL., supra, at 7-8 (describing "the high and ever-increasing
cost" of running for state legislatures)
See, e.g., W. Kent Davis, The InternationalView of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why
Is the United States the "Odd Man Out" in How It Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 361, 368-70 (1999) (citing Atlanta Journal-Constitutionpoll reporting that only
minority of Americans felt that lawyers were honest and Gallup poll that ranked honesty of
lawyers only slightly higher than that of televangelists and used car salesmen); Victor H.
Lott, Jr., A State Bar President'sViews on ProfessionalEthics, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 115, 115
(1999) (offering historical perspective on "the unpopularity of lawyers"); Terry Morrow, New
TV Judge Is Kinder, Gentler,KNOXVILLE NEwS-SENTINEL, Apr. 23, 2002, at E5 ("As bad of a
reputation as lawyers have in our community-they are somewhere above a used-car
salesman and below an encyclopedia peddler-the public is still fascinated by stories of the
law.").
' Consider, for example, Dan Quayle's ongoing criticisms of the legal profession. See
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responsive to their constituents, lawyers will have a more difficult
time obtaining preferential legislation.
b. Accessibility to the Public. Again, interest-group theory
predicts that the public at large will have a hard time organizing to
oppose the interests of concentrated groups in the lawmaking and
enforcement process.20 7 Nevertheless, in an institutional comparison with state supreme courts, legislatures appear more accessible
to the public.
Under interest-group theory, legislators are happy to deal with
any group that can provide votes or campaign contributions.0 8
While lawyers are currently among lobbying groups, many other
powerful constituencies are involved, including groups that clash
with lawyers, such as accountants, business associations, real estate
agents, and disgruntled citizens who dislike lawyers. The battle
over tort reform is an excellent example of how various powerful
constituencies can unite to pressure legislatures over issues of direct
economic value to lawyers (or particular groups of lawyers). 0 9

Carla Marinucci, This Time in S.F., Quayle Blames the Lawyers;But HisSpeech Lacks Punch
of Murphy Brown, S.F. CHRON., May 20, 1999, at Al. Consider also the advice of political
consultants that"[i]t'salmost impossible to go too far when it comes to demonizing lawyers."
See White, supra note 202, at 1075 & n.101 (quoting "Luntz Research Company"); see also
Michael D. Kimerer, A Presence in the Legislature,ARIZ. A'r'Y, Mar. 1996, at 8 ("Our current
negative public image exacerbates [the need for lobbyists) by spawning legislation that is
detrimental not only to our profession but to the public's interest."). State legislatures have,
in fact, recently passed a number of lawyer-unfriendly statutes. See infra notes 287-92 and
accompanying text.
Z

Cf. CITIZENS CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES, LEGISLATIVE OPENNESS: A SPECIAL

REPORT ON PRESS AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND ACTIVITIES INSTATE LEGISLATURES
69-73 (1974) (outlining need for greater state legislative openness to public).
See supra notes 41.48 and accompanying text.
The battle over tort reform has been waged in the United States Congress and almost
every state's legislature. See, e.g., Reed Branson, Miss. Leaders Sit While Tort DebateTaints
State Image, THE COMM. APPEAL, May 14, 2002, at B5 (reacting to United States Chamber of
Commerce's public declaration that Mississippi's failure to pass tort reform makes state
dangerous locale for businesses); Greg Hitt, TerrorismInsuranceBill Stalls, WALL ST. J., May
1, 2002, at A4 (describing battle in Congress over tort reform during aftermath of September
11 attacks); Lisa Grace Lednicer, Vote 2002: PoliticiansPush Hard to Survive, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, May 16, 2002, at Al (reporting on Oregon's most expensive state senate primary
race in which Oregon trial lawyers supported one candidate and business groups supported
another); John Tierney, In Tort City, FallingDown Can Pay Off, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2000,
at BI (positing that New York State's legislative "[aIttempts at tort reform in Albany have
been successfully resisted by trial lawyers"). The two main interest groups are various state
and national groups of trial lawyers on one side, and various business and manufacturing
groups on the other. See Joe Follick, Lobbyists Engage in Costly Arms Race, TAMPA TRIB.,

1222

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1167

Compared to the judiciary, legislatures are open by design.
Logistically, all legislators make at least some effort to be open to
constituent contact and comment. Successful legislators generally
pay great attention to constituent services and listen to the citizens
who care enough to contact their offices. By contrast, a judge's
chambers are essentially closed to the public.
Institutionally, the difference may be even more pronounced.
Justices, along with all judges, are steeped in the American
mythology surrounding judicial independence.2 10 Judges, above all,
are meant to eschew public opinion and follow the correct legal
course. The ethos of the legislature, by contrast, generally includes
following the will of the electorate (if not outright pandering and
vote-buying). The legislative openness to lobbying also blunts the
judicial problem of informal lawyer lobbying, in that legislators are
rarely informally lobbied because a savvy legislator recognizes every
contact with a constituent or business group as an opportunity to
curry votes or solicit campaign contributions.
In comparison to public knowledge of state supreme courts and
their role in lawyer regulation, people generally are more aware of
who their elected legislators are, and what they do (e.g., regulate
industries and occupations). Although elections for state legislatures are typically lower salience than federal elections, 1 state

Mar. 25, 2001, at 1 (describing "Florida's two biggest lobbying forces--trial lawyers and
business groups" as "the Hatfields and McCoys" and "Capulets and Montagues").
210 See generally Henry J. Abraham, The Pillarsand Politicsof JudicialIndependence in
the United States, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE INTHE AGE OF DEMOCRACY 29-36 (Peter H.
Russell & David M. O'Brien eds., 2001) (describing structural nature of American judicial
independence); Symposium, Judicial Independence, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791 (2002)
(discussing independent nature of judicial branch of government).
"' See MALCOLM E. JEWELL, REPRESENTATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES 166-68 (1982)
(delineating public awareness of state legislators, and concluding that name recognition and
awareness of state legislators runs at about 50% of name recognition of federal legislators);
Stephen E. Bennett, "Know-Nothings"Revisited: The Meaning of PoliticalIgnorance Today,
69 SOC. SCI. Q. 476,483-88 (1988) (presenting evidence that over one-third of American adults
are "know-nothings" lacking even most minimal political knowledge); Ilya Somin, Voter
Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, 12 CRITICAL REV. 413, 416-19 (1998) (summarizing

evidence of widespread voter ignorance). Of course, an institutional analysis based primarily
on American voter ignorance likely would result in a disheartening deadlock between political
institutions about which voters could not care less. There is a burgeoning academic literature
on the hows and whys of the phenomenon of"rational voter ignorance." See, e.g., MUELLER,
supranote 56, at 268 (describing conditions of voter ignorance, as follows: any individual vote
is unlikely to affect outcome of election, and details of policy are costly for voters to acquire).
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legislative elections are certainly higher salience than judicial
elections.1 2 These elections also do not suffer from the ethical
dilemmas of judicial races. There is no legislative ethic against
pronouncing how a candidate would decide any particular issue. To
the contrary, legislators are compelled to run on platforms and
issues.21
The legislature's relative openness to lobbying is tempered,
however, by the difficulties any voter faces in censuring a lawmaker
over a particular piece of unwanted legislation. Even those voters
who have the time, energy, and inclination to punish a legislator for
a particularly harmful vote may have difficulty convincing or
organizing other voters to focus on one legislative vote among the
many others.214 Similarly, voters may not want to vote against a
justice who is a good judge and a bad attorney-regulator. Nevertheless, it is easier to punish state legislators than justices, because
voters attempting to censure the legislator are acting upon the
legislator's primary responsibility of passing laws.
2. InstitutionalCapacityand Character.State legislatures have
some relative advantages and disadvantages to courts in their
institutional capacity. On the one hand, they are more accustomed

See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 235-59 (1957) (coining
term and concept of rational voter ignorance).
212 There are no known comparative studies of election salience for state supreme court
and state legislative races. The evidence establishing voter ignorance in judicial elections,
however, is much more striking than in state legislative elections.
238 The effect of rational voter ignorance means that politicians have an incentive in
certain circumstances to hide or cloud their stances on controversial issues, or to produce laws
that are so complex that it would require a substantial investment of time and energy by the
public to decipher the law. See Michael DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and the
Separationof Powers in State Governments: Repairingthe Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REV.
563, 578 (2001):
Applied to the tobacco context, rational ignorance suggests that some
legislators who could not safely vote for a cigarette tax increase could
safely vote for a statute that would have the same effect as a tax increase
precisely because the details of all this would be too confusing for most
voters to follow.
Id.; David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1549, 1608 (1998) (The
relevant audience for a politician is the average voter, as opposed to the average tax
practitioner or law review reader. It usually is not worthwhile for voters to understand the
tax law except as it applies (narrowly) to them-a phenomenon known as 'rational
ignorance.' ").
2.. See supra notes 45.46 and accompanying text.
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to legislating, delegating, and supervising delegation. On the other
hand, because they are populated mostly by nonlawyers, they may
lack some of the natural expertise of state supreme courts.
a. Institutional Characteristics. Obviously, a legislature's
primary job is legislating,2"15 so a legislature would seem to have a
natural advantage in regulating lawyers. Virtually every other
licensed profession (or industry) in the United States is regulated by
the state or federal legislatures. Although there are varying views
on the results, it seems natural to prefer the institution that has
been designed for, and is practiced in, regulating rather than
21 6
adjudicating.
Beyond their capacity for creating legislation, state legislatures
also are much more experienced in delegating enforcement authority
to agencies and overseeing their delegations. State legislatures
have multiple oversight tools at their disposal, the power of the
purse, oversight hearings, and the power to withdraw their
delegation. 17 The great majority of state legislatures also utilize
The physical process of legislating is radically different from the process of deciding
cases. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
3 (2000) ( The process of statutory creation is not a highly proceduralized adversary system
218

of argument by lawyers culminating in a discursive opinion .... Rather, the legislative

process is an often-chaotic process."); cf. LONL. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 177-81 (1964)
(contrasting "[t]he two fundamental processes of decision that characterize a democratic
society . . .decision by impartial judges and decision by the vote of an electorate or a
representative body").
28 Again, depending on one's view of the efficacy of legislatures or the insalubrity of most
legislation, one might disagree with this point. Interest-group theorists have, for example,
called for increased judicial review of legislative enactments. See supra notes 56-58 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, even the boldest interest group theorists have not
suggested that judges fully usurp the legislative function. In general, the boldest suggestions
include judicial correcting for interest group bias, not wholesale legislating. See, e.g., William
N. Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Implicationsof Public Choice Theory for Statutory
Interpretation,74 VA. L. Rev. 275, 278-79 (1988) (suggesting heightened judicial review as
counterweight to influence of interest groups); Thomas W. Merrill, Does PublicChoice Theory
Justify Activism After All?, 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB.POLY 219, 219-30 (1997) (arguing that in
market for "law change" public choice theory supports judicial activism). Furthermore, even
if such a usurpation were defensible from an interest group theory perspective, surely
regulation of lawyers--a subject which creates so many other interest group problems for
judicial regulation--should not be the area chosen.
21

See LOUISFISHER, SHAREDPOWER 71-91 (4th ed. 1998); KEEFE & OGUL, supranote 193,

at 342-44,355-58; JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAucRAcY 237-44 (1989); Marilyn F. Drees, Do State
Legislatures Have a Role in Resolving the "JustCompensation"Dilemma?Some Lessonsfrom
PublicChoice and PositivePolitical Theory, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 787, 810-11 (1997); Harold
J. Krent, Turning Congress Into an Agency: The Proprietyof RequiringLegislative Findings,
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sunset acts that require agencies periodically to review their
performance and assess whether the agency is still necessary.218
State legislatures also rely much more heavily than Congress on
"rules review" procedures, whereby a committee in the legislature
or a separate body reviews some or all administrative rules before
they go into effect.219
Nevertheless, there have been persistent and growing criticisms
of American legislative delegation. Some argue that the initial
delegations are chronically overbroad,"' and others argue that the

46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 756 n.137 (1996); Arthur MacMahon, CongressionalOversight
ofAdministration: The Power of the Purse,in LEGISLATIVE POLITICSU.S.A. 269-81 (Theodore
J. Lowi ed., 1962); Craig Volden, Delegating Power to Bureaucracies: Evidence from the
States, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 187, 187-88 (2002); cf. Kate Stith, Congress'Powerof the Purse,
97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1363-86 (1988).
158 See KEEFE &OGUL, supra note 193, at 350 (describing sunset laws as "most spectacular
technique for legislative oversight," and asserting that they are in use in 75% of states with
mixed results). For descriptions of how sunset reviews work on an agency level, see Matthew
F. Archbold, Board of BehavioralSciences, 16 CAL. REG. L. REP. 18, 18-19 (1999) (describing
sunset review process for California Board of Behavioral Sciences); StateBar Sunset Review
Underway, 64 TEX. B.J. 962, 962 (2001) (delineating process of sunset review for Texas Bar
Association).
219 See JAMES R. BOWERS, REGULATING THE REGULATORS 29-99(1990) (covering creation,
nature, and effect of rules review procedures in state legislatures); Jim Rossi, Institutional
Design and the LingeringLegacy of AntifederalistSeparationof Powers Ideals in the States,
52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1201-16 (1999) (providing overview of state rules review procedures).
For a study on the impact of state rules review, see generally MARCUS E. ETHRIDGE,
LEGISLATIVE PARTICIPATION INIMPLEMENTATION: POLICY THROUGH POLITICS (1985). For an
overview of rules review procedures, see generally NATL ASS'N ON ADMIN. RULES REVIEW,
1996-97 ADMINISTRATIVE RULES REVIEW DIRECTORY AND SURVEY (1996). For a description of
other state legislative efforts to oversee delegation, see Robert W. Hahn, State and Federal
Regulatory Reform: A ComparativeAnalysis, 29 J.LEGAL STUD. 873, 884-911 (2000). Based
upon these various tools and the structure of agency decisionmaking, some posit that
delegation and oversight by Congress and other legislatures is working well. See David B.
Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism,Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 419-43 (2002)
(making public choice case for delegation to agencies); see also Maria E. Mansfield, "By The
Dawn's Early Light": The Administrative State Still Stands After the 2000 Supreme Court
Term (Commerce Clause, Delegation, and Takings), 37 TULSA L. REV. 205, 266-67 (2001)
(arguing that agency activities are public.minded and reasonably well overseen by Congress);
Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why AdministratorsShould Make PoliticalDecisions,1J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 81, 91-99 (1985) (responding to public choice critiques of delegation and
defending latter as necessary and efficient). See generally Spence & Cross, supra note 51
(making public choice case for delegation to agencies).
See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY 82-96 (1993) (explaining
22
"politics of lawmaking" and incentives for overdelegation). See generally LOUIS FISHER,
CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR & SPENDING (2000) (describing specific examples of

congressional overdelegation).
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" ' These effects are natural
oversight of delegation is minimal.22
consequences of interest-group theory. Legislators seek maximum
credit with minimum work or responsibility. By transferring broad
lawmaking responsibilities to administrative agencies, legislators
avoid the hard work of ironing out the details and later can
conveniently blame unaccountable bureaucrats for any unpopular
effects or decisions.222
Even under the most negative assessment of legislative capacities, however, there are reasons to believe that state legislatures
would delegate less and oversee more lawyer regulation than do
state supreme courts. As noted above, state legislatures have less
incentive to curry favor with lawyers, and the main job of state
legislatures is legislating, so control of lawyer regulation would not
naturally take a back seat, as it does in the judiciary to their
223

primary job of adjudication.

' See Christopher R. Drahozal, Preserving the Common Market: State and Local
Governments in the United States Supreme Court, 7 SuP. CT. ECON. R. 233, 247 (1999)
(elucidating congressional difficulties in oversight and reliance on "fire alarm" oversight, i.e.,
waiting for affected parties to raise fire alarm to legislator of agency gone awry); Wilson,
supra note 43, at 388-89 ("By and large, the policies of regulatory commissions are not under
the close scrutiny or careful control of either the White House or of Congress simply because
what these agencies do has little or no political significance for either of these institutions.").
" See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation,68 CORNELLL. REV. 1,
57-61 (1982) (enumerating legislative incentives to delegate (and overdelegate) authority to
agencies); David Schoenbrod, Delegationand Democracy: A Reply to my Critics,20 CARDOZO
L. REV. 731, 740-41 (1999) (arguing that delegation "permits legislators to claim much of the
credit for the benefits of the laws but shift to the unelected agency officials much of the blame
for the inevitable costs and disappointments when the agency fails to deliver all the benefits
promised"). Note that this process of "overdelegation" has been followed in the legislative
approach to governing professions other than law. Most legislatures create governing
boards-typically made up of members of the profession itself as well as members of the
public-to oversee the nuts and bolts of regulating the profession. See WILBERT E. MOORE,
THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULES 124-27 (1970); BENJAMIN SHIMBERG ET AL., OCCUPA-

TIONAL LICENSING: PRACTICES AND POLICIES 14-15 (1973).
223 See supra notes 140-59 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, interest group theory
predicts that legislative attention to lawyer regulation would wax and wane depending on the
salience of the issues, the organization of antilawyer interests, and the existence of any
entrepreneurial politicians. See Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C. Munger, Legislatorsand
Interest Groups: How UnorganizedInterests Get Represented, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 89, 89106 (1986) (elucidating how latent preferences of unorganized voters can play important role
in influencing political outcomes through entrepreneurial politicians); Wilson, supra note 43,
at 369-70 (expatiating on circumstances that create interest-group politics in comparison to
entrepreneurial politics). Thus, assigning lawyer regulation to state legislatures would not
guarantee great legislative attention, and interest likely would remain relatively low.
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b. InstitutionalExpertise. At first blush, state legislatures
would appear to have a substantial disadvantage in institutional
expertise.
A substantial proportion of state legislators are
nonlawyers. When arguing against legislative oversight, critics
often stress the complexity of regulating the legal market and the
substantial expertise advantage of state supreme courts.2 24
Theorists of agency capture have long noted that a lack of
legislative expertise tends to result in more agency capture, because
the legislature has to rely upon experts for assistance, and more
often than not these experts are lobbyists who come from the
regulated industry itself.2 5 State legislatures, with their shortened
legislative sessions and limited staff, may be especially susceptible
to these difficulties. 2 6
Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that concern over
legislative expertise on lawyers is overblown. First, although not a
majority, many lawyers serve in state legislatures throughout the
country.22 7 These legislators should be able to provide some level of
knowledge and expertise without relying wholly on the regulated
interest.
Second, it is important to define the exact area of expertise at
issue. State supreme courts certainly offer more expertise in the

See, e.g., Schneyer, supranote 87, at 41:
The view that legislatures and executive-branch agencies are better
occupational rulemakers than either the judiciary or a peak professional
association, however sound as a generalization, is not necessarily sound
when it comes to setting standards for law practice. The judiciary's
expertise, its interest in the integrity of the legal process, and its
legitimate need for independence from the "political" branches must be
considered."
Id.; MCKAY REPORT, supra note 11, at 1-8 (stating argument for judicial control of lawyer
regulation).
2
For a full explanation of the interaction among complexity, expertise, and public
salience, see MARC ALLEN EISNER ETAL., CONTEMPORARY REGULATORY POLICY 28-31 (2000).
See also James Q. Wilson, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION, at vii-viii (1980)
(submitting that regulation frequently arises out of "a shadowy world of powerful lobbyists,
high-priced attorneys, and manipulative 'experts' ").
2w See MALCOLM E. JEWELL, THE STATE LEGISLATURE 95 (2d ed. 1969) (detailing that in
state legislatures "[l]obbyists are a vital part of the process"); KEEFE & OGUL, supranote 193,
at 296-98 ("Mhe capacity of the legislature to resist the pressures of organized interests is
likely to depend on its ability to gather and analyze information independently of other
sources.").
27 See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
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legal field from the lawyers' point of view because they are all
former practicing lawyers. However, state supreme courts generally
lack expertise on being a client of legal services or being a participant (as a plaintiff, defendant, witness, or juror) in the legal system.
These areas of expertise are equally valid and necessary in regulating the legal market. In fact, given the natural propensity for
lawyers and bar associations to lobby for regulation favoring their
interests, an expertise in the legal market from the consumer's point
of view may be more valuable, because the organized lawyer lobby
will always be present and active, and consumers are less likely to
be involved.
Third, while state justices surely have expertise in regulating the
activities of lawyers within the courtroom, they have no particular
expertise in the work of lawyers outside the courtroom, e.g., lawyers
involved in transactional, tax, or trusts and estates practices.
Consider the persistent cries that lawyer regulation addresses only
a narrow portion of legal practice.2 2
Lastly, it is worthwhile to note that regulating lawyers is not
rocket science. State legislatures certainly can handle debates over
the unauthorized practice of law or the scope of lawyer confidentiality without complicated or technical explanations. 9 Therefore, the

2
See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements ofMass Torts: When the
Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1159, 1188 (1995) ("Model Rules still represent an
ethics for lawyers who are presumed to be engaged in a generic practice, with a focus on
litigation-even transactional problems are analyzed with an assumption of the adversary
model."); Nancy B. Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform Code of
Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANK. INs.L REV. 45,45-50 (1998) (arguing for separate regulation
of bankruptcy lawyers because of relative inattention of lawyer regulators and inapplicability
of current regulation).
' These issues are near and dear to lawyers' hearts, so it is natural for lawyers to claim
that uncooperative legislators simply do not and cannot understand. As an example, consider
Senator Arlen Specter's effort to widen lawyer disclosure requirements in the 1980s and the
ABA's successful defeat of the bill, partially on grounds of institutional competence. Ted
Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677, 713-14 (1989). Frequently a claim that a legislature
does not "understand" is not really a claim of institutional competence; it is a claim of
institutional antipathy. Senator Specter (himself a lawyer) surely understood the meaning
of lawyer confidentiality and disclosure; he simply did not value them the way that bar
associations and practicing lawyers did. Furthermore, institutional competence alone cannot
determine what policies are decided by legislatures or by courts. For example, Congress and
state legislatures actually do regulate areas as complex and diverse as rocket science and tax
law, both subject areas that seem more challenging than lawyer regulation. Moreover,
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problem of legislative competence over lawyer regulation is less
acute than generally thought.
B. FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT

There have been periodic calls for federal legislative oversight of
lawyer regulation.2 3' Although the United States Congress shares
many of the strengths and weaknesses of state legislatures as a
lawyer regulator, there are some important differences.
Logistically, Congress has a much better chance of successfully
displacing state supreme courts as the primary lawyer regulator.
State legislatures likely would fail because state supreme courts
have regularly invalidated state legislative actions regulating
lawyers under the inherent powers doctrine.2 3 Since the inherent
powers doctrine is generally based upon state supreme court
readings of state constitutions, any changes would require state
constitutional amendments or a drastic reversal of interpretation by
state supreme courts, which are both substantial logistical barriers.
Congress, by comparison, could simply pass national legislation to
regulate lawyers under the Commerce Clause2 2 and remove state

consider the process of "mystification," the legal and judicial habit of cloaking relatively
simple concepts in intimidating legalese. Wolfram, supra note 132, at 625-30.
' See Ted Schneyer, ProfessionalDiscipline in 2050: A Look Back, 60 FORDHAM L. REV.
125, 125-27 (1991) (predicting federal regulation of lawyers); Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing
Legal Ethics, 73 TEx. L. REv. 335, 379-96 (1994) (arguing that Congress should take control
of legal ethics). See generally Amy R. Mashburn, A Clockwork Orange Approach to Legal
Ethics: A Conflicts Perspective on The Regulation of Lawyers by Federal Courts, 8 GEO. J.
LEGALETHICS 473 (1995) (arguing for centralized approach to regulation of lawyers in federal
system); Linda S. Mullenix, Multiforum Federal Practice: Ethics and Erie, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 89 (1995) (noting difficulties in regulating multiforum federal practice). But see
generallyH. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Federalismand Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal
Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 73 (1997) (arguing against any federalization of legal ethics). These
calls have resulted from frustration with the state-by-state regulation, particularly with the
inconsistency within the federal courts, and not from a systematic institutional analysis.
" For examples of state supreme courts invalidating state legislative actions under the
"inherent powers" doctrine, see Alpert, supra note 17, at 543-51; Carl Barr, JudicialActivism
in State Courts: The Inherent Powers Doctrine, in STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS
INTHE FEDERAL SYSTEM 129-49 (Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982); Deborah
L. Rhode, InstitutionalizingEthics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 687 (1994).
The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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supreme courts from the calculus under the Supremacy Clause.2"'
Although such a move might not prove constitutional under the
Supreme Court's current reading of the Commerce Clause, 34 it is
more likely to be sustained than any state legislative forays into
lawyer regulation.
The question of whether Congress would prove more or less open
to lawyers or to the public is more complex. It is clearly harder and
more expensive to organize to lobby Congress than a state legislature. The effect of this difficulty on the equilibrium between
lawyers and the public, however, is hard to assess. Some have
focused on the increased costs of congressional lobbying for the
regulated industries and the relative ease of lobbying state legislatures, and theorized that interest groups run rampant and capture
is more prevalent in the states.3 5 Others have focused on the
challenge of organizing the public before Congress and argued that
capture is more prevalent on the federal level.23 6
One reason to believe that state legislatures are more open to the
public on issues of lawyer regulation is the relative frequency of
state legislative acts against the interests of lawyers.3 7 Another

U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
' A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, but Professor Moulton
offers some insight into the potential constitutional difficulties of such a move. See Moulton,
supra note 164, at 117.23.
2
See, e.g:, THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (deriding states as subject to
factionalization, and arguing that "[t]he influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame
within their particular States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through
the other states"); Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "PassiveVirtues": Rethinking the
JudicialFunction,114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1923-24 (2001) ("State and local governments are
highly vulnerable to the rent-seeking behavior offactional coalitions."); Rossi, supra note 219,
at 1223 (noting that since time of Founding, state legislative process has been described as
prone to faction, far more so than federal lawmaking process). But see Peter H. Schuck,
Against (andfor)Madison:"An Essay in Praiseof Factions,15 YALE L. &POLY REV. 553, 57496 (1997) (defending factions or special interests).
' See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public
Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1334 (1994) ('Private interest legislation is
common today, much more so than in 1787, and more common at the national level than
among the states-the opposite of Madison's belief about what would happen."); Michael W.
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluatingthe Founders'Design,54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1502-03
(1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)); Richard B.
Stewart, Federalismand Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 921 (1985) (arguing that, because of
interest group power at federal level, Madison's solution in THE FEDERALIST No. 10 has
become "Madison's Nightmare").
' See infra notes 287-92 and accompanying text.
13
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reason to disfavor Congress is the much higher ratio of lawyer to
nonlawyer legislators,2 8 increasing the likelihood that Congress
would be more empathetic to lawyers than state legislatures.
In addition, institutional capacity and character is difficult to
assess authoritatively. As noted above, state legislatures generally
have more extensive powers at their disposal for oversight of agency
actions, but they also generally have fewer resources, smaller and
2 19
less active staffs, and fewer legislative days to utilize their tools.
Nor is Congress a model of legislative oversight; the entire study of
slack and agency capture was developed based on the federal
bureaucracy.2 40 Congress also has some advantages in institutional
expertise, namely larger staffs and research capacities, and a higher
percentage of lawyer-legislators. Correspondingly, however, the
consumer or legal client perspective may be neglected.
IV. DEREGULATION (OR MARKET CONTROL)
An alternative to either judicial or legislative regulation and
delegation is deregulation. The market would govern the provision
of legal services, and common-law tort remedies would compensate
victims for any injuries. Students of institutional analysis will
recognize this alternative as half of the more typical comparison
between legislatures and courts, which considers whether commonlaw courts or legislative regulation can better handle a perceived
market failure. 21 These comparisons also generally contrast the

ms See KEEFE & OGUL, supra note 193, at 117 (stating that in 1987-88, 42% of United
States Representatives and 62% of United States Senators were lawyers, in comparison to
20% state legislators in 1979).
2" See supra note 226 and accompanying text. Note that state legislatures are becoming
more "professional," meaning longer legislative sessions and more permanent staff. SeeALAN
ROSENTHAL, GOVERNORS AND LEGISLATURES: CONTENDING POWERS 41-46 (1990); Samuel S.
Patterson, American State Legislatures and Public Policy, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN
STATES 143-48 (Herbert Jacob & Kenneth N. Vines eds., 3d ed. 1976); Alan Rosenthal, The
State of State Legislatures: An Overview, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1185, 1187-92 (1983).
'o For more recent assaults on Congress's lack of oversight and regular overdelegation,
see FISHER, supra note 220, at 34-161; SCHOENBROD, supra note 220, at 82-96. For some of
the earliest and most influential work, see LOWI, supra note 42, at 125-27.
241 See KOMESAR, supra note 16, at 153-95 (comparing courts as adjudicators and
legislatures as legislators on issues of food safety, tort law, and tort reform); Timothy D.
Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A ComparativeInstitutionalAnalysis, 32 CONN.
L. REV. 1247, 1249-54 (2000) (comparing courts and legislatures on market failures in gun
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efficacy of legislative ex ante regulation with judicial ex post
compensation. 42 The oddity of the earlier court-to-legislature
comparison is that courts and legislatures are compared as legislators; this Section considers the possibility of eliminating ex ante
regulation and allowing the courts to regulate the market as expost
adjudicators.
Most economists, administrative law scholars, and political
scientists begin with the assumption that an unregulated market
with expost liability is the norm and that ex ante regulation should
be applied only in response to identifiable and otherwise irremediable market failures.2 43 This preference is defended partially because
allowing expost repayment of injuries that already have occurred is
easier than trying to predict and preempt injuries, 244 partially
because ex ante regulation can be accompanied by agency capture
and rent-seeking2 4 5 and partially because ex ante regulation is more
likely to over- or under-react to the possibility of injury.24 6

industry). See generallyMolly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: InstitutionalAnalysis and the
Problem of Takings, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 591 (1998) (contrasting institutions that could govern
takings).
U2 See, e.g., POSNER, supranote 34, at 565-71 (considering efficiency of court-made rules
versus legislative rules); Richard C. Ausness, The Casefor a "Strong"RegulatoryCompliance
Defense, 55 MD. L. REV. 1210, 1217-23 (1996) (discussing advantages of ex ante regulation);
Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post
Incentive-BasedRegulation, 107 YALEL.J. 1163, 1263-81 (1998) (considering both exante and
ex post approaches to damages caused by tobacco); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Regulating in
Foresight Versus JudgingLiability in Hindsight: The Case of Tobacco, 33 GA. L. REV. 813,
813-15 (1999) (same).
24 Utilizing the market as the baseline is preferable to ex ante regulation for three
reasons. First, there has long been a general American preference for the free market over
government regulation. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 18361937, at 105-08 (1991). Second, even the strongest modern defenders of regulation do not
argue that regulation should replace the free market on the whole. See generally SUSAN
ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROoRESSIVE AGENDA, THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN

REGULATORY STATE (1992); SUNSTEIN, supra note 29. Lastly, in light of the legislative
difficulties raised by interest group theory, many naturally shy away from any attempts at
ex ante regulatory solutions. See POSNER, supra note 34, at 572-75.
244

See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE:

TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK

REGULATION 3-39 (1993) (discussing systematic difficulties involved in predicting and
responding to risk); PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPION OF RISK 390-412 (2000) (same).
21 See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
24 See W. KIP VISCUSi, RATIONAL RISK POLICY 98 (1998) (presenting examples of
overreactions to risk); see also BREYER, supra note 244, at 23-28 (listing possible
underreactions).
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In the legal market, deregulation would involve eliminating entry
regulation and conduct regulation, and relying on ex post legal
malpractice liability to protect and recompense injured consumers.
The elimination of conduct regulation-in the form of rules and
codes of conduct-actually would have a surprisingly small effect on
the legal market. Many of the ABA's rules are restatements of what
other sources of law require, and these would be unaffected by
' Some of the rules are plainly aimed at decreasing
deregulation. 47
248
client
competition, such as restraints on advertising,
For example, a number of proscriptions specifically refer to outside sources of law in
defining a lawyer's obligations. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (1998)
(stating that lawyer must not "unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or
unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary
value"); MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (1998) (stating that lawyer must not
"offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law"); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.5(a), (b) (1998) (stating that lawyer must not "seek to influence a judge, juror,
prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law [or] communicate ex parte with
such a person except as permitted by law"); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (1998)
(stating that lawyer must not "use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights
of' third person). Other regulations already may be covered by existing laws dealing with
suborning perjury or obstruction of justice. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.3(a)(4) (1998) (stating that lawyer must not "offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be
false"); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (1998) (stating that lawyer must not
"falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely"). Still other regulations parrot
court procedural rules like Rule 11. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (outlining that signature
on pleading certifies that "the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law"), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.1 (1998) CA lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which
includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.").
For a fleshed out version of this argument, see Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When
We Talked About Ethics: A CriticalView of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO STATE L.J. 243, 255-56
(1985) (asserting that many Model Rules cover little more than what already would be
required by common law covering contracts, and fiduciary and agency relationships).
"" The ABA has a long and checkered history of utilizing ethical rules to suppress
competition and control the more entrepreneurial elements in the bar. The most glaring
example is lawyer advertising. The ABA initiated its lawyer regulation project with the 1908
Canons of Professional Ethics CCanons"). See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1956),
reprintedin ABA COMPENDIUM OF PROFESSIONALRESPONSIBILIY RULES AND STANDARDS 311,
320 (1997) [hereinafter ABA CANONS] (providing Canon 27, which states that it is
unprofessional to solicit employment through advertisements). Although the Canons were
based upon an 1887 Alabama Bar Association code that allowed attorneys advertising, see 31
A.B.A. REP. 569 (1908), reprintedin Walter Burgwyn Jones, Canons of ProfessionalEthics,
Their Genesis and History, 7 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 483, 496-98 (1932), the Canons explicitly
barred lawyer advertising. ABA CANONS, supra, at 320. Compare 31 A.B.A. REP. 582 (1908)
247

(printing canon barring lawyer advertising), with ALA. STATE BAR ASS'N CODE OF ETHICS
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solicitation,249 client referrals, 2 ° statements concerning lawyer
credentials, 251 law firm affiliation, 25 2 fee regulations, 253 and bans on

unauthorized practice in another jurisdiction or assisting in
unauthorized practice.25 4 The elimination of these rules likely would
increase market competition and lower prices. As for the remaining
(1887), reprintedin HENRYS. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 356 (1953) (stating that newspaper ads
are proper). Canon 27 on advertising and solicitation was amended in 1937, 1940, 1942, 1943,
1951, and 1963. DRINKER, supra, at 25-26; Walter P. Armstrong, A Century of Legal Ethics,
64 ABA J. 1063, 1066 (1978). Thus, if importance is measured in redrafting, the ABA
certainly considered the prohibition on advertising its most critical and beloved regulation.
The only other changes were to Canon 43 in 1942 and Canon 46 in 1956. Armstrong, supra,
at 1066. In 1977, the Supreme Court struck down a later regulatory ban on advertising, see
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (1969), in Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350,
359-85 (1977). Nevertheless, lawyer advertising remains highly regulated. See MODELRULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 (1998); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101
(1969). These rules are more stringent than the typical regulations to protect consumers from
misleading advertising or fraud. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of FreeSpeech
and the Legal Profession: Constraintson Lawyers'FirstAmendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 569, 580-81 (1998) (arguing that lawyer advertising regulation is more stringent than
some other advertising restraints deemed unconstitutional by Supreme Court).
" MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1, 7.3 (1998); MODEL CODE OF PROF L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101, 2-104 (1969).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2(c) (1998); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSI2

BILITY DR 2-101, 2-103(B) (1969).
2" MODELRULESOFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.4 (1998); MODEL CODE OFPROFLRESPONSIBILITY DR 2-105(A) (1969).
22 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1, 7.3 (1998); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-102 (1969).

222 Until 1975, some bar associations directly fixed prices with minimum fee schedules.
See ABEL, supra note 8, at 118-19. The Supreme Court struck down these practices in 1975.
See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 944, 973 (1975) (holding anticompetitive lawyer
conduct is within reach of Sherman Act). The current Model Rule 1.5 is more circumscribed,
but still allows a lawyer to consider "the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar
legal services" in setting a price, MODELRULESOF PROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.5(a)(3) (1998); accord
MODEL CODE OF PROF L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(B)(3) (1969), which sounds like an
invitation to price-fix. Further, Rule 1.5 contains so many allowable variables for setting a
fee that the rule actually offers little protection to clients or guidance to lawyers. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (1998) (listing eight factors for determining whether fee
is "reasonable"); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(B) (1969) (same). The
draft version of Rule 1.5, however, did offer clients some possible protection from excessive
or unforeseen fees, and the first several drafts required a written fee agreement. Ted
Schneyer, Professionalismas Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 14 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 677, 695 (1989). Interestingly, the draft rule requiring a
written fee agreement was pressed by the only nonattorney member of the Commission that
drafted the Model Rules. Id. Following attorney objections, the standard was lowered to
"preferably in writing," MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (1998), which actually
offers no client protection.
2" MODELRULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT R. 5.5 (1998); MODEL CODE OF PROF'LRESPONSIBILITY DR 3-101 (1969).
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rules, overall enforcement is so lax that some have argued that
malpractice insurers and malpractice claims are de facto dictating
lawyer regulation.25 5 Further, because the rules are increasingly
being applied as proof of the minimum standards of lawyer behavior
in malpractice actions, 2" much of the substance of the rules would
be enforced by the courts.257
The biggest change would be the elimination of entry standards.
While the malpractice standards for "practicing law" likely would
remain the same, there would be a sea change in who was allowed
to practice law. Although free market entry seems unimaginable to
a society that has been steeped in a rigorous bar exam and three
years of accredited law study for much of the last century, open
entry with ex post court control was essentially the system during
the nineteenth century.258
The advantage of such a system is obvious in light of interestgroup analysis, because the organizational and political advantages
of lawyers' and the public's collective action problems are minimized
when the political system is much less involved. Consequently, the
access equilibrium between lawyers and the public is neutralized,
and policy is not set by a centralized government institution, but
rather through a myriad of market transactions and the commonlaw courts. The question of lawyer access is not eliminated
altogether, however, since courts would still judge the behavior of
lawyers, and the connections between lawyers and judges still could
result in conscious or unconscious favorable treatment of lawyers.
' See, e.g., George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss Prevention: A
ComparativeAnalysis of Economic Institutions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 305, 306-07 (1997); John
Leubsdorf, Legal Malpracticeand ProfessionalResponsibility,48 RUTGERSL.REV. 101, 101-02
(1995); Manuel R. Ramos, Legal and Law School Malpractice: Confessions of a Lawyer's
Lawyer and Law Professor, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 863, 867-68 (1996).
See Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Towards a More Effective
"
Regulation of Lawyers' Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 313, 316 & n.9 (2002) (observing
that courts rely "on ethics rules for enforcing clients' rights against lawyers in motions to
disqualify or professional malpractice actions"); Wolfram, supra note 17, at 215 & n.36
(submitting that courts have applied "newly.sharpened lawyer code rules as an appropriate
measure or articulation of pre-existing but more general grounds of liability" in malpractice
actions).
" Consider also the continuing effect that nonlegal attorney norms would play in
replacing underenforced conduct regulations. See Wendel, supra note 6, at 1955-85
(describing effects of non-legal norms on attorney behavior).
"
See supra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
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Consider, for example, whether the procedural peculiarities of legal
malpractice actions are the result of such influence.25 9 Furthermore,
because filing a lawsuit is extremely expensive and risky, only the
wealthy or parties who were egregiously harmed likely would bring
260
suit.
The most vociferous objection to such a system would be the
theoretical harms inflicted on unsuspecting clients. Bar associations have long hailed entry regulation as a bulwark against client
ignorance; without a bar examination and law school, clients could
not differentiate between the good, the bad, and the shysters.2 61
Nevertheless, this argument is not the show-stopper that it appears
to be.26 2 First, although quite difficult and expensive, current entry
standards are remarkably poor indicators of any particular competence to actually practice law. Take for example, the skills that bar
passage guarantees to a client.263 Can a newly minted lawyer
necessarily file a complaint and prosecute a law suit, draft a will, or
defend a complex antitrust suit? Law school and bar passage

For a discussion of malpractice procedures, see supra notes 153-59 and accompanying
text.
' See Cross, supra note 68, at 360-68 (describing barriers to public participation in legal
system, as follows: expense of litigation, standing, and availability of precedent purchasing);
Frank B. Cross, Shattering the FragileCasefor JudicialReview of Rulemaking,85 VA. L. REV.
1243, 1314-22 (1999) (detailing structural and doctrinal biases of courts). If the market were
deregulated, some of the expense of litigation might decline.
"' See, e.g., Margaret Fuller Corneille, Bar Admissions: New Opportunitiesto Enhance
Professionalism,52 S.C. L. REV. 609,611 (2001) ('Bar exams are used to screen out those who
are not competent to practice. While not perfect, the bar exam represents the state high
courts' commitment to protecting the public by requiring potential lawyers to show evidence
of their legal competence."); J. Kirkland Grant, The Bar Examination: Anachronism or
Gatekeeper to the Profession?,70 N.Y. ST. B.J. 12, 12 (1998):
The function of the Bar Exam is ostensibly to make sure that only
competent individuals are permitted to practice law. The Bar Exam was
first used as a device to determine competence in the interest of protecting
consumers when virtually anyone who "studied law" could be qualified as
a lawyer.
Id.; Nancy J.Moore, ProfessionalismReconsidered,1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 773, 774, 778
(reviewing COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, AM. BAR ASS'N, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE

(1986)).
2 This is a compressed version of a broader argument against current entry standards.
See Barton, supra note 7, at 436-50 (discussing protection of public from incompetent
practitioners).
' Client protection must be measured from the day of bar passage, but the skills and
experience that most lawyers gain in practice are not guaranteed under the entry standards
and are not guaranteed to any clients based upon state licensing.
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guarantees a minimum of intelligence and ardor, but little in the
way of concrete skills.
Second, there is little evidence that most clients are ignorant of
the legal market. To the contrary, a substantial portion of legal
services are purchased by savvy entities like corporations, governments, or businesses. 64
Lastly, there are much less expensive and less obtrusive possibilities for client protection. Typically, the response to an information
asymmetry is to provide more information, not wholesale regulation
of the market. 265 Possibilities could include certification rather than
licensing, or a public clearinghouse of complaints or suits filed
against lawyers. In fact, eliminating the single (and relatively
unhelpful) credential of bar passage likely would create more
information for clients as lawyers struggled to differentiate
themselves in a more competitive market. 26 For this reason, the
need to protect the public from incompetent lawyers, while a factor
in those segments of the market where lawyers offer services to
individuals (e.g., personal injury, criminal law,26 7 and personal

I See Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without
Clients or Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129, 139 (2001):
The representation of corporations alone represents a significant
percentage of the work of all lawyers, and if one adds to that all the work
lawyers do representing partnerships (and, more recently, limited liability
companies), labor unions, formal and informal associations, governments
and classes, there can be little question that the representation of entities
is at the heart of what many, if not most, lawyers do.
Id.; see also Marc A. Galanter, "Old andIn the Way": The ComingDemographic Transforma.
tion of the Legal Profession and Its Implicationsfor the Provisionof Legal Services, 1999 WIS.
L. REV. 1081, 1088-90 (citing raft of statistics and concluding that "[m]ore and more of the
legal world is devoted to serving organizations rather than individuals").
' Information asymmetry denotes a situation where a buyer lacks the expertise to gauge
whether a seller's product is good, bad, or dangerous. For a description of less drastic
responses to information asymmetry, see Barton, supra note 7, at 446-47.
1 This differentiation is already occurring via the explosion in lawyer advertising, and
the move toward certifications above and beyond bar passage. See David A. Kessler,
ProfessionalAsphyxiation" Why the Legal Professionis Gaspingfor Breath, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 455, 461 (1997) (postulating on effects of increased lawyer advertising); John J.
Watkins, Lawyer Advertising, the Electronic Media, and the First Amendment, 49 ARK. L.
REV. 739, 739 (1997) (commenting on growth in lawyer advertising). See generally Judith
Kilpatrick, Specialist Certificationfor Lawyers" What is Going On?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 273
(1997) (describing current state of attorney certification).
I See Barton, supranote 7, at 462-63 (responding to argument that deregulation of entry
would harm indigent criminal defendants).
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bankruptcy), is not an endemic problem within the market, and
current entry standards do not, in fact, offer much protection.
Nevertheless, there is the following compelling reason not to
eliminate entry standards altogether: courts rely on licensed
practitioners with a uniform background, and at least some
guaranteed skills, to file and pursue cases.2 If the legal market
were deregulated and anyone could file or maintain lawsuits before
the courts, the administrative burden would be crushing, and the
courts likely would grind to a halt. Courts are already leery of, and
unfriendly to, pro se litigation." 9 Deregulation would exponentially
multiply the problems involved in educating lay-people in court
procedures, etiquette, and legal reasoning.270
A further difficulty is logistical. Remember that bar associations
invariably propose more and greater entry standards as a response
to any and all perceived problems within the profession."' The flip
side of this effect explains why any occupation will fight deregulation tooth and nail. If entry barriers suddenly were eliminated or
drastically eased, existing practitioners could not recoup their own

' I have previously argued that the needs of the courts are the only compelling argument
for entry regulation. Barton, supra note 7, at 450-52, 456-60. Nevertheless, current entry
regulations are poorly suited to meet this justification; graduation from an accredited law
school and passing the bar does not guarantee any level of proficiency in efficiently filing and
pursuing lawsuits or appeals. This may explain the judicial dissatisfaction with many of the
lawyers who appear before the courts. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
'z See Adam H. Bloomenstein, Developing Standardsfor the Imposition of Sanctions
Under Rule 11 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,21 AKRON L. REV. 289, 308-09 (1988)
(discussing imposition of Rule 11 sanctions againstpro se litigants); PaulJ. Liacos & Maureen
McGee, Where Does the Preservationof the Right to JusticeBegin?, 81 MASS. L. REV. 121, 127
(1996) (noting courts' "hostile attitude towards pro se litigants" and'its effect on low income
women).
'0 This assumes that the current structure of, and resources dedicated to, the courts are
fixed. Although the topic is beyond the scope of this Article, a court system could be designed
to minimize the judiciary's reliance on lawyers in processing legal disputes. Consider, for
example, the system of administrative law judges that governs appeals of agency decisions
on disability or unemployment insurance. For a description of the operations and procedures
of administrative law judges, see Charles E. Daye, Powers of Administrative Law Judges,
Agencies, and Courts: An Analytical and EmpiricalAssessment, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 157388 (2001); F. Scott McCown & Monica Leo, When Can an Agency Change the Findingsor
Conclusionsof an Administrative Law Judge?, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 65, 67-77 (1998).
"' This is because the burden of the regulation is borne by new entrants and not existing
lawyers, and (not coincidentally) current lawyers receive a windfall. Because the profession
is harder to join, and existing lawyers are already members, competition is suppressed and
earnings are boosted. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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investment in passing the entry regulations and would suffer a
substantial loss.72 Accordingly, the political feasibility of deregulation is even more challenging than a transfer in regulatory power
from the courts to legislatures because virtually all licensed
attorneys would vociferously oppose free market entry.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase has noted that the three possible
institutions for organizing social relations-markets, firms, and
governments-are all "more or less failures."2 7 There is no selection
among the judiciary, legislatures, or the markets that is going to
completely overcome the public's general apathy toward lawyer
regulation or eliminate the dominant power of bar associations and
lawyers in the process. Nevertheless, among the various institutions considered, one may do the least imperfect job of governing the
legal market and limiting the overweening influence of bar associations and lawyer lobbyists.
First, is regulation necessary at all? If the market could function
without involving any centralized government authority, the
problems associated with interest group theory could be minimized.
Because of the needs of the American courts, however, some
regulation of entry and conduct is necessary.2 74
The next question is which institution fares best in our two main
categories, propensity for capture and institutional capacity and
character. Legislatures, while typically criticized for their accessibility to organized special interests, would fare better with lawyer
regulation than judiciaries. The multiple institutional, political, and
personal connections between the judiciary and the lawyers they are
ostensibly regulating, as well as the natural inaccessibility ofjudges
to the public, virtually guarantees lawyers a stranglehold over every
aspect of lawyer regulation.

272

Barton, supra note 7, at 443-44.

2'' Ronald H. Coase, The RegulatedIndustries: Discussion,54 AMER. ECON. REV. 194,195

(1964). The title of Neil Komesar's groundbreaking work on institutional analysis--Imperfect
Alternatives--is also fitting. See generally KOMESAR, supra note 16.
M See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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Legislatures also will be open to lawyer lobbying, just as they are
open to lobbying by any wealthy and organized interest. Nevertheless, the unique access that lawyers enjoy before state supreme
courts will be eliminated, and the opportunities for public input will
be greatly magnified. On the whole, this should result in more
of lawyers and limit the opportunities for
public-spirited regulation
2 75
lawyer rent-seeking.
In addition, legislatures have an advantage in their capacity for
delegation, but a disadvantage in institutional expertise. Both
legislatures and state supreme courts are very busy institutions that
have strong incentives to delegate as much of their work as possible,
especially when a powerful interest like a bar association calls for
delegation. State supreme courts, however, have an institutional
aversion to broad policymaking and treat lawyer regulation as a
second tier responsibility, resulting in inordinate levels of delegation
and slack. Legislatures-while frequently pilloried for their efforts
at delegation-are more experienced at overseeing delegation, and
have more tools available to punish erring agencies.
Institutional expertise is the one area where state supreme
courts have an advantage, although it is not as great as one might
think. Defenders of the role of the courts in lawyer regulation
regularly rely upon judicial expertise in the legal market and in the
needs of the courts.2 76 While it is true that judges, as former
lawyers, have a better understanding of the legal market than the
typical legislator, this expertise cuts both ways in that judges
understand the market from two perspectives, as former lawyers
and as judges. The perspectives least likely to be represented before
regulators-those of clients and the public at large-are not natural
areas of judicial expertise, and some students of institutional
culture might argue that judges are uniquely incompetent to
understand and represent these perspectives. Legislatures, by
' Note the use of the word"limit," not "eliminate." Barring deregulation, there is no way
to fully eliminate the organizational and political advantages that bar associations possess,
and even deregulation suffers from the expense and uncertainty of using the courts to protect
the public ex post.
" See, e.g., Nathan M. Crystal, Core Values: Falseand True, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 747,
771-72 (2001) (describing courts' justifications for judicial control of lawyer regulation);
Wilkins, supra note 13, at 856-57 (noting that "courts cannot function without lawyers," and
therefore courts should have limited regulatory power over lawyers).

20031

LAWYER REGULATION

1241

contrast, are likely to have both lawyers and clients among their
ranks and will likely better represent all of the affected constituencies in the legal market.
Moreover, even the gap in expertise over the needs of the courts
need not bar legislative control, because legislatures already have
some control over many aspects of court operations (including their
budgets) and judges can always lobby legislatures over these
issues."' Lastly, a great portion of lawyer regulation is not
concerned with the operations of the courts or the filing and
maintaining of lawsuits, and, in these areas, the court's expertise is
less germane.
In sum, an institutional comparison favors legislative control of
lawyer regulation. The question of whether it should be state
legislatures or Congress depends upon whether one believes that
organized interests are more or less powerful on the state level or
the federal level,27 one's belief as to the advantages of federalism,1 9
and constitutional issues.2"' Nonetheless, state legislatures appear
preferable because they have fewer lawyer-legislators, more

'" Alternatively, if the regulation truly represents a substantial blow to the operations
of the courts, it could be struck down under the inherent powers doctrine. See Crystal, supra
note 276, at 771-72 (stating that courts might be compelled to act to maintain basic functions).
An overly aggressive version of the inherent powers doctrine, of course, would defang any
legislative efforts to reform lawyer regulation. See WOLFRAM, supra note 15, at 27-31
(explaining and critiquing most expansive versions of inherent powers doctrine).
27 The power of organized interests vis-A-vis the public at large in either state legislatures
or Congress will affect the access equilibrium, and therefore the type of regulation that
results. Given the vast differentiation among the various states, the great range in the
numbers of lawyers in state legislatures (the South seems to have a much higher proportion
of lawyer legislators than the West, see LEGISLATORS' OCCUPATIONS, supranote 203, at 32),
and the differences in regional attitudes, it is likely that there would be great variation
among the states if their legislatures controlled.
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
'States may perform their role as laboratories fbr experimentation to devise various solutions
where the best solution is far from clear."); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism,
47 FLA.L. REV. 499, 524 (1995) (extolling virtues of having many states attempting many
solutions to common problems).
280 Many state supreme courts have decided that lawyer regulation is, as a matter of state
constitutional law, under the exclusive control of the supreme court, and a power transfer to
the state legislature would require a change in court precedent or a constitutional
amendment. See WOLFRAM,supranote 15, at 23-24 C([A]ny attempt by a coordinate branch
of government to trench on that prerogative of the judicial branch is unconstitutional.").
Similarly, federal control might run afoul of the Supreme Court's recent Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
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legislative tools for oversight, and generally exhibit a more populist
spirit.
Naturally, there are several objections to this proposal. The most
obvious objection is the less than stellar job that state legislatures
have done with the regulation of other professions and occupations.
Walter Gellhorn, among others, has humorously criticized some of
2
the most glaring excesses of legislative licensing schemes, "' and
many have noted that professions other than law
and guiding their own
have had great success in controlling
282
rent-seeking.
regulation toward
Legislatures have by and large responded to organized professions exactly as interest group theory predicts; they have provided
helpful and protectionist regulation to occupations up to the point
where the benefits to the profession are equal to the public's
potential outrage. 8 3 Typically, this means that professions are very
successful before legislative bodies, and if state legislatures
regulated lawyers, bar associations also certainly would prove
successful.
The comparative question is whether bar associations and
lawyers would have more success before legislatures than they
2' See Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of OccupationalLicensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 10-19
(1976) ("Illinois purportedly tests a would-be barber's knowledge of, among other things,
physiology, electricity, anatomy, and barber history."); see also JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE

TYRANNY OF THE EXPERTS: HOWPROFESSIONALSARE CLOSINGTHE OPEN SOCIETY 14-17 (1970)

(listing silly licensing schemes for manicurists, egg graders, and other occupations).
2'2See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137-60 (1982) (crushing
political and economic case for all types of occupational licensure); Ira Horowitz, The
EconomicFoundationsof Self-Regulation in theProfessions,in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS
3,4-16 (Roger D. Blair &Stephen Rubin eds., 1980) (suggesting that self-regulation increases
professionals income beyond that of perfectly competitive market). As a further example,
consider the initial success of accountants in fending off calls for stringent regulatory changes
following the Enron debacle. See Stephen Labaton & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Enthusiasm
Waning in Congressfor Tougher Post-EnronControls, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2002, at Al. The
lobbying power of the American Medical Association C'AMA") is, like that of the ABA,
legendary. See Peter J. Van Hemel, A Way Out of the Maze: FederalAgency Preemptionof
State Licensingand Regulation of Complementaryand AlternativeMedicine Practitioners,27
AM. J.L.& MED. 329, 338 & n.75 (2001) (outlining AMA's largely successful efforts to suppress
nontraditional medical practitioners). For an overview of the AMA's legislative agenda, see
American Medical Association, AMA in Washington, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
category/4015.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
2N See S. David Young, THE RULE OF EXPERTS, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN AMERICA 15-

80 (1987) (arguing that occupational licensing is more responsive to licensed entities than
public).
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currently do before state supreme courts. Aside from the above
institutional comparison, the history of legislative and judicial
control of lawyer regulation suggests that legislatures would take a
more populist approach to the regulation of lawyers. Consider the
universal legislative slackening of entry and conduct requirements
during "Jacksonian democracy" and throughout the nineteenth
4
century, while legislatures were in control.1 The critical role that
state supreme courts, in conjunction with bar associations and the
American Association of Law Schools, played in creating and5
maintaining the current, strict regulatory scheme is also telling."

The criticism of lawyers reached a fever pitch during 1830-1860. See STEVENS, supra
at 7 ("During the 1830's, the attack on the class of lawyers reached a remarkable
81,
note
This was
pitch."); see also CHARLES WARREN, AHISTORYOFTHEAMERICANBAR 511-12 (1966).
THE LAW:
partially in response to criticisms of lawyer elitism, see JULIUS HENRY COHEN,
the
BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 115-16 (1924); STEVENS, supra note 81, at 7,partially due to
influence of "Jacksonian democracy," see 2 CHROUST, supra note 178, at 156-59; POUND, supra
see
note 91, at 236-37, and partially due to the rapid influx of frontier states into the Union,
81,
note
supra
STEVENS,
225-31;
at
91,
note
supra
LIEBERMAN, supra note 1,at 49; POUND,
the
at 9; William R. Johnson, Educationand ProfessionalLife Styles: Law and Medicine in
BarAssociations,
Wickser,
J.
Philip
(1974);
187
185,
Q.
HIST.OFEDUC.
14
Nineteenth Century,
New
15 CORNELL L. REV. 390, 392-94 (1930). For example, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, their
in
appearing
for
requirements
any
abolished
expressly
Wisconsin,
and
Hampshire,
a bar
courts. DRINKER, supra note 248, at 19 & n.38. Likewise, the states that maintained
91,
admission requirement significantly slackened their standards. See POUND, supra note
at 227-28:
In 1800 a definite period of preparation for admission to the bar was
prescribed in fourteen of the nineteen states or organized territories which
then made up the Union. In 1840 it was required in but eleven out of
thirty jurisdictions. In 1860 it had come to be required in only nine of the
then thirty-nine jurisdictions.
Id. In light of this "deprofessionalism," regulation of attorney behavior-by the courts,
Ethics
legislatures, or otherwise-was infrequent. See Fannie M. Farmer, Legal Practiceand
in North Carlina1820-1860, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION, MAJOR HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS
as the
274, 350 & n.101 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987) (noting that "prior to 1868, no court, so far
Carolina).
North
in
attorney"
an
records show, was called upon to disbar
an
Starting around the turn of the century, state supreme courts began to claim
2
(describing
536-43
at
17,
note
supra
Alpert,
See
lawyers.
regulate
inherent authority to
lawyers).
formulation of theory of judicial control, including restricting legislative power over
regulate
to
power
inherent
an
had
courtq
that
understood
widely
was
it
By the 1930s,
for and
attorneys, and the practice was widespread enough that it inspired commentary both
Power
Inherent
to
Claim
Judicial
The
Beardsley,
A.
Charles
Compare
practice.
the
against
with
courts),
of
power
inherent
claimed
against
(arguing
(1933)
Over the Bar, 19 A.B.A. J.509
used
Dowling, supra note 96, at 635 (listing benefits of inherent powers doctrine). Courts
note
their powers to regulate both the entry and disbarment of lawyers, see Dowling, supra
96, at 636-37, to integrate the bar, see MCKEAN, supra note 87, at 49, and even to investigate
and prosecute the unauthorized practice of law, see Dowling, supra note 96, at 636-37.
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Lastly, although all professions have attempted, with more or less
success, to capture the occupational regulatory process, note the
peerless success of lawyers in developing and maintaining a
relatively undisturbed and self-contained system of "selfregulation. '2 86
Moreover, state legislatures have recently passed or proposed a
number of lawyer-unfriendly statutes, including Texas's passage of
a sunset provision for the Texas State Bar, 7 Arizona's repeal of
their unauthorized practice of law statutes, 2 88 Kentucky's move 2to
89
allow nonlawyers to practice before administrative agencies,
Virginia's decision to allow nonlawyers to perform real estate
closings, 9" Florida's and Michigan's consideration of a move to
legislative regulatory control, 291 and the California legislature's
'
See Martyn, supra note 87, at 707 ("Thus, unlike other professionals, who are
supervised by state regulatory agencies, lawyers remain a virtually self-regulated profession."); Nancy J. Moore, EntrepreneurialDoctors andLawyers: RegulatingBusinessActivities
in the Medical and Legal Professions, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST INCLINICAL PRACTICE AND
RESEARCH 171, 181-84 (Roy G. Spece, Jr. et al. eds., 1996) (discussing regulation of medical
profession as compared to legal profession, and concluding that legal profession has much
more latitude to self-regulate than medical profession); Moore, supra, note 87, at 14-16
(opining that legal profession has reached unique heights of self-regulation); Schneyer, supra
note 87, at 37 ("Self.regulatory institutions have a firmer hold in law than in most
occupations.").
281 See Charles Aycock, President's Opinion, 63 TEX. B.J. 430, 430 (2000) (noting that
Texas "State Bar faces sunset review every 12 years"). Aycock also states that improvements
in "[t]he current grievance system [were] developed in response to the Legislature's
dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the disciplinary system in place at that time." Id.
2
See Jonathan Rose, UnauthorizedPracticeof Law in Arizona: A Legal and Political
Problem That Won't Go Away, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 585, 585-95 (2002) (discussing historical
background of Arizona legislature's 1985 repeal of its criminal statute barring unauthorized
practice of law). Despite the legislature's repeal of the statute, the Arizona Supreme Court
has a rule banning the unauthorized practice of law. See Pamela Lopata, Comment, Can
States Juggle the Unauthorizedand MultidisciplinaryPracticesof Law?: A Look at the States'
Current Grapple with the Problem in the Context of Living Trusts, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 467,
478-80 & nn.63-67 (2001) (detailing Arizona's case-by-case approach to defining practice of
law).
' The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled the statute unconstitutional. Turner v. Ky. Bar
Ass'n, 980 S.W.2d 560, 560 (Ky. 1998).
' This statute was also ruled unconstitutional. Fears v. Va. State Bar, No. LE-1283-3,
2000 WL 249247, at * 11 (Va.Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 2000).
"8 In 1996, members ofthe Florida state legislature proposed removing regulation of the
bar from the supreme court. See John A. Devault, First, Let's Put the Lawyers Under the
Legislature, FI.A B.J., Jan. 1996, at 8 (reporting with dismay on proposal for legislative
control of bar); see also F. Raymond Marks & Darlene Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal
Profession: Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 194 & n.4 (noting introduction ofbill
in Michigan legislature for lay control of bar and defeat of this effort by bar association and
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28 2 Much of this legislative
continuing tussles with its state bar.
293
unpopularity of lawyers
activity can be attributed to the overall
2 94
and the diminution of lawyer-legislators.
A secondary objection applies especially to state legislatures. In
presenting this argument, I have found in certain quarters an
almost virulent reaction against the competence of state legislators.
In some respects, this is simply a recasting of the expertise
objection-state legislators have smaller staffs and shorter legislative sessions-but it seems to involve more than these logistical
issues. It is an attack on the intelligence and abilities of state
legislators themselves. I have come to refer to this objection as the
"yokel" objection to state legislative control. In its most stringent
form, this objection lays bare the strong vein of elitism and paternalism that lies behind many of the defenses of judicial control of
lawyer regulation, 295 and in fact supports legislative control of
Bar associations, lawyers, and even law
lawyer regulation.
professors rightly fear how state legislatures would handle lawyer
regulation because of the animosity that much of the public, and
many legilslators, feel towards lawyers. Objectors attempt to frame

state supreme court).
'2 See, e.g., Lisa J. Frisella et al., State Barof California,17 CAL. REG. L. REP. 203,203-05
(2000) (listing far.reaching effects of bar enabling statute); Tamara Hill, Senate Bill 1413:
The Answer to Senate Bill 60 Plebisciteand Its Constitutionality Under the Inherent Powers
Doctrine,27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 601, 601-04 (1997) (describing one legislative effort to
eliminate California's unified bar); Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Reforming Lawyers
and Law Professors, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2583, 2598.99 (1996) (noting California legislature's
involvement in lawyer discipline and creation of State Bar Court).
See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 203-04 and accompanying text. Interestingly, some of this legislative
activity may be due to the existence of the inherent authority doctrine, because lawyers may
any
not bother to lobby legislatures as vigorously, instead relying on the courts to strike down
v. Wade.
unfavorable laws. Commentators have speculated on a similar process following Roe
the
By removing the abortion question from political debate, the Supreme Court halted
TALK:
RIomS
GLENDON,
ANN
MARY
See
political process and deactivated pro choice voters.
v.Wade, 410
THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 58 (1991) (suggesting that Roe

U.S. 113 (1973), effectively brought "to a virtual halt the process of legislative abortion reform
cf.
that was already well on the way to producing" compromise statutes in United States);
competitive
"the
(describing
(1997)
101-21
EcONOMICS
AND
LAW
COMPARATIVE
UGO MATrEI,
relationship among sources of law").
At the heart of one of the primary arguments for judicial regulation of lawyers--that
2
legislatures cannot be trusted to regulate such a complex field-is classic paternalism, or the
idea that poor confused legislators and the public cannot be trusted to handle regulation of
the profession and that the experts should take care of it.
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this animosity in terms of legislative ignorance of the legal system.
Interestingly, much of this animosity is based precisely upon
knowledge of the system from the client or litigant's point of view.
In fact, the strenuous objections of bar associations to legislative
control,'" and their continuing advocacy of judicial control, cast
doubt on the efficacy of judicial regulation.2 9 7
VI. CONCLUSION
There are serious problems with lawyer regulation. The solution
to these problems must begin with a top-to-bottom reassessment of
the institutions in charge. An institutional analysis of the
policymakers for lawyer regulation leads inexorably to the conclusion that state supreme courts should not be in charge. These
justices are too busy, too connected and sympathetic to lawyers, and
too inaccessible to the public to do any more than allow bar
associations and lawyers almost total control of the system.
Legislative control, whether by state legislatures or Congress, will
not eliminate the powerful influence of lawyers, but it will allow a
healthy dose of public influence to enter the picture and may begin
to reform the system.
Many lawyers and bar associations will be aghast at such a
suggestion, partially out of fear of regulatory changes, and partially
out of allegiance to the "profession" and all that freighted term has
come to mean. Paradoxically, while such a move might well begin
a deprofessionalization of lawyers, it also might lift some of the
.A

The ABA and other bar associations have continually supported judicial control of

lawyer regulation.

See, e.g., AM. BAR ASSN, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON

MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE 18 (2001) ("ABA should affirm its support for the principle
of state judicial licensing and regulation of lawyers."); MCKAY REPORT, supra note 11, at 1-6
("Regulation of the legal profession should remain under the authority of the judicial branch
of government."); Michael D. Kimerer, A Presence in the Legislature,ARIZ. ATT'Y, Mar. 1996,
at 8 (reporting that most bar members prefer supreme court control of regulation); George A.
Reimer, Permissible Contact, 57 OP. ST. B. BULL 27, 29 (1997) (reaffirming "that the
regulation of lawyers admitted to practice in Oregon is the province of the Oregon State Bar
and the Oregon Supreme Court, and not subject to inconsistent regulation by federal
authorities under the guise of administrative rules").
' Under interest group theory, one should be particularly wary of a regulated interests
lobbying efforts. Cf. Cross, supra note 260, at 1324-25 (expressing skepticism over judicial
review of agency decisions because regulated interests lobbied for Administrative Procedures

Act).
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burdens lawyers have placed on themselves. Lawyers and bar
associations have regularly presented themselves in a manner that
no profession could realistically meet. Perhaps much of the
unhappiness of lawyers, and of the public with the legal profession,
stems from self-regulation itself. Like many overly eager advocates,
lawyers have promised everyone-including themselves-more than
they can deliver.
VII. APPENDIX THE CURRENT STATE OF LAWYER REGULATION

The regulation of lawyers can be divided into two categories,
entry regulation and conduct regulation. Entry regulation controls
the state licensing of attorneys to practice law and includes the bar
examination, 298 an examination of the applicant's character and

Every state requires bar applicants to pass a bar examination that consists of multiple
choice and essay questions. See Suzanne E. Rowe, Legal Research,Legal Writing, and Legal
Analysis: Putting Law School into Practice,29 STETSON L. REV. 1193, 1214 & n.82 (2000)
('Almost every state administers essay questions in addition to the 'Multistate Bar
Examination,' which is comprised of multiple-choice questions."); W. Ray Williams, Hand-up
or Handout? The Americans with DisabilitiesAct and "UnreasonableAccommodation" of
LearningDisabledBarApplicants: Toward a New Paradigm,34 CREIGHTONL. REV. 611,620
&n.27 (2001) (explaining that test usually contains essay section and multiple-choice section).
Forty-eight states require new applicants to take the Multistate Bar Examination (MBE). See
Maureen Straub Kordesh, ReinterpretingARA Standard 302(fD in Light of the Multistate
PerformanceTest, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 299, 305 & n. 13 (2000) (listing jurisdictions that do not
participate in MBE); National Conference of Bar Examiners, Multistate Examination Use,
at http://www.ncbex.org/tests.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2003) (giving information on multistate
tests). The bar examination has been criticized as an ineffective means of consumer
protection and an extraordinarily effective means of limiting competition and boosting lawyer
profitability. See Barton, supranote 7, at 434-50 (comparing possible justifications for entry
restrictions in legal market to determine if current system is defensible). Consider, for
example, the plunge in bar passage rates during the Great Depression. See ABEL, supra note
8, at 62-66. Note that bar passage rates have been falling over the last ten years. See
Deborah J. Merritt et al., Raising the Bar: A Social Science Critique of Recent Increases to
PassingScores on the Bar Exam, 69 U. CIN. L. REv. 929, 929 (2001) C'[A]t least a dozen states
have raised the score required to pass their bar exams during the last decade.").
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fitness for practice, 2 " and education requirements. 00 Entry
regulation also encompasses the various statutes and court orders
barring the unauthorized practice of law by nonlawyers. °1 As such,

Every state requires a bar applicant to pass a character and fitness review. See
McChrystal, supra note 8, at 67 & n.1; Rhode, supra note 8, at 493. For a description of the
processes followed by most jurisdictions, see Jon Bauer, The Characterof the Questions and
the Fitness of the Process: Mental Health, Bar Admissions and the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 49 UCLA L. REV. 93, 101-05 (2001). These processes originated at least
partially to repress the admission of foreign-born and minority lawyers to the bar. Id. at 20607 & n.403; see also JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN MODERN AMERICA 125-29 (1976); Rhode, supra note 8, at 507-46.
'0 Forty-five states require graduation from an ABA-accredited law school in order to take
the bar examination. See Herb D. Vest, Fellingthe Giant: Breaking the ABA's Stranglehold
on Legal Education in America, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 494, 497 (2000) (explaining that most
states now rely on ABA standards). Many states will allow graduates of unaccredited law
schools to sit for the bar if they have been licensed and practiced for a certain period of time
(usually five years) in another jurisdiction. See BAR REQUIREMENTS, supranote 78, at 12-13.
The ABA has a plethora of requirements for accreditation, from library staff to faculty
governance to curricular rules. See generally SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO
THE BAR, AM. BAR AsS'N, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS (1999) (listing
requirements for accreditation). In particular, applicants to accredited law schools must have
completed three-fourths of the work required for a bachelor's degree at an accredited college
and have taken an admission test (typically the LSAT). Id. at 55-56. Some states
independently require a bachelor's degree to take the bar. See BAR REQUIREMENTS, supra
note 78, at 3-4 (noting that Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia require bachelor's degrees). In order to
graduate, a student must complete the equivalent of three years of continuous full-time study,
and correspondence classes are specifically barred. See Nicolas P. Terry, Bricks Plus Bytes:
How 'Click-and-Brick" Will Define Legal Education Space, 46 VILL. L. REV. 95, 102 & nn.3639 (2001) (noting various ABA requirements that ban correspondence law schools). These
requirements have come under fire in recent years from commentators as diverse as Richard
Posner and Harry Edwards. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND
LEGAL THEORY 281-309 (1999) (suggesting two-year J.D. program, among other reforms);
Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession,91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 76-78 (1992) (noting that regulatory environment has created
overly theoretical and impractical legal education). See generallyMarina Lao, Discrediting
Accreditation?: Antitrust and Legal Education,79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1035 (2001) (arguing that
ABA accreditation is illegal constraint on competition); George B. Sheperd & William G.
Sheperd, ScholarlyRestraints? ABA Accreditationand Legal Education, 19 CARDOZO L. REV.
2091 (1998) (offering exhaustive history of accreditation and criticizing it as overbroad and
anticompetitive); Herb D. Vest, Fellingthe Giant.- Breakingthe ABA's Strangleholdon Legal
Education in America, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 494 (2000) (opposing ABA accreditation).
"0 See Barlow F. Christensen, The UnauthorizedPracticeof Law: Do Good FencesReally
Make Good Neighbors--or Even Good Sense, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159, 161-201
(detaining historical development of restrictions on practice of law); Deborah L. Rhode,
Policingthe ProfessionalMonopoly: A Constitutionaland EmpiricalAnalysisof Unauthorized
Practice Prohibitions,34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6-33 (1981) [hereinafter Unauthorized Practice]
(detailing history of unauthorized practice prohibitions and current state of enforcement);
Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
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entry regulation controls both who is in (licensed lawyers) and who
is out (everyone else, from title companies to real estate agents to
accountants). State supreme courts are nominally in charge of entry
regulation in almost every state,0 2 but generally have delegated
03
their authority to unified state bar associations or to a separate
agency.0 4
Conduct regulation controls the behavior of lawyers once they are
licensed. All fifty states regulate lawyer conduct primarily through
written rules, typically adapting the ABA's Rules of Professional
0 5 These rules are
Conduct or Code of Professional Responsibility.
primarily enforced through bar disciplinary authorities or separate

209, 211 (1990) (discussing different state approaches to defining unauthorized practice of
law). These limitations have been criticized as the clearest example of self-serving and
anticompetitive lawyer regulation. See Barton, supra note 7, at 452, 456 (questioning
whether there is need for protection for public from substandard lawyers); Rhode,
Unauthorized Practice, supra, at 301 (describing survey of public that holds that many
activities could be handled by nonlawyers). There is no single understanding of what it
means to engage in the "practice of law." See CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR
ASS'N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 454 (1999).
m In forty-two states, the supreme court alone controls admission to the bar. BAR
REQUIREMENTS, supra note 78, at 3-4. In seven of the remaining states, the authority is split
between the legislature and the supreme court. Id. For example, in Massachusetts, there
is a legislative statute granting authority to the supreme court. Id. In Virginia, the
legislature controls entry requirements with the assistance of the Board of Bar Examiners.
Id. For a general overview of current bar admission requirements, see generally id.; INST. OF
JUDICIAL ADMIN., BAR ADMISSION RULES AND STUDENT PRACTICE RULES (Fannie J. Klein ed.,
1978).
m See supra notes 140-59 and accompanying text.
Typically, this agency is known as the Board of Bar Examiners. For example, in
Delaware, bar admission is delegated to the Board of Bar Examiners of the Delaware
Supreme Court; in Colorado, to the Supreme Court Board of Law Examiners; and in Illinois,
to the Illinois Board of Admissions to the Bar. BAR REQUIREMENTS, supra note 78, at 43-46.
m See AM. BAR ASS'N LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, at 01:3 to 01:63
(2000) (listing state ethics rules); Gregory C. Sisk, Iowa's Legal Ethics Rules--It's Time to
Join the Crowd, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 279,283-85 (1999) (discussing history of legal ethics codes).
Forty-two states presently apply the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (with slight local
variations). AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, at xi (2000). California has not adopted the Rules or Code per se,
but has borrowed heavily from both in designing its regulations. STEPHEN GILLERS,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 5 (5th ed. 1998). Typically, federal
courts simply adopt "the rules of professional ethics adopted by the highest court of the state
in which the district court sits, and these rules are interpreted by reference to state court
decisions." Philip K Lyon & Bruce H. Phillips, Professional Responsibility in the Federal
Courts: Consistency is Cloaked in Confusion, 50 ARK. L. REV. 59, 60 (1997); see also Moulton,
supra note 164, at 97-98 '"Mhe majority of federal district courts incorporate by local rule the
conduct of the state in which they sit.").
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administrative agencies of the state supreme courts.3 16 Lawyer
conduct is also regulated by common-law legal malpractice claims..7
and informal norms of lawyer conduct.0 5

See Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and Performance, 15 YALE L. &
POLV REV. 193, 212-13 (1996) ('In some states, including some of the largest, the disciplinary
process is primarily a state bar association responsibility.... The current trend, however,
is for lawyer disciplinary enforcement functions to be performed by government bodies rather
than by the bar."); Christopher D. Kratovil, SeparatingDisabilityfrom Discipline: TheADA
andBar Discipline,78 TEx. L. REV. 993,995-96 (2000) (noting that state supreme courts have
largely delegated to state bar associations duty of enforcing conduct).
7 See Leubsdorf, supra note 6, at 101-02 (describing nature of malpractice claims
and
their effect upon lawyer behavior); Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice:No Lawyer or Client
is Safe, 47 FL& L. REV. 1, 22 (1995) (reporting on study of prevalence of attorney malpractice
actions). The tort of lawyer malpractice controls attorney behavior by forcing errant
attorneys to pay injured clients. See Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Reforming
Lawyers and Law Professors, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2583, 2601 (1996) ("Legal Malpractice [is], by
far, the predominant way in which lawyers are regulated."); Gary N. Schumann & Scott B.
Herlihy, The Impending Wave of Legal MalpracticeLitigation-Predictions,Analysis, and
Proposals for Change, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 143, 151-55 (1998) (examining attorney as
defendant). Malpractice insurance also has a significant effect. See Cohen, supra note 255,
at 307-46 (describing nature of insurance and role of malpractice insurance in regulating
attorney conduct); David A. Hyman, ProfessionalResponsibility, Legal Malpractice,and the
Eternal Triangle: Will Lawyers or Insurers Call the Shots?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 353, 355-80
(1997) (examining malpractice insurers as attorney regulators).
8 See Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Procedure Entitlements, Professionalism, and
Lawyering Norms, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 801, 802 (2000) (arguing that for lawyers "social
organization and, in particular, community norms are almost always more important
influences on individual conduct than formal rules"); Marianne M. Jennings, The Model Rules
and the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility Have Absolutely Nothing to Do with Ethics: The
Wally Cleaver Propositionas an Alternative, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 1223, 1251-54 (arguing that
following few simple norms would eliminate need for Rules of Professional Conduct); Wendel,
supra note 12, at 1955-85 (describing importance of social norms on attorney behavior).

